About Jean-Louis Gassée

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Science Fiction: Apple Makes A Toaster Fridge…

 

…a supremely elegant one, naturally.

Plummeting iPad sales rekindle fantasies of a hybrid device, a version that adopts PC attributes, something like a better execution of the Microsoft Surface Pro concept. Or not.

For a company that has gained a well-deserved reputation for its genre-shifting — even genre-creating — devices, it might seem odd that these devices evolve relatively slowly, almost reluctantly, after they’ve been introduced.

It took five years for the iPhone to grow from its original 3.5” in 2007, to a doubled 326 ppi on the same screen size for the June 2010 iPhone 4, to a 5” screen for the 2012 iPhone 5.

In the meantime, Samsung’s 5.3” Galaxy Note, released in 2011, was quickly followed by a 5.5” phablet version. Not to be outdone, Sony’s 2013 Xperia Z Ultra reached 6.4” (160 mm). And nothing could match the growth spurt of the long-forgotten (and discontinued) Dell Streak: from 5” in 2010 to 7” a year later.

Moreover, Apple’s leadership has a reputation — again, well-deserved — of being dismissive of the notion that their inspired creations need to evolve. While dealing with the iPhone 4 antenna fracas at a specially convened press event in 2010, a feisty Steve Jobs took the opportunity to ridicule Apple’s Brobdingnagian smarphone rivals, calling them “Hummers”, predicting that no one will buy a phone so big “you can’t get your hand around it”.

A smaller iPad? Nah, you’d have to shave your fingertips. Quoting the Grand Master in October 2010 [emphasis mine]:

“While one could increase the resolution to make up some of the difference, it is meaningless unless your tablet also includes sandpaper, so that the user can sand down their fingers to around one-quarter of their present size. Apple has done expensive user testing on touch interfaces over many years, and we really understand this stuff.

There are clear limits of how close you can place physical elements on a touch screen, before users cannot reliably tap, flick or pinch them. This is one of the key reasons we think the 10-inch screen size is the minimum size required to create great tablet apps.

For his part, Tim Cook has repeatedly used the “toaster-fridge” metaphor to dismiss the idea that the iPad needs a keyboard… and to diss hybrid tablet-PC devices such as Microsoft’s Surface Pro, starting with an April 2012 Earnings Call [emphasis and stitching mine]:

“You can converge a toaster and a refrigerator, but those aren’t going to be pleasing to the user. […] We are not going to that party, but others might from a defensive point of view.”

Recently, however, Apple management has adopted a more nuanced position. In a May 2013 AllThings D interview, Tim Cook cautiously danced around the iPhone screen size topic — although he didn’t waste the opportunity to throw a barb at Samsung [insert and emphasis mine]:

“We haven’t [done a bigger screen] so far, that doesn’t shut off the future. It takes a lot of really detailed work to do a phone right when you do the hardware, the software and services around it. We’ve chosen to put our energy in getting those right and have made the choices in order to do that and we haven’t become defocused working multiple lines.”

Sixteen months later, Apple’s Fall 2014 smartphone line-up sports three screen sizes: the 4” iPhone 5C and 5S , the new 4.7” iPhone 6, and the 5.5” iPhone 6 Plus phablet.

Is this apostasy? Fecklessness?

Remarking on Jobs’ quotable but not-always-lasting pronouncements, Cook gives us this:

“[Jobs] would flip on something so fast that you would forget that he was the one taking the 180 degree polar [opposite] position the day before. I saw it daily. This is a gift, because things do change, and it takes courage to change. It takes courage to say, ‘I was wrong.’ I think he had that.”

That brings us to the future of the iPad. In the same interview (in 2012) Cook expressed high hopes for Apple’s tablet:

“The tablet market is going to be huge… As the ecosystem gets better and better and we continue to double down on making great products, I think the limit here is nowhere in sight.”

Less than two years after the sky-is-the-limit pronouncement, iPad unit sales started to head South and have now plummeted for three quarters in a row (- 2,3%, – 9% and – 13% for the latest period). This isn’t to say that the iPad is losing ground to its competitors, unless you include $50 models. Microsoft just claimed $903M in Surface Pro revenue for the quarter ended last September, which, at $1K per hybrid, would be .9M units, or double that number if the company only sold its $499 year-old model. For reference, 12.3M iPads were sold in the same period (I don’t know any company, other than Apple, that discloses its tablet unit volume).

As Andreessen Horowitz’s Benedict Evans felicitously tweets it: There’re 2 tablet markets: next-gen computing vision, where Apple has 80%, and, bigger but quite separate, the cheap TV/casual games device.”

Still, the concern remains. Does the iPad own 80% of a shrinking market, or can the Cupertino team reboot sales and fulfill Tim Cook’s The Limit Is Nowhere In Sight promise?

What’s missing?

A hint might lie in plain sight at the coffee shop next door. We see laptops, a Kindle reader or two, and iPads – many with an attached keyboard. Toaster-fridges!

But here’s Craig Federighi, Apple’s Sr. VP of Software Engineering, who is fond of dismissing talk of touch-screen Macs:

“We don’t think it’s the right interface, honestly.”

I find Federighi’s remark a bit facile. Yes, touching the screen makes much more ergonomic sense for a tablet than for a laptop, but in view of the turnabouts discussed above, I don’t quite know what to make of the honestly part.

Frederigh may be entombed in the OS X and iOS software caves, but can he honestly ignore the beautiful Apple Wireless Keyboard proposed as an iPad accessory, or the many Logitech, Incase, and Belkin keyboards offered in the company’s on-line store? (Amazon ranks such keyboards between #20 and #30 in their bestsellers lists.) Is he suborning others to commit the crime of toaster-fridging?

In any case, the iPad + keyboard combo is an incomplete solution. It’s not that the device suffers from a lack of apps. Despite its poor curation, the App Store’s 675,000 iPad apps offer productivity, entertainment, education, graphic composition and editing, music creation, story-telling, and many other tools. As Father Horace (Dediu) likes to put it, the iPad can be “hired to do interesting jobs”.

No, what’s missing is that the iOS user interface building blocks are not keyboard-friendly. And when you start to list what needs to be done, such as adding a cursor, the iPad hybrid looks more and more like a Mac…but a Mac with smaller margins. The 128GB iPad plus an Apple Keyboard rings up at $131 less than a 11”, 128GB MacBook Air. (As an added benefit, perhaps the Apple toaster-fridge would come bundled with Gene Munster’s repeatedly predicted TV Set.)

On to better science fiction.

Let’s imagine what might happen next quarter when Intel finally ships the long-promised Broadwell processors. The new chips’ primary selling point is reduced power consumption. The Broadwell probably won’t dislodge ARM SoCs from smartphones, but a reduced appetite for electricity could enable a smaller, slimmer, lighter MacBook Air 2, with or without a double (linear) density Retina display.

Now consider last quarter’s iPad and Mac numbers, compared to the previous year:

341_jlg_table

Mac units grew 25% year-on-year, while iPads experienced a 7% decrease.

You’re in Apple’s driver seat: Do you try to make the iPad feel more like a Mac despite the risks on many levels (internal engineering, app developers, UI issues), or do you let nature to take its course and let the segment of more demanding users gravitate to the Mac, cannibalizing iPad sales as a result? Put another way, are you willing to risk the satisfaction of users who enjoy “pure tablet” simplicity in order to win over customers who will naturally choose a nimbler Mac?

JLG@mondaynote.com

PS: John Kirk just published a column titled The Apple Mac Takes Its Place In The Post-PC World where he digs up a prophetic Gates quote and explains the rise of the Mac as the weapon of choice for power users.

The iPad’s Future

 

The new iPad Air 2 is more than a mere iteration, but the real revolution in the iPad line may be heralded by the introduction of the iPhone 6 Plus.

The new iPad Air 2 looks and feels terrific. Hold an iPad mini in one hand and an iPad Air 2 in the other —  they seem to weigh about the same. This is an illusion: The 341 gram mini is lighter than the 444 gram Air 2 (.75 vs .98 pounds; both with cellular equipment), but the Air 2 is almost impossibly thin. At 6.1 mm, the Air 2 makes the mini’s 7.4 mm feel bulky.

