About Frédéric Filloux

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Google might not be a monopoly, after all

 

Despite its dominance, Google doesn’t fit the definition of a monopoly. Still, the Search giant’s growing disconnect from society could lead to serious missteps and, over time, to a weakened position. 

In last week’s column, I opined about the Open Internet Project’s anti-trust lawsuit against Google. Reactions showed divided views of the search engine’s position. Granted, Google is an extremely aggressive company, obsessed with growth, scalability, optimization — and also with its own vulnerability.

But is it really a monopoly in the traditional and historical sense? Probably not. Here is why, in four points:

1. The consent to dependency. It is always dangerous to be too dependent from a supplier one doesn’t control. This is the case in the (illegal) drug business. Price and supply will fluctuate at the whim of unpredictable people.This is what happens to those who build highly Google-dependent businesses such as e-commerce sites and content-farms that provide large quantities of cheap fodder in order to milk ad revenue from Google search-friendly tactics.

326_jaws
In the end, everything is a matter of trust (“Jaws”, courtesy of Louis Goldman)

Many news media brands have sealed their own fate by structuring their output so that 30% to 40% of their traffic is at the mercy of Google algorithms. I’m fascinated by the breadth and depth of the consensual ecosystem that is now built around the Google traffic pipeline: consulting firms helping media rank better in Google Search and Google News; software that rephrases headlines to make it more likely they’ll hit the top ranks; A/B testing on-the-fly that shows what the search engine might like best, etc.

For the media industry, what should have remained a marginal audience extension has turned into a vital stream of page views and revenue. I personally think this is dangerous in two ways. One, we replace the notion of relevance, reader interest, with a purely quantitative/algorithmic construct (listicles vs depth, BuzzFeed vs. ProPublica for instance). Such mechanistic practices further fuel the value deflation of original content. Two, the eagerness to please the algorithms distracts newsrooms, journalists, editors, from their job to find, develop, build intelligent news packages that will lift brand perception and elevate the reader’s mind (BuzzFeed and plenty of others are the quintessence of cheapening alienation.)

2. Choice and Competition. In 1904, Standard Oil Inc. controlled 91% of American oil production and refining, and 85% of sales. This practically inescapable monopoly was able to dictate prices and supply structure. As for Google, it indeed controls 90% of the search market in some regions (Europe especially, where fragmented markets, poor access to capital and other cultural factors prevented the emergence of tech giants.) Google combines its services (search, mail, maps, Android) to produce one of the most potent data gathering systems ever created. Note the emphasis: Google (a) didn’t invent the high tech data X-ray business, nor (b) is it the largest entity to collect gargantuan amounts of data. Read this Quartz article The nine companies that know more about you than Google or Facebook  and see how corporations such as Acxiom, Corelogic, Datalogix, eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, PeekYou, Rapleaf, and Recorded Future collect data on a gigantic scale, including court and public records information, or your gambling habit. Did they make you sign a consent form?

You want to escape Google? Use Bing, Yahoo, DuckDuckGo or Exalead for your web search, or go here to find a list of 40 alternatives. You don’t want your site to be indexed by Google? Insert a robot exclusion line in your html pages, and the hated crawler won’t see your content. You’re sick of Adwords in your pages or in Gmail? Use AdBlock plug-in, it’s even available for the Google Chrome browser. The same applies for storing your data, getting a digital map or web mail services. You’re “creeped out” by Google’s ability to reconstruct every move around your block or from one city to another by injecting data from your Android phone into Maps? You’re right! Google Maps Location History is frightening; to kill it, you can turn off your device’s geolocation, or use Windows Phone or an iPhone (be simply aware that they do exactly the same thing, but they don’t advertise it). Unlike public utilities, you can escape Google. Simply, its services are more convenient, perform well and… are better integrated, which gets us to our third point:

3. Transparent strategy. To Google’s credit, for the most part, its strategy is pretty transparent. What some see as a monopoly in the making is a deliberate — and open — strategy of systematic (and systemic) integration. Here is the chart I made few months ago:

326 graph_goolge

We could include several recent additions such as trip habits from Uber (don’t like it? Try Lyft, or better, a good old Parisian taxi – they don’t even take credit cards); or temperature setting patterns soon coming from Nest thermostats (if you chose to trust Tony Fadell’s promises)… Even Google X, the company’s moonshot factory (story in Fast Company) offers glimpses of Google’s future reach with the development of autonomous cars, projects to bring the internet to remote countries using balloons (see Project Loon) or other airborne platforms.

4. Innovation. Monopolies are known to kill innovation. That was the case with oil companies, cartels of car makers that discouraged alternate transportation systems, or even Microsoft which made our life miserable thanks to a pipeline of operating systems without real competition. By contrast, Google is obsessed with innovative projects seen as an absolute necessity for its survival. Some are good, other are bad, or remain in beta for years.

However, Google is already sowing the seeds of its own erosion. This company is terribly disconnected from the real world. This shows everywhere, from the minutest details of its employees daily life pampered in a overabundance of comfort and amenities that keep them inside a cosy bubble, to its own vital statistics (published by the company itself). Google is mostly white (61%), male (70%), recruits in major universities (in that order: Stanford, UC Berkeley, MIT, Carnegie Mellon, UCLA), with very little “blood” from fields other than scientific or technical. For a company that says it wants to connect its business to a myriad of sectors, such cultural blinders are a serious issue. Combined to the certainty of its own excellence, the result is a distorted view of the world in which the distinction between right and wrong can easily blur. A business practice internally considered virtuous because it supports the perpetuation of the company’s evangelistic vision of a better world can be seen as predatory in the “real” world. Hence a growing rift between the tech giant and its partners and customers, and the nations who host them.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

Google and the European media: Back to the Ice Age

 

Prominent members of the European press are joining a major EU-induced antitrust lawsuit against Google. The move is short on rationale and long on ideology. 

A couple of weeks ago, Axelle Lemaire, France’s deputy minister for digital affairs,  was quoted contending Google’s size and market power effectively prevented the emergence of a “French Google”. A rather surprising statement from a public official whose profile stands in sharp contrast to the customary high civil service profile. As an MP, Mrs Lemaire represents French citizens living overseas and holds dual French and Canadian citizenship; she got a Ph.D. in International Law at London’s King’s College as well as a Law degree at the Sorbonne. Ms. Lemaire then practiced Law in the UK and served as a parliamentary aide in the British House of Commons. Still, her distinguished and unusually “open” background didn’t help: She’s dead wrong about why there is no French Google.

The reasons for France’s “failure” to give birth to a Google-class search engine are simply summarized: Education and money. Google is a pure product of what France misses the most: a strong and diversified engineering pipeline supported by a business-oriented education system, and access to abundant capital. Take the famous (though controversial) Shanghai higher education ranking in computer science: France ranks in the 76 to 100 group with the University of Bordeaux; 101 to 150 for the highly regarded Ecole Normale Supérieure; and the much celebrated Ecole Polytechnique sits deep in the 150-200 group – with performance slowly degrading over the last ten years and a minuscule faculty of… 7 CS professors and assistants professors. That’s the reality of computer science education in the most prestigious engineering school in France. As for access to capital, two numbers say it all: according to its own trade association, the size of the French venture capital sector is 1/33th of the US’ while the GDP ratio is only 1 to 6. That’s for 2013; in 2012, the ratio was 1/46th, things are improving.

The structural weakness of French tech clearly isn’t Google’s fault. Which reveals the ideological facts-be-damned nature of the blame, an attitude broadly shared by other European countries.

A few weeks ago, a surreal event took place in Paris, at the Cité Universitaire Internationale de Paris (which wants to look like a Cambridge replica). There, the Open Internet Project uncovered the next European antitrust action against Google. On stage was an disparate crew: media executives from German and French companies; the former antitrust litigator Gary Reback known for his fight against Microsoft in the Nineties – and now said to help Microsoft in its fight against Google; Laurent Alexandre, a strange surgeon/entrepreneur and self-proclaimed visionary  living in Luxembourg Brussels where his company DNA Vision is headquartered, who almost got a standing ovation by explaining how Google intended to connect our brains to its gigantic neuronal network by around 2040; all of the above wrapped up with a speech from French Economy Minister Arnaud Montebourg who never misses an opportunity to apply his government’s seal on anti-imperialist initiatives.

The lawsuit alleges market distortion practices, discrimination in several guises, anticompetitive conduct, preference for its own vertical services at the expense of fairness in its search results, illegal use of data, etc. (The summary of EU allegations is here). The complaint paves the way for painstaking litigation that will drag on for years.

Among the eleven corporations or trade groups funding the lawsuit we find seven media entities, including the giant German Axel Springer GroupLagardère Active whose boss invoked the “moral obligation” to fight Google. There is also CCM Benchmark Group, a large diversified digital player whose boss, Benoît Sillard, had his own epiphany while speaking with Nikesh Arora in Mountain View a while ago. There and then, Mr. Sillard saw the search giant’s grand plan to dominate the digital world. (I paid a couple of visits to Google’s headquarters but was never granted such a religious experience – I will try again, I promise.)

Despite the media industry’s weight, the lawsuit fails to expose Google practices directly affecting the P&L of news providers. Indeed, some media companies have developed business that competes with Google verticals. That’s the case of Lagardère’s shopping site LeGuide.com but, again, the group’s CEO, Denis Olivennes, was long on whining and short on relevant facts. (The only fun element he mentioned was outside the scope of OIP’s legal action: with only €50m in revenue, LeGuide.com paid the same amount of taxes as Google whose French operation generates $1.6bn in revenue).

Needless to say, that doesn’t mean that Google couldn’t be using its power in questionable ways at the expense of scores of e-retailers. But as far as the media sector is concerned, gains largely outweigh losses as most web sites enjoy a boost in their traffic thanks to Google Search and Google News. (The value of Google-generated clicks is extremely difficult to assess — a subject for a future Monday Note.)

One fact remains obvious: In this legal action, media groups are being played to defend interests… that are not theirs.

In this whole affair, the French news media industry is putting itself in an awkward position. In February 2013, Google and the French government hammered a deal in which the tech giant committed €60m ($81m) over a 3-year period to fund digital projects run by the French press. (In 2013, according to the fund’s report, 23 projects have been started, totaling €16m in funding.) The agreement between Google and the French press stipulates that, for the duration of the deal, the French will refrain from suing Google on copyrights grounds – such as the use of snippets in search results. But those who signed the deal found themselves dragged in the OIP lawsuit through the GESTE, a legacy trade association – more talkative than effective – going back to the Minitel era  that supports the OIP lawsuit on antirust rather than copyrights grounds. (Those who signed the Google Funds agreement issues a convoluted communiqué to distance themselves from the OIP initiative.)

In Mountain View, many are upset by French media that, on one hand, get hefty subsidies and, on the other, file an anti-Google suit before the Europe Court of Justice. “Back home, the [Google] Fund always had its opponents”, a Google exec told me, “and now they have reasons to speak louder…” Will they be heard? It is unlikely that Google will pull the plug on the Fund, I’m told. But people I talk to also said that any renewal, under any form, now looks unlikely. So will be the extension of an innovation funding scheme in Germany — or elsewhere. “Google is at a loss when trying to develop peaceful relations with the French”, another Google insider told me… “We put our big EMEA [Europe and Middle East] headquarters in Paris, we created a nicely funded Cultural Institute, we fueled the innovation fund for the press, and now we are bitten by the same ones who take our subsidies…”

Regardless of its merits, the European press’ involvement in this antitrust case is ill-advised. It might throw the relationship with Google back to the Ice Age. As another Google exec said to me: “News media should not forget that we don’t need them to thrive…”

–frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

 

Legacy Media: The Missing Gene

 

Legacy media is at great risk of losing against tech culture. This is because incumbents miss a key driver: an obsession with their own mortality. Such missing paranoia gene negatively impacts every aspect of their business. 

At the last Code conference (the tech gathering hosted by Walter Mossberg and Kara Swisher), Google co-founder Sergey Brin made a surprising statement (at least to me): Asked by Swisher how Google sees itself, Brin responded in his usual terse manner: “There is the external and the internal view. For the outside, we are Goliath and the rest are Davids. From the inside, we are the Davids”. From someone who co-founded a $378bn market cap company that commands more than 80% of the global internet search, this is indeed an unexpected acknowledgement.

Sergey Brin’s statement echoes Bill Gates’ own view when, about fifteen years ago, he was asked about his biggest concern: Was it a decisive move or product by another big tech company? No, says, Gates, it is the fact that somewhere, somehow, a small group of people is inventing something that will change everything… With the rise of Google and Facebook, his fears came true on a scale he couldn’t even imagine. Roughly at the same time, Andy Grove, then CEO of Intel, published a book with a straightforward title: “Only the Paranoid Survives“. Among my favorites Grove quotes:

“Business success contains the seeds of its own destruction. The more successful you are, the more people want a chunk of your business and then another chunk and then another until there is nothing.”

Still, Intel wasn’t paranoid enough and completely missed the mobile revolution, leaving to ARM licensees the entire market of microprocessors for smartphones and tablets.

This deep-rooted sense of fragility is a potent engine of modern tech culture. It spurs companies to grow as fast as they can by raising lots of capital in the shortest possible time. It also drives them to capture market share by all means necessary (including the worst ones), and to develop a culture of excellence by hiring the best people at any cost while trimming the workforce as needed while obsessively maintaining a culture of agility to quickly learn form mistakes and to adapt to market conditions. Lastly, the ever-present sense of mortality drives rising tech companies to quickly erect barriers-to-entry and to generate network effects needed to keep incumbents at bay.