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The iPad Air 2 also has an improved screen, a better camera, enhanced motion capture, faster processing, and, perhaps most important, it has Touch ID, Apple’s fingerprint recognition system. This is a bigger deal than initially reported. For businesses that have increasingly stringent security requirements, Touch ID is a welcome replacement for annoying password entry and will help the selling iPads in “compliance-burdened” enterprises. (On this, and the rest of Apple’s announcements, see Charles Arthur’s column in The Guardian, IMHO the best overview.)

And liberation from the password or, more important, from lazy security, isn’t limited to IT-controlled environments. I hear from normal humans that they love the Apple Pay + Touch ID combination for their online shopping, an activity that was previously more convenient on a conventional PC.

If a MacBook Air showed up with a comparable pile of improvements, there would be oohs and aahs all over the Kommentariat. Instead, the slimmed-down, sped up iPad Air 2 has been met with either tepid, supercilious praise (“If the iPad has never appealed to you as a product, the Air 2 probably won’t change your mind”; CNET) or borderline dismissal on the grounds that it won’t fix iPad’s slowing sales (“But it is not clear that making the iPad Air 2 the Twiggy of tablet devices will be enough to reinvigorate Apple’s iPad sales”; NYT).

Indeed, after growing faster than anything in tech history, tablets have stalled. For the past three quarters unit sales have plummeted: iPad sales fell by 2.29% in the first (calendar) quarter of 2014 versus the same quarter in 2013, and they fell by 9% in Q2:

340_appl_tabl

(A thank-you to Apple for providing actual unit and revenue numbers for their product lines— does any other company do that?)

When Apple releases its fiscal Q4 numbers this coming Monday, we’ll find out how “poorly” the iPad did in the July to September period. We don’t expect the numbers to show a turn around, neither for the quarter and certainly not for the entire fiscal year.

Some folks look at these numbers and question the device’s future (Apple iPad Fad is Over). But technological viability and short-term sales effects are two different topics.

In The iPad Is a Tease last April and The Sweet Spot On Apple’s Racket in August, I tried to separate the merits of the tablet genre, which I see as established and durable, from the unreasonable expectations that arose from the sense of liberation from PC obfuscation. If you see the tablet as a one-for-one replacement for a PC, you’ll be disappointed, and the falling iPad sales will look like an inevitable skid into obsolescence. I flirted with membership in that camp when I accused the iPad of being unsympathetic to “ambitious” users (iPad and File Systems: Failure of Empathy; in my defense, that was in early 2013 — eons ago in tech time).

I’ve since recanted. Instead of a hybrid product as promoted by Microsoft, the sweet spot in Apple’s business model seems to be a tablet and a laptop, each one used for what it does best, unencumbered by hybridization.

As Tim Cook noted last week, Mac sales (laptops, mostly) grew 18% in the last reported quarter. This time, contrary to earlier expectations, it looks like the Mac is cannibalizing the iPad… not a bad “problem” to have. And it’s nothing like the evisceration of iPod sales after the iPhone was introduced. With the advent of the iPhone, the music player became an ingredient, it was no longer a standalone genre.

The new Air 2 won’t put iPad sales back on its previous growth curve… and I don’t think Apple is troubled by this. Making the iPad Air nimbler and more useful, a stand-out in a crowd of tablets, that’s Apple’s strategy, and it’s more than good enough — for the time being.

Talk of Apple’s game plan brings us to the iPhone 6 Plus. (These lengthening product names bring bad memories form the auto industry, but what can Apple do?) Does the new, larger iPhone say something about the future of the iPad mini?

I once thought the mini was the “real” iPad because I could carry it everywhere in a jacket pocket. But about two weeks ago I bought an iPhone 6 Plus, and I haven’t touched my mini since. (As punishment for my sin, I found 52 apps awaiting an update when I finally turned on the mini this morning…) Now I have an “iPad micro” in my (front) jeans pocket…and it makes phone calls.

With the introduction of the iPhone 6 Plus, the iDevices playing field has changed: A broader range of iPhones could “chase” the iPad upwards, creating opportunity for a beefier “iPad Pro”. Or perhaps Apple will use its now-proven microprocessor design muscle to make a lighter, nimbler MacBook Air.

Whatever Apple does next, the iPhone 6 Plus might prove to be a turning point.

JLG@mondaynote.com

HP’s Old Curses

 

Finally! HP did what everyone but its CEO and Board thought inevitable: They spun off the commoditized PC and printing businesses. This is an opportunity to look deeper into HP’s culture for roots of today’s probably unsolvable problems.

The visionary sheep of Corporate America are making a sharp 180º turn in remarkable lockstep. Conglomerates and diversification strategies are out. Focus, focus, focus is now the path to growth and earnings purity.

As reported in last week’s Monday Note, eBay’s John Donahoe no longer believes that eBay and PayPal “make sense together”, that splitting the companies “gives the kind of strategic focus and flexibility that we think will be necessary in the coming period”. This week, Symantec announced that it will spin off its storage division (née Veritas) so that “the businesses would be able to focus better on growth opportunities including M&A”.

And now Meg Whitman tells us that HP will be “a lot more nimble, a lot more focused” as two independent companies: HP Inc. for PCs and printers, Hewlett Packard Enterprises for everything else.

Spinning off the PC and printer business made sense three years ago when Léo Apotheker lost his CEO job for suggesting it, and it still makes sense today, but this doesn’t mean that an independent HP PC company will stay forever independent. In a declining PC market that they once dominated, HP has fallen behind Lenovo, the company that acquired IBM’s PC business and made the iconic ThinkPad even more ubiquitous. HP Inc. will also face a newly-energized Dell, as well as determined Asian makers such as Acer and Asus. That Acer is losing money and Asus’ profits have fallen by 24% will make the PC market even more prone to price wars and consolidation. It doesn’t take much imagination to foresee HP Inc. shareholders agitating for a sale.

Many think that Hewlett-Packard Enterprise’s future isn’t so bright, either. The company’s latest numbers show that the enterprise business, which competes with the likes of IBM, Oracle, and SAP, isn’t growing.  As with the PC business, such unexciting state of affairs leads to talk of consolidation, of the proverbial “merger of equals”.

Such unhappy prospects for what once was a pillar of Silicon Valley leads to bitter criticism of a succession of executives and of an almost surreal procession of bad Board decisions. Three years ago, I partook in such criticism in a Monday Note titled How Bad Boards Kill Companies: HP. This was after an even older column, The Incumbent’s Curse: HP, where I wistfully contemplated the company’s rise and fall.

I’m fascinated by the enduring power, both negative or positive, of corporate cultures, of the under-the-surface system of emotions and permissions. After thinking about it, I feel HP’s current problems are rooted more deeply and started far earlier than the Board’s decisions and the sorry parade of executives over the past 15 years.

Founded in 1939, HP spent a quarter century following one instinct: Make products for the guy at the next bench. HP engineers could identify with their customers because their customer were people just like them…it was nerd heaven.

HP’s line of pocket calculators is the exemplar of a company following its instincts. They worked well because they appealed to techies. The  amazingly successful HP-80 was a staple of the financial world; its successor, the HP 12-C, is still sold today.

But HP’s initial success bred a strain of Because We Can that led the company into markets for which its culture had no natural feeling. I’m not just referring to the bizarre attempt in 1977 to sell the HP-01 “smartwatch” through jewelry stores…

Hewlett_Packard_Digital_Watch_Modell_1_1977

No, I’m referring to computers. Not the technical/scientific desktop kind, but computers that were marketed to corporate IT departments. In the late ’60’s, HP embarked on the overly ambitious Omega project, a 32-bit, real-time computer that was cancelled in 1970. The Because We Can impulse of HP engineers wasn’t supported by a reliable internal representation of the customer’s ways, wants, and emotions. (A related but much more modest project, the 16-bit Alpha, ultimately led to the successful HP 3000 — but even the HP 3000 had a difficult birth.)

Similarly, when 8-bit microprocessors emerged in 1974, HP engineers had no insights into the desires of the unwashed hobbyist. They couldn’t understand why anyone would embrace designs that were clearly inferior to their pristine 16-bit 9800 series of desktop machines.