For a large part, these drives stem from these companies’ early history and culture. Most started combining a great idea with clever execution – as opposed to being born within an expensive infrastructure. Take Uber or AirBnB. Both started with a simple concept: harness digital tools to achieve swift and friction-free connections between customers and service providers. Gigantic infrastructure or utterly complicated applications weren’t required. Instead, the future of these companies was secured by a combination of flawless execution and fast growth (read this New York Times story about the Uber network effect challenge). Hence the rapid-fire rounds of financing that will boost Uber’s valuation to $17bn, allowing it to accelerate its worldwide expansion – and also combat a possible price war, as stated by its founder himself at the aforementioned Code Conference.

Unfortunately, paranoia-driven growth sometimes comes with ugly business practices. Examples abound: Amazon’s retaliation against publishers who fight its pricing conditions; Uber bullying tactics against its rival – followed by an apology; Google offering for free what others were used to sell, or distorting search results, etc.

Such behaviors leave the analog world completely flummoxed. Historical players had experienced nothing but a cosy competitive gentlemen-like environment, with a well-defined map of players. This left incumbents without the genes, the culture required to fight digital barbarians. Whether they are media dealing with Google, publishers negotiating with Amazon, hotels fighting Booking.com or AirBnB, or taxi confronting Uber, legacy players look like the proverbial deer caught in the headlights. In some instances, they created their own dependency to new powerful distributors (like websites whose traffic relies largely on Google), before realizing that it was time to sue the dope dealer. (This is exactly what the European press is doing by assigning Google before the European Court of Justice invoking antitrust violations — a subject for a future Monday Note). The appeal to legislators underlines the growing feeling of impotence vis-a-vis the take-no-prisoners approach of new digital players: Unable to respond on the business side, the old guard turns to political power to develop a legal (but short-lasting) containment strategy.

In the media industry, historic players never developed a sense of urgency. The situation varies from one market to another but, in many instances, the “too important to fail” was the dominant belief. It always amazed me: As I witnessed the rise of the digital sector – its obsession with fast growth, and its inevitable collision course with legacy media – incumbents were frozen in the quiet certitude that their role in society was in fact irreplaceable, and that under no circumstances they would be left to succumb to a distasteful Darwinian rule. This deep-rooted complacency is, for a large part, responsible for the current state of the media industry.

Back in 1997, Andy Grove’s book explained how to deal with change :

“The implication was that either the people in the room needed to change their areas of knowledge and expertise or people themselves needed to be changed” 

Instead, our industry made too few changes, too late. Since the first digital tremors hit business models ten years ago, we have been through one or two generations of managers in traditional media company. It is amazing to see how the same DNA is being replicated over and over. Some layers are moving faster than others, though. The higher you go in the food chain, the more people are penetrated by a sense of vital urgency. But the rank-and-file and middle management are holding back, unable to exit their comfort zone.

Earlier this year, the French newspaper Liberation chose the outdated slogan: “We are a Newspaper” in reaction to its new owners ideas (read this story in the NYT). Last week, Liberation opted to appoint as it editor-in-chief one of the strongest opponent to digital media (he is just out from the weekly Le Nouvel Observateur which he gently led into a quiet nursing home, leaving it worth next to nothing).

The gap between the managers of pure digital players and those who still lead legacy media has never been greater. Keenly aware of their own mortality, the former rely more than ever on brutal street-fight tactics, while the incumbents evolve at a different pace, still hoping that older models will resist longer than feared. For old media, it is time for a radical genetic alteration — if performed down to every layer of the media industry.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

 

The New York Times KPI’s

 

Here are numbers lifted form the NYT’s Innovation report (see last week) and other sources. 

Most of The New York Times’ reach comes from its digital audience. Regardless of the metric, viewers on desktops and mobile are crushing print readers.

321-1 - 450

Sources: ComScore for the monthly uniques (US only); internal count for the home page views per 24 hours period and Gfk MRI based on net weekday & Sunday readership, Fall 2013 survey.

321-2 - 450

321-3 - 450

In theory, the Times can get rid of print. Digital revenue far exceeds the cost of running the newsroom, which amounts to $200m a year for 1300 writers and editors. Even if you add $20m for the 200 technical staff needed to run digital operations, and even 30% more for overhead, sales, marketing, and support staff, the result would still be a substantial profit  — but would advertisers come in the same way for a digital-only product?

321-4 - 450

The ad market seems to reward quality journalism over aggregation and listicles: The NYTimes.com monetizes itself three times better than Business Insider and nineteen times better than BuzzFeed. For this graph I simply divided annual advertising revenue for each media by the number of monthly users: 30m UVs for the NYT, 12m UVs for Business Insider according to ComScore figures quoted in this 247wallst story, and a revenue estimated at $20m by Reuters. (Had I used a 25m UVs assumption, BI’s ARPU would have been only $0.80 per visitor and per year).

321-5 - 450

The Times is known to have invested a lot in its digital subscription system (760,000 subs to date). It turns out to have been worth every penny. For those who doubt the paid model’s efficiency, The New York Times provides a great blueprint for quality media.

–frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com 

 

Time to Rethink the Newspaper. Seriously.

 

The newspaper’s lingering preeminence keeps pulling legacy media downward. Their inability to challenge the old sovereign’s status precludes every step of a critically needed modernization. (Part of a series).  

This column was scheduled to appear in the next two or three weeks. Then, on Thursday, the thick Innovation report by an ad hoc New Times task force came to the fore. Like many media watchers, I downloaded its 97 pages PDF , printed it (yes) and carefully annotated it. A lot has been written about it and I’m not going to add my own exegesis on top of numerous others. You can look at the always competent viewpoint from Nieman Lab’s Joshua Benton who sees The leaked New York Times innovation report as one of the key documents of this media age. (Other good coverage includes Politico and Capital New York — I’m linking to the NYT tag, then you’ll have all the stories pertaining to Jill Abramson’s brutal firing as well).

320-Innovation_full

This report is important one for two main reasons:

— The New York Times is viewed as one of the few traditional media to have successfully morphed into a spectacular digital machine. This backdrop gives a strong resonance to the report because many news organizations haven’t achieved half of what the NYT did, whether the metric is the performance of its digital subscription model, or its achievements in high-yield advertising – all while keeping its impregnable ability to collect Pulitzer prizes.

— We rarely, if ever, see an internal analysis expressed in such bold terms. Usually, to avoid ruffling feathers, such reports are heavily edited – which ends up being the best way to preserve the status quo. Even more, mastheads tend to distance themselves from endorsing conclusions coming from the “management crowd” – a coldly demeaning phrase. But, it the Times case, the report was expressly endorsed by the top editors (Abramson and her then second-in-command Dean Baquet who now leads the shop.)