By the late 70’s the company was bisected into engineers who stuck to the “guy at the next bench” approach, and engineers who targeted the IT workers that they mistakenly thought they understood. Later, in 1999, the instrument engineers and products — the “real” HP to many of us — were split off into Agilent, a relatively small business that’s not very profitable. The company’s less than $7B in revenue is nothing compared to the more than $100B in yearly revenues for the pre-split HP.

In all industries, some companies manage to stick to their story, while others drift from the script. I’m thinking of Volkswagen and its 40-year old Golf (not the misbegotten Phaeton) versus Honda’s sprightly 1972 Civic hatchback that later lost its soul and turned into today’s banal little sedan. (To be fair, I see the Civic as alive and well in the Honda Fit.)

In the tech world, Oracle has kept to the plot – no doubt because the founder, Larry Ellison, is still at the helm after 37 years. Others, like Cisco, make bizarre acquisitions: Flip, a consumer camera company that it quickly shut down, and home networking company LinkSys (purchased at a time when CEO John Chambers called The Home his company’s next frontier). And now Cisco is going after the $19T (trillion!) Internet of Things.

The now dysfunctional Wintel lost the plot by letting the PC-centric intuitions that worked well for so long blind them to the fact mobile devices aren’t “PCs – only smaller”.

I have a personal feeling of melancholy when I see that the once mighty HP has drifted from its instincts. The company hired me in June 1968 to launch their first desktop computer on the French market. After years in the weeds, this was the chance of a lifetime for this geeky college drop-out. At the time I joined, HP’s vision was concentrated. They rarely acquired other companies…why buy what you can build yourself? That all changed, and in a big way, in the 90’s.

To this day, I’m grateful for the kindness and patience of the HP that took me in. It was the company that David Packard describes in The HP Way, not today’s tired conglomeration.

JLG@mondaynote.com

eBay Under New Management – Again

 

Apple Pay, not even launched yet, is already making waves. Apple’s payment system has caused eBay to move people and business units around.

Early in 2012, PayPal’s President, Scott Thompson, abruptly left the company to become CEO of Yahoo. During his four-year tenure at the eBay subsidiary, Thompson had doubled PayPal’s user population and increased payment volume by 26% per year to over $120B. So why did he leave? eBay CEO John Donahoe put it this way:

“Scott wanted to be a CEO, and that’s great. He felt the opportunity wasn’t going to come along again. He had the best non-CEO job in the world, but he wanted to be a CEO, and wanted to go for it.”

Yes, Thompson wanted to be CEO…of an independent PayPal, but Donahoe and the eBay Board wouldn’t have it.

Fast forward to this year. Carl Icahn believes that PayPal would be more creative and make more money for its shareholders if it were freed from eBay tangles, so he makes a non-binding proposal to separate PayPal from its parent company.

In a January 23rd, 2014 blog post, Donahoe rebuffs the offer and doubles down on his position:

“PayPal and eBay make sense together for many reasons. Let me highlight three that we believe are among the most important [emphasis his]:
One: eBay accelerates PayPal’s success.
Two: eBay data makes PayPal smarter.
And three: eBay funds PayPal’s growth.”

Donahoe prays at the Church of Synergy and Leverage: Together, eBay and PayPal will ascend to heights neither is able to reach on its own.

That was then.

Last week, Donahoe left the Church. He and the eBay Board announced their three-part game plan for 2015:

  • PayPal will become an independent company led by Dan Schulman (American Express, AT&T, Priceline, Virgin Mobile)
  • Devin Wenig, currently president of eBay Marketplace, will replace Donahoe as eBay CEO.
  • After the separation is complete, Donahoe will no longer have an executive role but will  serve on the Board of one or both companies

(Compensation packages for the new CEOs are detailed in this SEC filing.)

What happened?

In eBay’s Investor Presentation, Donahoe extolls the union’s accomplishments, but explains that “Now the Time is Right for Two World Class Independent Platforms” and that the decision to part company “[r]eflects confidence we can preserve relationships and avoid dis-synergies through arm’s-length operating agreements”.

Spoken like a true consultant. (Prior to joining eBay, Donahoe had a stellar career at Bain & Company, where his eBay CEO predecessor Meg Whitman also worked.)

There is a shorter explanation: Apple Pay.

Apple’s new payment system, tied to the iPhone 6, is supported by American Express, Visa, and MasterCard, and recognized by a number of merchants including Walgreens, Macy’s, Target, and Whole Foods.

This changes the competitive landscape in two ways.

The first is the gravitational well, the network effect: More participants will attract more participants. It remains to be seen how well Apple Pay will perform, but we know the Touch ID feature works well — better than this skeptical user expected, and better and more securely than its current competitors.

The second way Apple Pay changes the landscape is much more alarming to competitors: Business Model Disruption. For Apple, revenue from a payment system is peripheral, it’s yet another part of the larger ecosystem that sustains the iDevice money makers. To PayPal, of course, payment revenue is all there is.

This distinction isn’t clear to everyone. In a conversation in Paris last week, an otherwise sensible friend insisted that Apple Pay will be a “huge profit opportunity”. No, Apple will earn about $1 for every $700 charged through Apple Pay. In order to reach the $10B “unit of needle movement”, Apple Pay would have to transact $7T (trillion). For reference, 2013 US retail revenue was $4.5T.

According to their 2013 Annual Report, eBay processed about $180B in payments in 2013, yielding $6.1B in transaction revenues. For that same $180B, Apple would content itself with $270M….that’s about 0.15% of the company’s overall revenue.

When eBay purchased PayPal for $1.5B in 2002, the deal made sense — it certainly made much more sense than the later acquisition and disposition of Skype. In recent years, PayPal has grown faster than eBay’s Marketplaces business, to the point where the two were roughly equal last year ($6.1B vs $6.8B). Today, Wall Street values the combined companies at approximately $67B (although it will be interesting to see how much the PayPal “half” fetches).

The fast-growth, synergistic business Donahoe vigorously guarded last January has been kicked to the curb because its business model is threatened by Apple Pay.

It didn’t have to be that way. We’ve recently heard that PayPal and Apple had been in “massive” talks earlier this year…until Apple found out about PayPal’s partnership with Samsung, thus ending any hope of a collaboration with the Cupertino team. Recall that PayPal’s President David Marcus unexpectedly left the company last June to lead Facebook’s mobile messaging initiative. The official explanation at the time was that Marcus was simply looking for a new adventure, but it’s more likely that Marcus was frustrated with Donahoe:

“eBay CEO John Donahoe pushed for the Samsung deal even though PayPal president at the time, who left for Facebook following the Apple-PayPal deal collapse, David Marcus was ‘purposely categorically against the Samsung deal, knowing that it would jeopardize PayPal’s relationship with Apple.’”

Looking at the game board three months later, Donahoe dissolved the eBay-PayPal union and deliberately wrote himself out of a job — undoubtedly with the “help” of his Board.

In the meantime, we have PayPal’s reaction to Apple Pay: An ad mocking Apple for the selfies fracas. Yes, a number of individual iCloud accounts were compromised by clever social engineering techniques and outright password theft, but no one seriously believes the iCloud infrastructure itself was penetrated. Conversely, in May of this year, eBay suffered a massive security breach requiring all users to change their passwords because hackers did gain access to the company’s servers, something PayPal management chose to ignore.

Again, we don’t yet know if Apple’s payment system will live up to its promise, but with the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus looking like The Mother of All Upgrades (two weeks after the launch, people are still lining up outside Apple Stores), Apple Pay should be on solid ground on its rumored October 20th opening day. Nonetheless, with an ex-Amex exec at the helm of a soon independent PayPal, the payment game is going to be interesting.

JLG@mondaynote.com

BlackBerry: The Endgame

 

The BlackBerry was the first truly modern smartphone, the king of Personal Information Management On The Go. But under its modern presentation lurked its most fatal flaw, a software engine that couldn’t be adapted to the Smartphone 2.0 era.

Jet-lagged in New York City on January 4th 2007, just back from New Years in Paris, I left my West 54th Street hotel around 6am in search of coffee. At the corner of the Avenue of the Americas, I saw glowing Starbucks stores in every direction. I walked to the nearest one and lined up to get my first ration of the sacred fluid. Ahead of me, behind me, and on down the line, everyone held a BlackBerry, checking email and BBM messages, wearing a serious but professional frown. The BlackBerry was the de rigueur smartphone for bankers, lawyers, accountants, and anyone else who, like me, wanted to be seen as a four-star businessperson.