Let’s then focus back to this column’s original intent: Why reinvent the newspaper, quickly and thoroughly.

Until last week, the reference on the matter was an email sent in January 2013 by Lionel Barber, the Financial Times editor (full-text in the Guardian), in which he sets a clear roadmap to shifting resources from print to digital:

I now want to set out in detail how we propose to reshape the FT for the digital age. (…)

[We] are proposing a shift of some resources from night work to day and from print to digital. This requires an FT-wide initiative to train our journalists to operate to the best of their abilities. And it requires decisive leadership. (…)

On unified news desks, we need to become content editors rather than page editors. We must rethink how we publish our content, when and in what form, whether conventional news, blogs, video or social media.

 A year later, key numbers for the FT are impressive:

— A 2013 profit of £55m ($92m, €67m) for the FT Group (which includes the 50% stake Pearson owns in the Economist Group); that’s an increase of 17%, while sales are slightly down by 1% to £449m ( $755m, €551m)

— 415,000 digital subscribers (+31% in one year) who now account for two-thirds of the FT’s total audience (652,000 altogether: +8%, including a staggering 60% growth in corporate users at 260,000)

— A rise in digital subscribers that offsets the decline in advertising now accounting for 32% of FT Group revenue vs. 52% in 2008.

— For the first time, in 2013, FT digital content revenue exceeded print content.

The FT might be on sale – but its management did quite well.

Echoing Lionel Barber’s view of resources reassignments are the equally strong terms from The New York Times’Innovation Report:

In the coming years, The New York Times needs to accelerate its transition from a newspaper that also produces a rich and impressive digital report to a digital publication that also produces a rich and impressive newspaper. This is not a matter of semantics. It is a critical, difficult and, at times, painful transformation that will require us to rethink much of what we do every day. [page 81] 

Stories are typically filed late in the day. Our mobile apps are organized by print sections. Desks meticulously lay out their sections but spend little time thinking about social strategies. Traditional reporting skills are the top priority in hiring and promotion. The habits and traditions built over a century and a half of putting out the paper are a powerful, conservative force as we transition to digital — none more so than the gravitational pull of Page One. [It] has become increasingly clear that we are not moving with enough urgency. [page 59]

The newsroom should begin an intensive review of its print traditions and digital needs — and create a road map for the difficult transition ahead. We need to know where we are, where we’re headed and where we want to go. [page 82]

These quotes from a news organization that never gave up on great journalism will be helpful to those who desperately struggle to transform newsrooms. It is also a plea for the necessity of dumping the obdurate print-first obsession:

— It precludes modernizing the recruiting process as journalists are still too often picked for their writing capabilities while many other talents are needed.

— It limits audience development initiatives. In today’s print-oriented newsrooms, most writers and editors consider their jobs done once the story is filed in the CMS (Content Management System). Unfortunately, in every fast-growing digital media outlets such as Buzzfeed, The HuffPo, Politico, Quartz, Vox Media, now part of the competitive landscape, throwing the story online is actually just the beginning. The ability to cause a news item to reverberate around the social sphere is now as important as being a good writer.

— As stated in the Times report, convincing the masthead on the mandatory resource-shifting in only part of the journey; most of the transformation’s weight lies on the shoulders of the rank and file in the newsroom.

— At the NYT as everywhere else, the old guard (regardless of age, actually), is the main obstacle to the necessary rapprochement between the editorial and the business side. For instance, by rejecting the idea that Branded Content would greatly benefit from the newsroom expertise (although everyone agrees that a news writer should never be asked to write advertorial), or that a conference is indeed an editorial initiative directed to a valuable audience segment, such conservative postures are actually shrinking the company down to its most fragile component.

— The same goes for the analytics arsenal. I heard scores of examples in which newsrooms call for more dashboards and indicators, but seldom use them. Editors should be supported by tactical analytics teams (including at the editorial meeting level) that will provide immediate and mi-terms trends, as well as editorial decision-making tools.

One of the most difficult part of the transformation of legacy media is not addressed in the Times Innovation report nor in the FT’s exposé. It pertains to the future of the physical newspapers itself (the layout of the Times remains terribly out-of-date): How should it evolve? What should be its primary goals in order to address and seduce a readership now overwhelmed by commodity news? What should be the main KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) of a modern newspapers? What about content: types of stories, length, timelessness, value-added? Should it actually remain a daily?

(To be continued…)

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

 

The Ripple Effects of Disruptive Models

 

Last week, we discussed the impact of services such as Uber or Airbnb. More broadly, no sectors is immune to major overhauls. Today, we’ll have a look at the impact of Disruptors. 

Nested in Paris’ Le Marais neighborhood, a clever incubator/think-thank called TheFamily, made its mission to chronicle the digital transformation of our society. Largely inspired by the iconic Ycombinator incubator, TheFamily funds and provides all sorts of services to a hundred plus startups. But it also wants to rattle the establishment with an activist posture. Paraphrasing the “Barbarians at the Gate” book title, the incubator hosts a conference series titled Les Barbares Attaquent (Barbarians On The Attack) that examines all the sectors to be impacted by the digital tidal wave.

The latest event (#18) featured the book industry. Prior to that, human resources, retail, luxury, housing & construction, health, transportation, education, garment industry, consulting, insurance, finance and other sectors were dissected by TheFamily partners and guest speakers. Each time with a larger attendance.

One of the founders, Nicolas Colin, recently made headlines when his blog post (fr) denounced the notoriously archaic parisian taxi lobby (see previous Monday Note), triggering a lawsuit from Nicolas Rousselet, the owner of the main French taxi company G7. (Nicolas is the son of André Rousselet, himself one of former president François Mitterrand’s favorite oligarchs, anointed TV mogul in the late Eighties). By suing the blogger, Rousselet Jr. wanted to shut down any criticism of his company’s unrelenting conservatism. In fact, he completely underestimated the reaction of the French digital multitude that rallied en masse to support the blogger (and the media La Tribune, that republished the infamous post.)

This little Gallic tale illustrates the split between the old and the new economy. It could have happened in Brussels, Berlin or San Francisco where lobbies furiously oppose the rise of Disruptors that threaten transportation or short-term rental housing — among other things.

Before we go further, let’s look at the engine of the Disruptors’ phenomenal growth. It can be summed up to one phrase: unprecedented access to capital.