Five days later, on January 9th, Steve Jobs walked on stage holding an iPhone and the era of the BlackBerry, the Starbucks of smartphones, would soon be over. Even if it took three years for BlackBerry sales to start their plunge, the iPhone introduction truly was a turning point In BlackBerry’s life.

RIM (as the company was once called) shipped 2M Blackberries in the first quarter of 2007 and quickly ascended to a peak of 14.6M units by Q4 2010, only to fall back to pre-2007 levels by the end of 2013:

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Last week, BlackBerry Limited (now the name of the company) released its latest quarterly numbers and they are not good: Revenue plunged to $916M vs. $1.57B a year ago (-42%); the company lost $207M and shipped just 2.1M smartphones, more than a half-million shy of the Q1 2007 number. For reference, IDC tells us that the smartphone industry shipped about 300M units in the second quarter of 2014, with Android and iOS devices accounting for 96% of the global market.

Explanations abound for BlackBerry’s precipitous fall.

Many focus on the company’s leaders, with ex-CEO Jim Balsillie and RIM founder Mike Lazaridis taking the brunt of the criticism. In a March 2011 Monday Note uncharitably titled The Inmates Have Taken Over The Asylum, I quoted the colorful but enigmatic Jim Balsillie speaking in tongues:

“There’s tremendous turbulence in the ecosystem, of course, in mobility. And that’s sort of an obvious thing, but also there’s tremendous architectural contention at play. And so I’m going to really frame our mobile architectural distinction. We’ve taken two fundamentally different approaches in their causalness. It’s a causal difference, not just nuance. It’s not just a causal direction that I’m going to really articulate here—and feel free to go as deep as you want—it’s really as fundamental as causalness.”

This and a barely less bizarre Lazaridis discussion of “application tonnage” led one to wonder what had happened to the two people who had so energetically led RIM/BlackBerry to the top of the industry. Where did they take the wrong turn? What was the cause of the panic in their disoriented statements?

Software. I call it the Apple ][ syndrome.

Once upon a time, the Apple ][ was a friendly, capable, well-loved computer. Its internal software was reliable because of its simplicity: The operating system launched applications and managed the machine’s 8-bit CPU, memory, and peripherals. But the Apple ][ software wasn’t built from the modular architecture that we see in modern operating systems, so it couldn’t adapt as Moore’s Law allowed more powerful processors. A radical change was needed. Hence the internecine war between the Apple ][ and Steve Jobs’ Mac group.

Similarly, the BlackBerry had a simple, robust software engine that helped the company sell millions of devices to the business community, as well as to lay consumers. I recall how my spouse marveled at the disappearance of the sync cable when I moved her from a Palm to a Blackberry and when she saw her data emails, calendar and address book effortless fly from her PC to her new smartphone. (And her PC mechanic was happy to be freed from Hotsync Not Working calls.)

But like the Apple ][, advances in hardware and heightened customer expectations outran the software engine’s ability to evolve.

This isn’t something that escaped RIM’s management. As recounted in a well-documented Globe and Mail story, Mike Lazaridis quickly realized what he was against:

“Mike Lazaridis was at home on his treadmill and watching television when he first saw the Apple iPhone in early 2007. There were a few things he didn’t understand about the product. So, that summer, he pried one open to look inside and was shocked. It was like Apple had stuffed a Mac computer into a cellphone, he thought.

[…] the iPhone was a device that broke all the rules. The operating system alone took up 700 megabytes of memory, and the device used two processors. The entire BlackBerry ran on one processor and used 32 MB. Unlike the BlackBerry, the iPhone had a fully Internet-capable browser.”

So at a very early stage in the shift to the Smartphone 2.0 era, RIM understood the nature and extent of their problem: BlackBerry’s serviceable but outdated software engine was against a much more capable architecture. The BlackBerry was a generation behind.

It wasn’t until 2010 that RIM acquired QNX, a “Unix-ish” operating system that was first shipped in 1982 by Quantum Software Systems, founded by two Waterloo University students. Why did Lazaridis’ company take three years to act on the sharp, accurate recognition of its software problem? Three years were lost in attempts to tweak the old software engine, and in fights between Keyboard Forever! traditionalists and would-be adopters of a touch interface.

Adapting BlackBerry’s applications to QNX was more complicated than just fitting a new software engine into RIM’s product line. To start with, QNX didn’t have the thick layer of frameworks developers depend on to write their applications. These frameworks, which make up most of the 700 megabytes Lazaridis saw in the iPhone’s software engine, had to be rebuilt on top of a system that was well-respected in the real-time automotive, medical, and entertainment segment, but that was ill-suited for “normal” use.

To complicate things, the company had to struggle with its legacy, with existing applications and services. Which ones do we update for the new OS? which ones need to be rewritten from scratch? …and which ones do we drop entirely?

In reality, RIM was much more than three years behind iOS (and, later, Android). Depending on whom we listen to, the 2007 iPhone didn’t just didn’t stand on a modern (if incomplete) OS, it stood on 3 to 5 years of development, of trial and error.

BlackBerry had lost the software battle before it could even be fought.

All other factors that are invoked in explaining BlackBerry’s fall — company culture, hardware misdirections, loss of engineering talent — pale compared to the fundamentally unwinnable software battle.

(A side note: Two other players, Palm and Nokia, lost the battle for the same reason. Encumbered by once successful legacy platforms, they succumbed to the fresh approach taken by Android and iOS.)

Now under turnaround management, BlackBerry is looking for an exit. John Chen, the company’s new CEO, comes with a storied résumé that includes turning around database company Sybase and selling it to SAP in 2012. Surely, such an experienced executive doesn’t believe that the new keyboard-based BlackBerry Passport (or its Porsche Design sibling) can be the solution:

337_unnamed

Beyond serving the needs or wants of die-hard keyboard-only users, it’s hard to see the Passport gaining a foothold in the marketplace. Tepid reviews don’t help (“The Passport just doesn’t offer the tools I need to get my work done”); Android compatibility is a kludge; developers busy writing code for the two leading platforms won’t commit.

Chen, never departing from his optimistic script, touts BlackBerry’s security, Mobile Device Management, and the QNX operating system licenses for embedded industry applications.

None of this will move the needle in an appreciable way. And, because BlackBerry’s future is seen as uncertain, corporate customers who once used BlackBerry’s communication, security, and fleet management services continue to abandon their old supplier and turn to the likes of IBM and Good Technology.

The company isn’t in danger of a sudden financial death: Chen has more than $3B in cash at his disposal and the company burns about $35M of it every quarter. Blackberry’s current stock price says the company is worth about $5B, $2B more than its cash position. Therefore, Chen’s endgame is to sell the company, either whole or, more likely, in parts (IP portfolio, QNX OS…) for more than $2B net of cash.

Wall Street knows this, corporate customers know this, carriers looking at selling Passports and some services know this. And potential body parts buyers know this as well… and wait.

It’s not going to be pretty.

JLG@mondaynote.com

Apple Watch Is And Isn’t…

 

The Apple Watch isn’t just another iDevice, a “wearables” accessory to the Apple ecosystem. It’s a bold attempt to create a new kind of wrist-worn personal computer that looks like a smartwatch.

In previous Monday Notes dealing with the putative iWatch and other “wearables”, I thought the new product would be a nice add-on to the iDevices ecosystem — a bit player that would make the iPhone more desirable —  but that it wouldn’t move the needle, meaning $10B or more in revenue. I reasoned that a watch battery would be too small to feed a computer powerful enough to offer a wide range of apps and communications capabilities.

I was wrong.

In his demonstration (76 minutes into the official video) at the Cupertino Flint Center last Tuesday, Kevin Lynch, the Adobe defector who now runs the Apple Watch software engineering effort, showed us that the Watch isn’t just a shrunk-down iPhone: It can stand on its own, it has introduced an entire new genre of user interface, and will have its own App Store. The reinterpreted watch crown, a side button, touch and pressure on the face, plus voice all combine to a potentially rich and unique set of ways to interact with this newest very personal computer.

As Horace Dediu, our disruption scholar, puts it:

“The Apple Watch is as much a Watch as the iPhone is a Phone.”