When it comes to technology, Uber or Airbnb are not rocket science. The platform and the algorithm needed to efficiently match supply & demand have been indeed brilliantly implemented, but there is no need beyond off-the-shelf technologies to set up the whole thing. By contrast, when Google started in 1998, it did stretch the limits of the technology of the day (networking and computing power); as for Facebook, despite the relative crudeness of the original concept, it had to deal very early with scalability issues. Actually on its very first day, Mark Zuckerberg’s hottest girl matching system (how nice) crashed Harvard’s network. No such headache for Uber or Airbnb who rely on proven technologies: cellular network, mapping, databases, LAMP-based softwares. As shown in the following three graphs, funding has been equally abundant for these areas:

319-google 319 facebook 319 uber 319 Airbnb

Not only have investors poured big money in Uber and Airbnb but they did so extremely fast, boosting the valuation of these two companies to staggering levels. Since there is very little technology involved, where did the money go? Mostly to market share acquisitions, the only way to leave the competition in the dust for good. Take Airbnb: in just one year, its number of listed spaces grew more than doubled to 500,000 listings in 33,000 cities and 192 countries. Its $10bn valuation puts it head-to-head with the giant group Accor that operates 3500 brick-and-mortar hotels and 450,000 rooms.

In these new models, the American venture capital ecosystem is acting as a weapon of mass domination. When Uber collects more than $300 million in VC money to expand in 100 cities worldwide, its London-based competitor HailO got “only” $77m and when it comes to the French LeCab, it only raised €11m ($15m). It shows how anemic the French system is when it comes to funding its startups; instead of patting the registered cabs sector in the back with demagogic promises, the successive digital economy ministers would have been better advised to act decisively to stimulate access to capital.

Still, the European way of resisting these new models won’t last for long. To be sure, in Brussels, the ill-named “ministry of mobility” decided to simply forbid Uber-like system; in France, the resistance is more messy when hundreds of yelling taxi divers blocked main streets and airport accesses. But grass-root movements are likely to morph into a more anglo-saxon-like lobbying, with highly paid professional hired to defend special interests.

Consider this: between 1998 and 2013, the amount spent in Washington DC alone by various lobbies has grown x16 in constant dollars to a staggering $3.23bn. Today, tech firms are the fourth contributor after pharmaceuticals, insurance and oil & gas: when a big pharma spend $1.00 to influence lawmakers, tech companies now spend $0.63 and the gap is closing.

Why am I mentioning this? It’s because the capital raised by Disruptors will inevitably find its way to effective lobbyism in Brussels (at the European Commission), and eventually in Paris or Berlin.

Disruptors’ lobbyists will argue that new urban transportations system and peer-to-peer housing rental do more good than harm in the community. And for the most part, they might be right. Sharing cars in congested cities via system such as RelayRides definitely makes sense from a environment standpoint when any individual car stays idle 95% of the time. A survey conducted by UC Berkeley (pdf here) on a 6,000 San Francisco residents participating on car-sharing system revealed a drop of 50% in the personal car ownership (the auto industry might not like it, but our lungs will.)

On the economic side, there is no shortage or arguments either. Terminating the paid-for license system (the so-called Medallion) would free €3 billion in Paris, and $10 billion in New York, sums now immobilized and promised to an inexorable deflation. In times of raising inequality, maybe it is not such a bad idea to let people make extra money by renting their apartment or their car — with limitations, of course. To put some figures on the idea: an Airbnb host in San Francisco is making $9,300 per year on average by renting his/er property 58 nights. As for those who makes their personal car available for sharing though RelayRides, they make on average $250 a month.

As for the hotel industry, evidence shows Airbnb’s growth to have very little impact. According to the Boston University School of Management, in the state of Texas, a growth of 1% in Airbnb supply translated into only a 0,05% decrease in the revenue of 4,000 hotels surveyed, while a single percentage point of increase in the supply of regular hotels rooms translated into a 0.29% decrease — 20 times more — in Texas hotel revenues. Of course, cheap hotels are more impacted than the local Hyatt.

Between consumers who are voting with their smartphones, enjoying Uber or Airbnb, and the fact that Disruptors are undoubtedly beneficial to the community, regulators and lawmakers will have hard time defending the status quo.

In fact, they are left with two levers: making sure that the consumer is properly protected form any abuse (that’s already the case, basically) and dealing smartly with the tax issue. The digital economy has a long track-record of linking success to hubris — in practical terms, it means a strong disregard for local tax systems. Here in Europe, the first thing Uber and Airbnb did was setting most of their operations in tax-friendly places such as Luxembourg or Ireland — like Apple or Google before them. On the long run, that’s obviously a mistake as politicians will seize on the opportunity to further single out these new models. In fact, Disruptors would be well-advised to play by the rules in order to insure the sustainability of their services.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

Uber, Airbnb vs Cartels and Regulators

 

Disruptive models for transportation or accommodations are perfect illustrations for the gap between friction-free, agile new models and the cohort of status quo defenders. For their part, regulators, lost as they are in digital translation, are worse than powerless. (Part of an series on Disruptors)  

Last week, a member of the French Parliament released a long-awaited report addressing the fight between taxi-cabs and digital-era car services such as Uber. In the meantime, the new socialist mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, is training her guns on Airbnb, the acclaimed lodging system that is making a killing in the capital.

Not all the disruptors are Ugly Americans, though. Local startups take advantage of an unfortunate side of French culture – bad service at high prices – to put a dent in established markets. To name but a few: Drivy, a car rental system between individual, offers a inexpensive service available 24/7 (most French car rental agencies in Paris downtown are closed on Sundays) and, thanks to the backing of the German insurer Allianz, the company has the resources to grow; similarly, TripnDrive offers free airport parking if you make your car available for rental (of course you get paid if the car is actually rented), again with the backing of a major insurer.

What’s going on in Europe is interesting. Let’s focus on Uber (a serious knee injury made me an assiduous customer of Uber and drivers gave me lots of details about their economics). The office of the Prime Minister commissioned a report after last January’s violent protests by registered cabs who blocked airports accesses and attacked some Uber cars. In France, every government from right to left, has a solid track record of yielding to street protests, which explains why the country is so immune to structural reforms such as the ones implemented in Canada or Sweden. To the PM’s credit, hearings where thorough and the report (PDF here in French) provides a detailed view of the situation. To make it short, city cabs are artificially limited to 17,636 cars for the Greater Paris, thanks to a license system that cost around €200,000 in Paris (€300,000 in Nice or Cannes; in New York a medallion can fetch $1 million). Such malthusian, lobby-driven policies lead to poor supply: Only 3 cabs for 1000 inhabitants in Paris, vs. 13,5 in NYC, 11 in London, 8 in San Francisco, 7 in Seoul, etc.

Practically, a Paris cab driver willing to work as an independent (as many do) must cough up close to €300,000 ($415,000) — that will include the mandatory license, the car, equipment, affiliation to a dispatching system, insurance —  before earning a single euro. Should h/she should choose to lease a taxi, the cost will be €4500 per month for the whole setup. No wonder why taxi drivers are jealously defending their expensive turf.