The almost overwhelming richness of the user interface and of demonstrated apps led one twitterer to express a concern I can’t suppress:

Dr. Drang Apple Software Army

Will the software overwhelm the hardware, resulting in problematic battery-life, or befuddle normal humans?

Indeed, I remember how I worried when Steve Jobs first demonstrated the iPhone on January 9th, 2007 and stated it ran OS X. Knowing Jobs’ occasionally robust relationship with facts, I feared embarrassment down the road. But, no. When the iPhone shipped almost six months later, on June 29th, hackers immediately dissected it and discovered it ran a bona fide pared-down version of OS X — later renamed iOS.

As with the original iPhone, we might be six months away from a shipping product, time for Apple to fine-tune its software and work on the S1 SoC (System on a Chip) that drives the watch… and to put in place the supply chain and retail operations for the many Apple Watch variations.

In the meantime, some choice morsels of context will help as we consider the impact of Apple’s new Watch. We’ll start with Marc Newson, the famed designer (and Jony Ive’s friend and collaborator)  who just joined Apple. If you haven’t done so already, take a look at this video where Newson flips through his portfolio of watch and clock designs, including this striking reinterpretation of a great classic, the Atmos Clock from Jaeger-LeCoultre:

Newson Atmos

(The pages that Newson surveys in the video are taken from a book published by Taschen, the noted publisher of lovingly designed art books.)

For more context, follow this link supplied by Kontra (a.k.a. @counternotions) and regard the sea of watch designs from Newson’s Ikepod days, a company Newson left in 2012.

Newson Ikepod Manatee

Turning to the Apple Watch mega-site, we see a family resemblance:

Apple Watches

Professional watchmakers and industry executives seem to appreciate Newson’s influence and Apple’s efforts, although they are quick to point out that they don’t think the Apple Watch is a threat to their high-end wares (“It’s a techno-toy more than a watch, but what a fun toy,” says Laurent Picciotto of Chronopassion Paris).  Watches by SJX provides a quick collation of What The Watch Industry Thinks Of The Apple Watch. Swiss watchmaker Eric Giroud voices the majority opinion:

“It’s a nice product; good shape and amazing bracelet – thank you Marc Newson for the resurrection of the Ikepod strap. It’s difficult to speak about its impact on watchmaking because the Apple Watch is not a watch except that it is also worn on the wrist.”

Benjamin Clymer is the editor of Hodinkee, an on-line magazine dedicated to the world of watches. In a post titled A Watch Guy’s Thoughts On The Apple Watch, Clymer provides a review that’s informed by a deep personal knowledge of the watch scene. If you don’t have time to read the whole article — it’s a long piece — the author provides a good summary in the introduction [emphasis mine]:

[…] though I do not believe it poses any threat to haute horology manufactures, I do think the Apple Watch will be a big problem for low-priced quartz watches, and even some entry-level mechanical watches. In years to come, it could pose a larger threat to higher end brands, too. The reason? Apple got more details right on their watch than the vast majority of Swiss and Asian brands do with similarly priced watches, and those details add up to a really impressive piece of design. It offers so much more functionality than other digitals it’s almost embarrassing. But it’s not perfect, by any means.

Not everyone in the watch industry is so impressed. In an article titled Apple Watch ‘too feminine and looks like it was designed by students’, says LVMH executive, The Telegraph provides the money quote [emphasis mine]:

“To be totally honest, it looks like it was designed by a student in their first trimester,” added Mr Biver, who heads up the brands Tag Heuer, Zenith and Hublot.

The article evoked general hilarity and prompted more than one commenter to dig up the infelicitous Ed Colligan quote about the iPhone:

“PC guys are not going to just figure this out. They’re not going to just walk in.”

I’ll offer a rewrite for Jean-Claude Biver and his haute horlogerie colleagues:

“We like Apple products, they provide productivity and fun in our daily lives; we respect the sense of design Sir Jony and now Marc Newson bring to the company. I wish I could say more but, try as I might, I couldn’t get the livestream of Mr. Cook’s presentation to work in my Rue de Rive office in Geneva. First, there was this Mandarin dubbing, I can understand why but it was really annoying. Then, the transmission kept breaking down. I imagine that the tons of concrete now being poured for Apple’s next headquarters will provide a suitable resting place for the individual in charge.
Again, congratulations on a well-executed global launch.”

More seriously, let’s put streaming glitches glitches aside, they won’t matter in the longer run because they don’t concern the product itself. Last week’s launch, its detailed preparations, including the no-longer mysterious white building, attest to the gravity of Apple’s long-term ambition.

As additional evidence that the Apple Watch isn’t just a hobby, recall that the iPhone was initially offered in one size and one color. By comparison, the Apple Watch is an explosion: It comes in three styles and two sizes (in millimeters, 38 and 42, because that’s the trade vocabulary), two material/finishes for each style (silver and space gray, yellow or rose gold), nine bands for the basic Apple Watch, six for the Apple Watch Sport, and at least four for the gold Apple Watch Edition — and all with matching crown buttons.  Henry Ford has definitely left the building.

The fact that Apple invited fashion editors to Cupertino (some of whom had to be told where that town is) is another Think Different sign. Nerds are still welcome, but this is a new game. Again, turn to the Apple Watch site and look at the bands/bracelets. As Ben Clymer notes in his piece, the level of detail tells us this isn’t just another iDevice.

Stepping back a little, when I see the team of watch industry execs, design luminaries, and fashion experts Apple has brought on board, I have a hard time believing that Apple is going to stop at watches. At the very least, will Mssrs. Ive and Newson bring livelier, more varied designs to the iPhone? And what does Tim Cook mean when he slyly alludes to products that “haven’t even been rumored yet…”?

But let’s not get ahead of ourselves — we’re still barely past the demo. We’ll have to wait for the actual product to come to the wrists of real users. Only then will we have the Apple Watch make-or-break moment: Word-of-mouth from non-experts.

And, still in the not getting ahead of ourselves department, for Apple, today’s make-or-break product is the iPhone 6. The Apple Watch makes great “ink” and iPhones make the money.

JLG@mondaynote.com

An Ancient Love Story: Apple & Payment Systems

 

This week’s product launch should break the mold of Apple’s recent Fall announcements: More products than usual and a challenge to the status quo – in payment system this time.

A larger iPhone; a line of wearables (unveiled if not yet ready-to-ship); significant iOS improvements (a true “iOS 2.0”); HomeKit and HealthKit devices, applications, and partnerships; payment systems… If only half of the rumors about Apple’s September 9th media event are true, we’re going to have a wider and deeper flood of new products than we’ve seen in Apple’s previous Fall launches.

And let’s not forget the big white cocoon that covers the two-story structure that Apple built for the occasion:

Apple White Cocoon Edited

(image source:  AppleInsider)

Apple is likely to add some drama to the event by lifting the veil at the last moment.

For today, we’ll focus on the recent flurry of leaks and rumors surrounding payment systems. We’ve heard about agreements with American Express, Visa, MasterCard, Bank of America; with retailers such as Nordstrom and Macy’s, CVS and Walgreens; and hoteliers such as Starwood… The predications may not prove accurate down to the last detail, but the outbreak is too strong not to be taken seriously. Apple is about to get into the payment system business in a serious way.

There have been rumors before. Search for “apple payment system” and you’ll get about 80 million hits on Google (11 million on Bing). Flipping through the pages, we see that the excitement started as far back as five years ago when Apple’s “Grab & Go” patent filings disclosed the company’s interest in near field communication, a wireless data transfer method that can be used for quick purchases and payments. This led to the birth of a new i-Word around 2010: the iWallet.

From its very beginning, the iPhone has looked like a logical payment device. Our phones are always with us; they’re more secure than the magnetic stripe on a credit card because they can use “payment tokens” — codes that authenticate you without identifying your credit card account; payment apps can be easily downloaded and updated.

The possibilities looked endless and, of course, led to overheated predictions: Think of all the trillions of dollars sloshing around in debit/credit cards. If Apple captured only a small fraction of the flow, they’d be filthy rich!