On the service side, it’s not a pretty sight: filthy cars, credit cards not accepted, beware if you don’t tip, rough manners (like in a bistro, clients are always a pain), endless tales of foreigners overcharged, no cars in sight when it rains, if you book it, expect an “approach fee” of €10-15 (plus €7 minimum fee, plus $35 per hour of waiting time or traffic jam), you’re expected have change on you, etc.  I feel bad conveying such a picture, but that is exactly the situation.

Needless to say, this left a wide open field to Uber-like systems that offer all the agility of modern digital services. Based on multiple interviews I made during my daily trips:
– Drivers are much younger than regular taxi drivers; the oldest ones are former cab drivers who hastily sold their beloved license before it depreciates.
– Above all, they enjoy the freedom of working whenever they want (especially when the demand is high) and the simplicity of the whole process.
– Most want to develop a business around it (some share a sedan with an associate and develop their own clientèle).
– The entry price is much lower. No license needed to operate, and if the driver cannot or will not invest, rental is much cheaper: €2,000/month max, versus €4,500 for a registered cab.
– A swift and friction-free system for booking and paying (no-money exchange with the driver).
– Greater security for the driver who doesn’t carry cash and whose customers are duly identified in the system.

The French government’s response? Restriction and demagoguery. After the cabs’ violent outburst, the administration decided to freeze car service registrations. Today, the report’s authors are willing to constrain Uber’s development.

For instance, it recommends to forbid what it calls “digital hailing”, i.e, the ability to visualize on the app the nearest cab and hiring it, like here:

uber-geol

This possibility of visual geolocation would be left exclusively to registered cabs (although none of them use any app). Uber and its likes would be restricted to advanced reservation — which turns to be a fine line: Uber’s geolocation system is powered by FourSquare’s database of various places. Practically it means booking a Uber car from the Café de Flore  by name is fine, but I can’t use the street address of the place. The parliamentary report is filled with such nonsense and betrays a deliberate disregard for the user perspective (a notion not even mentioned in the opus.)

Legislators and lobbies are missing a key point here. What users enjoy the most with services like Uber or Airbnb are two things:

(a) The lightness and the reliability of the intermediation : an app acts as a trusted third party that, in addition, will smartly address the supply and demand issue. As an example, next month, Uber is going to dispatch more than 100 of its best limo drivers for the Cannes Film Festival to address the surge in demand (apparently, there is so much work on the Croisette that local cabs are willing to tolerate the newcomers.)

(b) The frictionless and robust transaction system: The cell phone is the sole payment vector in the case of Uber, and Airbnb is acting as an escrow agent that guarantees the transaction for both parties.

By and large, the European resistance to the digital modernization of commercial services is driven by two concurrent ideological postures: defense of well-established, well-identified leagues — and strong anti-americanism.

In Brussels, on April 15th, a court order issued a straightforward ban of application-powered car services such as Uber, triggering the anger of the European commissioner for digital policies Neelie Kroes (see also her adamant blog post):

As for the socialist French MP, while his report leans only softly in favor of the old-fashion cab system that no French government wants to upset, its own website clearly expresses his personal bias again what he calls “Uber’s Cow-boy behavior” (always the long-standing cliché) and the fact that Google is behind the service.

Disruptive models are growing like weeds. Everywhere.

Next week, we’ll explore four critical issues:

1. The long term macroeconomic impact of disruptors, once they’ll have percolated in almost every sectors; how to deal with heavily funded players (Uber and Airbnb are valued at $3.5bn and $10bn respectively, and the fact they are not willing to pay taxes in their local markets).

2. The social impact for the new breed of workers who enthusiastically — sometimes naively — embrace such newcomers.

3.  The cascading effects of disruptors that will call for a modernization of many connected sectors (e.g. all sorts insurances, funding systems) and the underlying factors that pave the way for earthquake-like disruptions.

4. The upcoming transformation of industry lobbies and its political impact.

This is just the beginning of the story.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

Religion is a safer bet than Facebook

 

Facebook’s incredible global reach and success appear to forestall challenges. In the long run, though, the social network’s growth and its frantic quest for new revenue sources raise questions. (First of two articles)    

Casting doubt on Facebook’s future is like going to Rome and questioning the existence of God. It’s not the right venue to do so. First, you can’t argue with figures, they’re overwhelming. Each institution features about the same number of devotees: 1.2 billion across the world. As for financials, Facebook’s annual report shows strong growth and wealth: $7.8bn in revenue for 2013 (+ 55% vs 2012), net income at $1.5bn and a $11bn cash pile. As for the Catholic Church, since it doesn’t not issue financial statements, we are left to guesstimates. Two years ago, a story in the Economist provided a back-of-the-envelope calculation putting the operating budget of the American Catholic Church alone to $170bn, the bulk being health and educational institutions, with $11bn for parishes where hardcore users are – which, for that part, is much better than Facebook.

Why, then, question Facebook’s future? Mainly for two reasons: ARPU evolution and diversification.

Let’s look at a few metrics. The most spectacular is the Monthly Active Users (MAUs) base: 1.23 billion people for the entire world. An interesting way to look at that number is to break down the global MAUs into geographic zones and combine those with ARPU numbers (calculated from the quarterly figures stated in the annual report). The results look like this:

316_facebook_arpu

Facebook’s long term challenge comes from these two factors: North American growth will be flat this year, and the rest of the world doesn’t bring much. The company is heavily and increasingly dependent on advertising: from 85% of its revenue in 2012 to 89% last year. Logically, its only option is to squeeze more money per user — which it steadily managed to do thus far. But, in the Facebook ecosystem, making more money from ads means milking more cash from users’ data. This, in turn, will lead to a greater invasion of privacy. It certainly doesn’t seem to bother Mark Zuckerberg, who is a transparency apologist.

Actually: Is he or was he?

As author David Kirkpatrick pointed out in his excellent opus, The Facebook Effect, Zuckerberg once said that “Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity” (and judging by FB’s content policy, anyone can wonder if putting a breast-feeding pictures a sign of depravation?)

That was then.

Now, to address privacy concerns, Facebook is said to consider anonymous logins. It’s probably a good idea to back off a bit on the totalitarian pitch quoted above, but since the extensive data-mining performed by the network is made much more valuable by its use of real user names, anonymous logins are sure to impact the ARPU in the more mature markets. Along that line of thought, in Europe, Facebook’s ARPU is less than half of what it is in the US & Canada: $8.04 vs. $18.70. This significantly lower number stems from privacy concerns that are much more developed in European countries. There, the 20-25 segment seems especially worried about the consequences of spending too much time on Facebook.

A remaining lever is what I’ll call the Big Tobacco strategy: Do elsewhere what you can no longer do on your home playing field. Facebook might not be as cynical as Philip Morris (reborn as Altria as an attempt to erase the stain), but it is undoubtedly bound to try and replicate its successful collect-and-milk consumer data mechanism.

This might take a while to achieve.

First because of the ultra-slim ARPU generated by emerging markets users. You might object that the Indian market, as an example, currently enjoys growth along two dimensions: more users, with growing incomes. Granted. But the more sophisticated the India market becomes, the more inclined it will be to create a social network much more attuned to its own culture than a Menlo Park-based system manned by geeks in hoodies. Never underestimate the power, nor the determination of locals. And, let’s not dream too much about a huge Chinese version of Facebook.

Also, for Facebook, the cost of operating its service will make the ARPU question one of growing urgency. Again, based on the 2013 annual report, FB’s Cost of Revenue — mostly infrastructure —  amounts to $1.9bn. Divided by the 757 million DAUs, it costs $2.5 per year to serve a single daily user, that is connecting to his/er pals, hosting photos, videos, etc. If we aggregate all the cost structure components (networking, giant data centers and also R&D, sales & marketing, administrative), the cost of taking care of a single daily user rise to $6.69 per year and $4.12 for a monthly user. It’s still fine for an American and a European, much less so for an Asian who brings a yearly ARPU of $3.15, or an African who brings a mere $2.64 (in theory, the strain on the infrastructure is roughly the same, regardless of user location).

But some will argue Facebook is doing quite well on mobile. Out of its 1.23 billion monthly users, FB says 945 million reach its service via a mobile each month and 556 million do so on a daily basis. And, as stated in its 10-K, mobile is at the core of Facebook’s future:

There are more than 1.5 billion internet users on personal computers, and more than three billion mobile users worldwide according to GSMA Wireless Intelligence, and we aspire to someday connect all of these people. 

Fine, but once again, the ARPU weakens the ambition. While a mobile subscriber in the US and Europe brings respectively $69 and $38 each year (source: GSMA), according to the Cellular Operator Association of India, a Indian mobile subscriber yields only $1.72 per year. This makes advertising projections a tricky exercise.

As it expands, Facebook’s current model will inevitably yield less and less money per user. Hence, its frenetic quest for diversification and service extensions — a topic we’ll address in a future Monday Note.

As for the Church, it certainly is a safer bet than Facebook: The user base is less volatile, the interface blends much better into local cultures, barriers to competitive entries are stronger (and much older), and believers have long sacrificed their privacy to articles of faith.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

 

Lessons from a good vertical: Skift.com

 

For digital media companies, creating good verticals that breed small but valuable audiences has become essential. On that subject, here are my takeaways following a conversation with Rafat Ali, founder and CEO of Skift.com. In 20 months, Rafat’s company has become a reference in the travel intelligence business. 

There is no excuse for not trying to build a vertical digital service (web site & mobile app) for a strong media company shifting to digital. As long as you have a powerful (not to be confused with profuse) newsroom coupled with a well-structured contents system, trying a foray in a specific domain is worth considering. As an example, see Atlantic Media, one of the most innovative media brands, as it deploys a series of verticals nested in its Government Executive Media Group. These units all generate small but extremely valuable and loyal audiences — and enviable revenue per user (more on the Atlantic in a future Monday Note).

Building a vertical is a mere matter of implementation, you might say. But a look below the surface shows how such process demands much more than merely putting a small group of good writers in a digital stable, and asking them to gather news on a specific subject.

That’s why Skift.com drew my attention. In less than twenty months, manned by only 9 people crammed in an mid-town Manhattan office, Skift.com has become a strong voice and a reference in the travel industry: airlines, booking systems, hotels, tour operators – and all the the sector’s disruptors.

OLYMPUS DIGITAL CAMERA

I met Rafat Ali five years ago in Hyderabad, India; we were both of speaking at the same conference. Rafat was about to exit his first and remarkable startup, PaidContent.org (a terrible name he now laughs off), one of the first blogs decoding the media industry’s transformation. After building it from scratch and spending eight exhausting years producing and editing stories, Rafat sold it to the Guardian for a reported $30m – right before the 2008 crisis. (Last year, PaidContent was acquired by GigaOm).

After a short transition, Rafat was free to go. So did he. In 2010, at the age of 36, he left for a two-year series of trips to Oman, Iceland, Burma, India (where he has family), radiating from his bases in New York and London. At last out of PaidContent’s trenches, he took the time to read a hundred books during his journeys. Following @rafat on Twitter, you could feel his excitement, and also his growing interest in the travel sector.

‘You have to remember, it was 2010, the iPad had just been launched, everyone was thinking about what to build on it’, said Rafat. His first idea was to re-invent the travel guide book for the iPad. But he soon realized how crappy the whole travel industry’s information ecosystem was: ‘I was blown away.’ While the transactional part of the travel business had been completely broken apart by a massive, unprecedented disintermediation — benefiting the customer, trade information remained frozen in the past, with its sets of professional printed publications perpetuating a jargon-filled verbiage offering little or no actionable intelligence, nor useful data

Nature (and digital business) abhors vacuum, so does Rafat Ali, who decided to fill the void. When asked to define Skift in a nutshell, he said this: ‘In late 2011, we wanted to build the Bloomberg News of travel’. (When it comes to business information, this is quite a goal. Never aim low, I can’t agree more.) Rafat’s wanted to build something based on a few concepts: rely heavily on data, capitalize on the open-web, use APIs aggressively (to connect with third party data sets), aim at professionals, consultants, experts, and — last but not the least — prosumers who often know more than merchants. (Read Rafat’s post on the “Mediata” Startups).

The other key to Skift’s concept — which means shift in Danish — was tearing apart the silo culture that plagued the travel industry for decades: ‘You have airlines, airports, cruises, hotels, technology… All of these silos have collapsed in global interconnected megatrends, and we knew we could make our voice heard across all…’, explained Rafat while pointing at this graph:

SkiftCircularGraphic-b
Graph ©
Skift.com

As far as editorial is concerned, Rafat believes journalistic content is needed to create addiction, daily use, while-data related products generate usefulness, stickiness, loyalty and, ultimately, monetization. Content-wise, at the beginning, the site was built on four “legs”: aggregation (collecting headlines); curation (with a tweet-length phrase to describe a story); licensed content (full articles brought from news providers); and originally produced articles. Today, Skift is down to two items: 40% of articles are licensed (mostly Newscred) and 60% are original content — about 15-20 short business stories (produced by a staff of three…)

Business-wise, Skift positioned itself primarily as a B2B company, then secondarily as B2B-2C. Its traffic is still modest (1m UVs/mo), but growing fast; so does its newsletter business, expected to reach 75,000 subscribers by year end. No mobile apps in sight as the mobile web works well for Skift: mobile users account for 35% of web traffic and 50% of newsletters readings.

Skift sells few but high yield ads, to the point that Rafat is about to create a tiny studio to create bespoke brand contents. (Maintaining the mandatory Chinese wall could be tricky in such a small structure.)