Others disagreed. In January 2011, PCWorld’s Tom Spring explained why Apple’s Mobile Payment System Will Fail. Among his objections, was the implicit assumption that phones are somehow easier than cards (“What’s gained…by waving an iPhone instead of swiping a bank card is not clear to me”), and that retailers won’t accept phones as payment instruments until the “Another Box at the Register” obstacle is surmounted:

“Near field communication is a technology that requires a physical box/reader on the retailer’s end. Until we know more about what incentives there are for retailers to invest in this technology I think it’s going to be hard sell for Apple to convince millions of merchants to put another box at the point of sale…”

Indeed, attempting to modify ingrained customer behavior isn’t a well-trodden path to riches, nor is asking retailers to install a new box next to their cash register. This is why many payment system innovations, Google Wallet is a recent example, have failed to amass enough gravitational pull to gain currency (pardon the pun). There just hasn’t been enough acceptance by consumers and retailers for “fast lane” payment devices to become as matter-of-fact as the incumbents.

Still… Apple has repeatedly shown great patience and willingness to challenge settled wisdom.

The company’s embrace of payment systems started in 2003 when its newly-opened iTunes Store offered two innovations: Single tracks were sold for 99 cents apiece (at the time), and we could settle the purchase with a credit card. Critics scoffed: The price is too low! The credit card companies’ fixed+percentage transaction fees will be a profit-killer!

How can Apple possibly make money with such a proposition?

This was myopia. The iTunes Store wasn’t intended to be a money maker. Its only purpose was to sell more iPods at higher margins, that’s where the money was – and still is. In retrospect, Jobs was pouring the foundations of the Apple ecosystem business model:   Hardware is the star; everything else supports the big shots’ volumes and margins.

Returning to today’s (or this coming Tuesday’s) topic, Apple doesn’t want to displace the key players — the banks and credit card companies — any more now than they did a decade ago. Credit card companies, for example, play a hard-to-replace role in policing transactions. It’s not always pretty or convenient when one has to call a US number from Europe because the system “tripped” over an unusual transaction, but it works.

One can’t imagine Apple even thinking of storing and lending money, of trying to “capture a fraction of the flow”. If the company does introduce a near field payment system, it won’t be as an attempt to make money in itself, it will simply be another extension of the Apple ecosystem, another way to make iDevices more attractive.

Beyond this neat playbook theory lurks the matter of modifying consumer behavior and retail infrastructure; Tom Spring’s objections are just as cogent today as they were in 2009. And perhaps Apple’s answer — its rebuttal to the conventional reluctance — is hiding in the still-cocooned show-and-tell building.

JLG@mondaynote.com

PS: On today’s topic, see Horace Dediu’s views on the value of payment systems as bit pipes.

PPS: Unrelated but hard to resist: People from the fashion industry now working at Apple. And their friends, fashion editors, unusual invitees to a Cupertino product launch.

Three Years Later: Tim Cook’s Apple

 

On September 9th, Apple will announce products likely to be seen as a new milestone in Tim Cook’s tenure as Apple’s CEO.

You Break It You Own It. This Labor Day weekend sits about midway between two  anniversaries: Tim Cook assumed the CEO mantel a little over three years ago – and Steve Jobs left this world – too soon – early October 2011. And, in a few days, Apple will announce new products, part of a portfolio that caused one of Cook’s lieutenants, Eddy Cue, to gush Apple had the “best product lineup in 25 Years”. Uttered at last Spring’s Code Conference, Cue’s saeta was so unusual it briefly disoriented Walt Mossberg, a seasoned interviewer if there ever was one. After a brief pause, Walt slowly asked Apple’s exec to repeat. Cue obliged with a big I Ate The Canary smile – and raised expectations that will soon meet reality.

After three years at the helm, we’ll soon know in what sense Tim Cook “owns” Apple. For having broken Steve’s creation, for having created a field of debris littered with occasionally recognizable remains of a glorious, more innovative, more elegant past. Or for having followed the spirit of Steve’s dictum – not to think of what he would have done – and led Apple to new heights.

For the past three years, detractors have relentlessly criticized Cook for not being Steve Jobs, for failing to bring out the Next Big Thing, for lacking innovation.
Too often, clickbaiters and other media mountebanks veered into angry absurdity. One recommended Cook buy a blazer to save his job; another told us he a direct line to Apple’s Board and knew directors were demanding more innovation from their CEO; and, last Spring, a Valley bloviator commanded Apple to bring out a smartwatch within 60 days – or else! (No links for these clowns.)

More measurably, critics pointed to slower revenue growth: + 9% in 2013 vs + 65% in 2011 and + 52% in 2010, the last two “Jobs Years”. Or the recent decrease in iPad sales: – 9% in the June 2014 quarter – a never-seen-before phenomenon for Apple products (I exclude the iPod, now turning into an ingredient of iPhones and iPads).

Through all this, Apple’s CEO never took the bait and, unlike Jobs, either ignored jibes, calmly exposed his counterpoint, or even apologized when warranted by the Maps fiasco. One known – and encouraging – exception to his extremely controlled public manner took place when he told a representative of a self-described conservative think-tank what to do with his demand “to commit right then and there to doing only those things that were profitable” [emphasis mine]:

“When we work on making our devices accessible by the blind, […] I don’t consider the bloody ROI.”
and…
“If you want me to do things only for ROI reasons, you should get out of this stock.”

Not everything that counts can be counted and… you know the rest of the proverb. Apple shareholders (not to be confused with pump-and-dump traders) at large seem to agree.

The not-taken road to perdition hasn’t been a road to perfection either. Skipping over normal, unavoidable irritants and bugs – the smell of sausage factories is still with me –

a look at Apple’s Mail client makes one wish for stronger actions than bug fixes leading to new crashes. This is a product, or people, that need stronger decision as they do not represent Apple at its best. Another long-time offender is the iTunes client. One unnamed Apple friend calls it “our Vista” and explains it might suffer from its laudable origin as a cross-platform Mac/Windows application, a feature vital to iPod’s success – we’ll recall its 2006 revenue ($7.7B, + 69% year-to-year growth!) was higher than the Mac’s ($7.4B, + 18%).

Now looking forward, we see this:

Apple Flint Center Barge

A large, cocooned structure being built by an “anonymous” company, next to Cupertino’s aptly named Flint Center for the Performing Arts, where Apple will unveil its next products this coming September 9th. Someone joked this was yet another instance of Apple’s shameless imitation of Google’s innovations. This time Apple copied Google’s barges, but could even get its own clone to float.

Seriously, this is good news. This is likely to be a demo house, one in which to give HomeKit, HealthKit or, who knows, payment systems demonstrations, features of the coming iOS 8 release for “communicating with and controlling connected accessories”. The size of the structure speaks for Apple’s ambitions.

On other good news, we hear Apple’s entry into “wearables”, or into the “smartwatch” field won’t see any shipments until 2015. The surprise here is that Apple would show or tease the product on 9/9. There have been exactly zero leaks of body parts, circuit boards, packages and other accessories, leading more compos mentis observers (not to be confused with compost mentis on Fox News) to think a near term announcement wasn’t in the cards. But John Paczkowski, a prudent ans well-informed re/code writer assures us Apple will indeed announce a “wearable” — only to tell us, two days later, it won’t ship until next year. The positive interpretation is this: Apple’s new wearable category isn’t just a thing, an gizmo, you can throw into the channel and get the money pump running – at nice but immaterial accessory rates. Rather, Apple’s newer creation is a function-rich device that needs commitment, software and partnerships, to make a material difference. For this it needs time. Hence the painful but healthy period of frustration. (Electronic Blue Balls, in the immortal words of Regis McKenna, the Grand Master of Silicon Valley Marketing, who was usually critical of firms making an exciting product announcement, only to delay customer gratification for months.)

The topic of payments is likely to be a little less frustrating – but could mead to another gusher of media commentary. Whether Apple partners with Visa, American Express or others is still a matter of speculation. But one thing is clear: this idea isn’t for Apple to displace or disintermediate any of the existing players. Visa, for example, will still police transactions. And Apple isn’t out to make any significant amount of money from payments.

The goal, as always, is to make Apple devices more helpful, pleasurable – and to sell more of these at higher margins as a result. Like HomeKit or HealthKit, it’s an ecosystem play.