But Skift’s true gem is its industry dashboards and data collection system, a well-structured tree that leads to scores of statistics and rankings. Inside, you’ll learn that AirBnB — whose valuation is now higher than Hyatt — has a Skift Score (a combination of indicators) roughly twice the “bookings & tools” industry average. Or that Dutch airline KLM scores way better than the hippest Virgin Atlantic. Or that Hertz masters the social ecosystem way better than the trendy Über.

Using data analytics, Skift produces reports — short and updated twice a month (as opposed to quarterly “bibles” prone to quick obsolescence.) ‘We will focus mainly on marketing, strategy and technology to produce competitive intelligence’, said Skift’s CEO. Rafat’s intense focus on doing few things but doing them well extends to the obligatory conference business: Skift intends to do just a single event about the Future of Travel, in a similar fashion to Quartz’sThe Next Billion conference (see the #qznextbillion hashtag for a list of tweets linking to videos). In both cases, these events are built on strong editorial concepts, ‘We want to make a conference about leadership instead of a vendors-to-vendors type…’ said Rafat.

What’s next for Skift? First, an off-site staff meeting in Iceland. Actually, Rafat Ali is considering a global franchise set in Reykjavik. Less anecdotal, Skift founder wants to apply his news and contents formula beyond the travel industry to what he feels are interconnected sectors — at least in discretionary spending — namely food & beverage and retail sectors.

One final note. Looking at the state of travel information, I can’t help but discern a complete failure of traditional, legacy journalism. Too cozy with the main players and their corrupting PR machines, too filled-up with press junkets and freebies, the mainstream media coverage of this $6.5 trillion/260 million jobs sector has become mostly illegible. This leaves a large open field to new players.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

 

Dealing With Data Frenzy

 

Last week, I attended the Newspaper Association of America’s MXC conference in Denver. We were to focus on the publishers’ use of data. A hot topic that sometimes becomes overly broad and leads to unrealistic expectations. Here are some key points I made.   

For any digital publisher, relying on data is no longer an option nor a luxury. It has become a necessity. Each passing quarter confirms the demise of digital advertising: yields continues to fall, programmatic buying (most often operated by large third party players) takes over and continues to fuel deflation. Highly visible media brands — two years ago the Huffington Post, now BuzzFeed — deal with the issue by generating huge quantity of pages saturated with kittens and listicles, each yielding very low CPMs. At the other end of the spectrum, strong media houses develop customized, sophisticated campaigns for high-end brands (see examples on NYT’s IdeaLab page); they also fill their pages and apps with so-called Branded Content items — which very few publishers manage to implement correctly.

For news publishers, the use of data should focus on four goals:
— Increase advertising yields through smarter targeting
— Improve their editorial recommendation engines (hence raising the number of page views per visit)
— Up-sell ancillary products
— Raise the performance of their subscription system (if any.)

Over the recent years, the advertising community managed to find a new gun to shoot itself in the foot. It’s called targeted ads. Everyone has ugly anecdotes about those. Typically, the stories go like this: You do a web search for an item and quickly find it. In the following months you’re deluged by ads for the product you bought. The annoyance prompts many to opt for AdBlocking systems — I did (except for sites I’m in charge of), with no regret nor guilt.

To put it mildly, there is room for improvement, here.

Coming back to profiting from site users’ data, one good example I heard recently is a recent request made by a large airline to the Financial Times: “Find us people who travel on long haul flights and who log on FT.com more than four times per month and from locations scattered along our routes”, i.e. super-frequent flyers used to business or first class, etc. Thanks to IP location analysis yielding geospatial coordinates for each connection, the retrieval of such high-value clientele wasn’t overly complicated. The geolocation principle applies to other requests, such as finding residents of a specific city or suburb, in order to serve effective advertising.

When you think of profiling, use a passport analogy. Anyone who visit a site from a browser (it’s more complicated with mobile apps), is issued a passport in the form of an anonymous cookie, such as this one, injected in my computer by the New York Times:

nyt_cookie

As a digital subscriber, I have inherited no less than 113 cookies from the NYTimes, each one stored in my computer for a specific purpose. They come from every segment of my navigation (pages, sections, articles, blogs), each generates a “stamp” on the passport. The more stamps I get on my passport, the more NYTimes people knows about me. Over time, the process draws a finely defined profile.

The example I often use looks like this (my perspective is from a French business media company):

Based on her past navigation, the user ID:6547dgfc_9088 turned out to be:
– A woman in her 30’s
– Leaving in Toulouse [Thanks to the geolocation of her internet box] She works :
…in the aerospace industry
… most likely in a financial department
… with a special interest in European regulations
… at a fairly high position.
Then we should be able to serve her with:
– Local ads / adjusted for her income and likely tastes [she also visits our lifestyle sections & other online properties in our network] – Adjusted editorial recommendations [related stories] based on her sector and position
– A special deal for our next conference on corporate finance
– A notification when someone in our team or among our partners publishes a book (paper or digital) relevant to her interest
– An abstract of our annual in-depth survey on aerospace
– A sneak-peak at our partner’s COOC (Corporate Open Online Course) featuring four hours of talk by a prominent tax lawyer from Brussels [don't forget the Red Bull] – [And if she's not a subscriber] A promotional, customized, one-time newsletter featuring the economics of commercial airplanes, with past stories from our newsroom, curated links, etc., all of the above driving to the inevitable conclusion: this discerning individual should definitely take advantage of our one-time offer.    

This “internal” profiling can be spectacularly enhanced by working with a major profiling third party. As an example, the large European player Weborama has accumulated a staggering 70 million profiles for an internet population of 52 million French users (each person can be linked to multiple profiles.) All over Europe, Weborama has collected 210 million profiles, roughly 40% of Europeans web users. In our example, by tapping into such large databases, the profile of this upwardly moving female exec from Toulouse will be enhanced up to the minutest detail of her tastes and preferences.

For the media company, reaching such productive interplay between a profiled individual and its ability to serve her with relevant content, services and products requires a well-integrated system — and a critical mass of products.

Understanding someone’s social and semantical genome through internal an external profiling is only a part of the equation. Matching the customer’s profile to the company output (journalism, conferences, publications, surveys…) also demands that the genome of those products be precisely established. If we want to “talk” to the customer’s profile, a story must have its set of tags, keywords and metadata; so does the theme of an upcoming conference that must go beyond a basic presentation, or the description a book. Ideally, every single piece of what the news organization produces must have its semantic genome encoded in a standardized way.

In defining user profiles, media organizations must have a rich and diverse line-up of contents, services and ancillary products. The broader the spectrum of a media brand, the better. All things being equal in terms of editorial quality, an isolated media will be less well armed than a larger company that operates multiple properties ranging from editorial to e-commerce and uses those to construct a wide range of user profiles.

Much more than in print media, isolation is not an attractive option in the digital world.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com