There’s also the less surprising matter of new iPhones. I don’t know if there will be a 4.7” model, or a 5.5” model or both. To form the beginning of an opinion, I went to the Palo Alto Verizon store on University Avenue and asked to buy the 5” Lumia Icon Windows Phone on display. The sales person only expressed polite doubt and excused himself “to the back” to get one. It took eight minutes. The rest of the transaction was quick and I walked out of the store $143.74 lighter. I wanted to know how a larger phone would feel on a daily, jeans and jacket breast-pocket experience. It’s a little heavy (167 grams, about 50 grams more than an iPhone 5S), with a very nice, luminous screen and great Segoe WP system font:

Icon Lumia

I won’t review the phone or Windows Phone here. Others have said everything that needs to be said on the matter. It’s going to be a tough road for Microsoft to actually become a weighty number three in the smartphone race.

But mission accomplished: It feels like a larger iPhone, perhaps a tad lighter than the Lumia will deliver a pleasant experience. True, the one-handed use will probably be restricted to a subset of the (mostly male) population. And today’s 4” screen size will continue to be available.

There remains the question of what size exactly: 4.7”, or 5.5” (truly big), or both. For this I’ll leave readers in John Gruber’s capable hands. In a blog post titled Conjecture Regarding Larger iPhone Displays, John carefully computes possible pixel densities for both sizes and offers an clarifying discussion of “points”, an important iOS User Interface definition.

We’ll know soon.

As usual, the small matter of implementation remains. There are sure to be the usual hiccups to be corrected in .1 or .2 update in iOS 8. And there won’t be any dearth of bilious comments about prices and other entries on the well-worn list of Apple sins.

But I’ll be surprised if the public perception of Tim Cook’s Apple doesn’t take yet another turn for the better.

JLG@mondaynote.com

 

Shift Happens: Apple + IBM. This Time It’ll Be Different.

 

Strategic Alliances and other grandly named partnerships never seem to live up to their florid marriage announcements. Apple and IBM are it – again – but this time, Apple is the larger, more prosperous company, and IBM is trying the bad old recipe of regaining growth by cutting down.

Let me slip into something more comfortable: Devil’s Advocate robes. Thus togged out, I will explain why this Apple + IBM rapprochement won’t work – or, worse, it will.

First, the clash of cultures.

Apple is a focused company, its financial statements tell the story: Its money is made in hardware. All other activities, such as the important contributions from the App Store, make up an ecosystem that support the hardware volumes and margins. Everyone in the company knows this.

A look at IBM’s latest quarterly report tells a much more complicated story. In its simplest analysis, the company consists of three main segments, each with its own P&L (Profit & Loss) numbers and, one assumes, its own goals, rewards and punishments, and fight for resources. It is, counterintuitively as the shadow of its former grandeur remains, a smaller business than Apple’s: $24.4B last quarter (-2% year-to-year) vs. $37.4B (+6%).

I asked WolframAlpha for per employee, per year revenue and profit comparisons and got this:

Wofram IBM Apple Revenue

and…

Wolfram IBM Apple Profit

Inside IBM, morale isn’t great. Following a series of layoffs, management is perceived as using Excel as a windshield to drive the company.

Two groups with widely differing habits of the heart and mind.

Second, earlier embraces haven’t worked.

We have memories of  AIM, the 1991 accord between Apple, IBM, and Motorola that gave us Kaleida, the multimedia PowerPC processor, and Taligent, Apple and IBM’s attempt at a more modern operating system. Big announcements, big plans – and nothing but debris.

Even earlier, we have memories of the Apple/DEC Alliance: In the Summer of 1987, my boss and benefactor John Sculley had given me the mission to bring to a conclusion a conversation he’d started with DEC’s CEO. Things went well and, in January 1988, we reached our goal:

 “…Apple Computer and Digital Equipment announced a joint development agreement under which the two companies would work together to integrate Macintosh and the AppleTalk network system with the VAX and DECnet.

At the celebratory dinner, I sat next to DEC’s founder, Ken Olson. The likable Grand Old Man professed happiness with our collaboration and calmly told me that while he knew lots of people who used PCs, he couldn’t comprehend why. At home, he said, he had a “glass teletype” — a CRT, remember those? — and an Ethernet connection back to the factory, quite expensive at the time. Combined with DEC’s  ALL-IN-1 office productivity suite (all commands were two-characters long) he had everything he needed.

The Apple/DEC Alliance went nowhere. As with many such covenants, the product of the announcement was the announcement itself. The marriage itself was a sham.

Third and more generally, alliances don’t work.

There was a time when strategic alliances were all the rage. In 1993, my friend Denise Caruso published the aptly titled Alliance Fever, a 14-page litany of more than 500 embraces. The list started at 3DO and ending with Zenith Electronics, neither of which still stands: 3DO went bankrupt in 2003, Zenith was absorbed by LG Electronics.

These aren’t isolated bad endings. If you have the time and inclination for a nostalgic stroll through the list, you’ll see many more such disappearances.

But, you’ll object, this was more than twenty years ago. The industry has learned from these examples; we won’t fall into the same rut.

One would hope. And one would be disappointed.

The tendency remains strong for sheepish company execs to congregate and participate in what Valley wags call a Clusterf#^k. In two Monday Notes (Mobile World 2010 and 2011), I offered examples such as this one:

Do your eyes glaze over when you read such BS?

“Global leaders Intel Corporation and Nokia merge Moblin and Maemo to create MeeGo*, a Linux-based software platform that will support multiple hardware architectures across the broadest range of device segments, including pocketable mobile computers, netbooks, tablets, mediaphones, connected TVs and in-vehicle infotainment systems.”

Relax, you’re normal. Who are they kidding? Themselves, most likely.

All the holy words are there: Linux (mandatory), based (to male things clearer), platform (the p-word), multiple hardware architectures (we don’t know what we’re doing so we’re covering all bases), broadest range of devices (repeat the offense just committed), segments (the word adds a lot of meaning to the previous phrase), including pocketable mobile computers, netbooks, tablets, mediaphones, connected TVs and in-vehicle infotainment systems (only microprocessor-driven Toto toilets are missing from the litany).

Alliances generally don’t work because there’s no one really in charge, no one has the power to mete out reward and punishment, to say no, to change course. Often, the partners in an alliance are seen as a bunch of losers clinging to each other with the hope that there’s safety in numbers. It’s a crude but, unfortunately, not inaccurate caricature.

I’ll switch sides now and explain why It’ll Be Different This Time.

Division of labor is the most convincing argument for this partnership. IBM is and always has been an Enterprise Services company. As it did in its glorious mainframe days, it can take care of everything: analyze your business, recommend changes, re-engineer your organization, write software, maintain everything. Today, there’s much less focus on hardware revenue, but the broad scope remains.

Then came the mobile revolution, which IBM has missed out on. It’s not that they didn’t have the opportunity. The company could have jumped on the mobile-everything wave, but that would have meant breaking the “Roadmap 2015” promise that was avowed by IBM’s former CEO, Sam Palmisano. Palmisano might be forgiven for not anticipating the size and importance of mobile when he promised, in his 2010 letter to investors, that IBM share value would double by 2015, but Ginni Rometty, Palmisano’s successor, has no excuse. The 2012 changing of the guard was a perfect opportunity for Rometty to stand up, say Things Have Changed and re-jigger the roadmap. Ah well.

On the positive side, IBM’s clients are re-organizing their businesses as a result of the mobile deluge, some late, some early. The smarter ones have realized that mobile devices aren’t just “small PCs” and have turned to broad-range professional services vendors such as IBM to re-engineer their business.

For Apple’s part, the iPhone and the iPad have gained increasingly wider acceptance with large Enterprise customers:98% of Fortune 500 companies have rdeployed iOS devices and more than 90% of tablet activations in enterprise environments are iPads.” Of course, a few BYOD devices don’t constitute wholesale adoption inside a company. Apple doesn’t have the manpower and culture to come in, engineer, deploy, and maintain company-wide applications and fleets of devices. That’s IBM forte.

What’s new in the arrangement is IBM’s decision to invest in extending its ability to develop applications that fully integrate iOS devices — as opposed to “suffering” them.

On the numbers side, naysayers mistakenly use the “98%” figure quoted above to opine that the partnership won’t create much additional revenue. They’re probably right — at least initially. But the partnerships could herald a move from “anecdotal” to systematic deployments that are deep and wide. This will take time and the needle won’t move right away…it will be more like the hours hand on the clock face.

Another more immediate effect, across a wide range of enterprises, will be the corporate permission to use Apple devices. Recall the age-old mantra You Don’t Get Fired For Buying IBM, which later became DEC, then Microsoft, then Sun…and now Apple. Valley gossip has it that IBM issued an edict stating that Macs were to be supported internally within 30 days. Apparently, at some exec meetings, it’s MacBooks all around the conference room table — except for the lonely Excel jockey who needs to pivot tables.

We’ll see if the company whose motto once was Think actually works well with the Think Different squad.

JLG@mondaynote.com

 

The Sweet Spot On Apple’s Racket

 

iPad sales are falling – but the sky is not. We’re merely dealing with a healthy case of expectations adjustment.

The tablet computer has always felt inevitable. The desire to harness the power of a computer in the comfortable form of a letter-size tablet with a keyboard, or perhaps a stylus for more natural interaction — or why not both? — has been with us for a very long time. Here we see Alan Kay holding a prototype of his 1972 Dynabook (the photo is from 2008):

Alan_Kay_and_the_prototype_of_Dynabook,_pt._5_(3010032738)

(credit: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynabook)

Alan prophetically called his invention a personal computer for children of all ages.

For more than 40 years, visionaries, entrepreneurs, and captains of industry have whetted our appetite for such tablets. Before it was recast as a PDA, a Personal Digital Assistant, Steve Sakoman’s Newton was a pen-based letter-size tablet. Over time, we saw the GridPad, Jerry Kaplan’s and Robert Carr’s Go, and the related Eo Personal Communicator. And, true to its Embrace and Extend strategy, Microsoft rushed a Windows for Pen Computing extension into Windows 3.1.

These pioneering efforts didn’t succeed, but the hope persisted: ‘Someone, someday will get it right’. Indeed, the tablet dream got a big boost from no less than Bill Gates when, during his State of The Industry keynote speech at Comdex 2001 (Fall edition), Microsoft’s CEO declared that tablets were just around the corner [emphasis mine]:

“The Tablet takes cutting-edge PC technology and makes it available wherever you want it, which is why I’m already using a Tablet as my everyday computer. It’s a PC that is virtually without limits — and within five years I predict it will be the most popular form of PC sold in America.

Unfortunately, the first Tablet PCs, especially those made by Toshiba (I owned two), are competent but unwieldy. All the required ingredients are present, but the sauce refuses to take.

Skip ahead to April 2010. The iPad ships and proves Alan Kay right: The first experience with Apple’s tablet elicits, more often than not, a child-like joy in children of all ages. This time, the tablet mayonnaise took and the “repressed demand” finally found an outlet. As a result, tablets grew even faster than PCs ever did:

PNG - Tablets Fastest Ever

(Source: Mary Meeker’s regular Internet Trends 2014 presentation, always long, never boring)

In her 2013 report, Meeker showed iPads topping the iPhone’s phenomenal growth, climbing three times faster than its more pocketable sibling:

PNG - iPad 3X iPhone Meeker 2013

(Source: Mary Meeker Internet Trends 2013)

There were, however, two unfortunate aspects to this rosy picture.

First, there was the Post-PC noise. The enthusiasm for Android and iOS tablets, combined with the end of the go-go years for PC sales, led many to decree that we had finally entered the “Post-PC” era.

Understandably, the Post-PC tag, with its implication that the PC is no longer necessary or wanted, didn’t please Microsoft. As early as 2011, the company was ready with its own narrative which was delivered by Frank Shaw, the company’s VP of Corporate Communications: Where the PC is headed: Plus is the New “Post”. In Microsoft’s cosmos, the PC remains at the center of the user’s universe while smartphones and tablets become “companion devices”. Reports of the PC’s death are greatly exaggerated, or, as Shaw puts it, with a smile, “the 30-year-old PC isn’t even middle aged yet, and about to take up snowboarding”.

(Actually, the current debate is but a new eruption of an old rash. “Post-PC” seems to have been coined by MIT’s David Clark around 1999, causing Bill Gates to pen a May 31st, 1999 Newsweek op-ed titled: Why the PC Will Not Die…)

Both Bill and Frank are right – mostly. Today’s PC, the descendant of the Altair 8800 for which Gates programmed Microsoft’s first Basic interpreter, is alive and, yes, it’s irreplaceable for many important tasks. But classical PCs — desktops and laptops — are no longer at the center of the personal computing world. They’ve been replaced by smaller (and smallest) PCs — in other words, by tablets and smartphones. The PC isn’t dead or passé, but it is shape-shifting.

There was a second adverse consequence of the iPad’s galloping growth: Expectations ran ahead of reality. Oversold or overbought, it doesn’t matter, the iPad (and its competitors) promised more than they could deliver. Our very personal computers — our tablets and smartphones — have assumed many of the roles that previously belonged to the classical PC, but there are some things they simply can’t do.

For example, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Tim Cook confides that “he does 80% of the work of running the world’s most valuable company on an iPad.” Which is to say Tim Cook needs a Mac for the remaining 20%…but the WSJ quote doesn’t tell us how important these 20% are.

We now come to the downward trend in iPad’s unit sales: -2.29% for the first quarter of calendar year 2014 (compared to last year). Even more alarming, unit sales are down 9% for the quarter ending in June. Actually, this seems to be an industry-wide problem rather than an Apple-specific trend. In an exclusive Re/code interview, Best Buy CEO Hubert Joly says tablet sales are “crashing”, and sees hope for PCs.

Many explanations have been offered for this phenomenon, the most common of which is that tablets have a longer replacement cycle than smartphones. But according to some skeptics, such as Peter Bright in an Ars Technica op-ed, there’s a much bigger problem [emphasis mine]:

“It turns out that tablets aren’t the new smartphone…[t]hey’re the new PC; if you’ve already got one, there’s not much reason to buy a new one. Their makers are all out of ideas and they can’t make them better. They can only make them cheaper.”

Bright then concludes:

“[T]he smartphone is essential in a way that the tablet isn’t. A large screen smartphone can do…all the things a tablet can do… Who needs tablets?”

Hmmm…

There is a simpler – and much less portentous – explanation. We’re going through an “expectations adjustment” period in which we’ve come to realize that tablets are not PC replacements. Each personal computer genre carries its own specifics; each instils unique habits of the body, mind, and heart; none of them is simply a “differently sized” version of the other two.

The realization of these different identities manifests itself in Apple’s steadfast refusal to hybridize, to make a “best of both worlds” tablet/laptop product.

Microsoft thinks otherwise and no less steadfastly (and expensively) produces Surface Pro hybrids. I bought the first generation two years ago, skipped the second, and recently bought a Surface Pro 3 (“The tablet that can replace your laptop”). After using it daily for a month, I can only echo what most reviewers have said, including Joanna Stern in the WSJ:

“On its third attempt, Microsoft has leapt forward in bringing the tablet and laptop together—and bringing the laptop into the future. But the Pro 3 also suffers from the Surface curse: You still make considerable compromises for getting everything in one package.”

Trying to offer the best of tablets and laptops in one product ends up compromising both functions. In my experience, too many legacy Windows applications work poorly with my fingers on the touch screen. And the $129 Type Cover is a so-so keyboard and poor trackpad. Opinions will differ, of course, but I prefer using Windows 8.1 on my Mac. We’ll see how the upcoming Windows 9, code name Threshold, will cure the ills of what Mary Jo Foley, a well-introduced Microsoft observer, calls Vista 2.0.

If we consider that Mac unit sales grew 18% last quarter (year-to-year), the company’s game becomes clear: The sweet spot on Apple’s racket is the set of customers who, like Tim Cook, use MacBooks and iPads. It’s by no means the broadest segment, just the most profitable one. Naysayers will continue to contend that the prices of competing tablets are preordained to crash and will bring ruin to Apple’s Affordable Luxury product strategy…just as they predicted netbooks would inflict damage on MacBooks.

As for Peter Bright’s contention that “[tablet] makers are all out of ideas and they can’t make them better”, one can easily see ways in which Google, Lenovo, Microsoft, Apple, and others could make improvements in weight, speed, input methods, system software, and other factors I can’t think of. After we get over the expectations adjustment period, the tablet genre will continue to be innovative, productive, and fun – for children of all ages.

JLG@mondaynote.com