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Blackberry’s Future

 

by Jean-Louis Gassée

Once the king of smartphones for business uses, Blackberry got a new CEO, a new operating system and new devices, with and without the traditional keyboard. In spite of these changes, the company’s latest numbers don’t paint a picture of revival.

Thorsten Heins doesn’t suffer a lack of enthusiasm. During the run up to the March release of its BlackBerry 10 operating system, RIM’s CEO painted an optimistic picture of a company on the rebound, a company that would correct the mistakes of the industry leaders:

“It’s still the same,” Heins said of the iPhone. “It is a sequential way to work and that’s not what people want today anymore. They want multitasking.”

Rechristened as BlackBerry, Heins told us that the company would energize the develop community and spawn devices that are too exciting to describe:

“There’s one new product I’m really excited about, but I can’t really share it,” Heins told CNET in an interview today.

Last week, the company released its latest quarterly numbers and they are exciting, although not in the sense that Heins would like. The forecast was $3.4B in revenue and $0.07 in earnings per share; the reality was $3.1B in sales and, more important, a loss of $0.13 per share.

The numbers “excited” traders so much that BBRY shares lost 28% of their value in a single trading session, putting them back to their one-year-ago level.

The earnings release was followed by the customary conference call where the CEO and CFO review the numbers and answer questions from Wall Street analysts. Courtesy of Seeking Alpha, the call transcript is here and contains the obligatory pablum, including an excessive abuse of the F-word (22 occurrences):

Embracing our heritage of mobility first is very important as we build our culture and go through this transition. We don’t have to be all things to all people and all markets, and embracing this focus allows us to drive efficiency, be flexible and agile, and to ultimately drive best-in-class innovations. [...] We’re continuing to focus on improving all areas of the business…

Curiously, there’s no breakdown of the sales of BlackBerry devices. How much of their revenue was “energized” by the BB10? Without actual numbers, we’re left in a cloud of doubt about how well the new platform is actually doing.

The disquietude continues: There are no subscriber numbers, and no guidance other than an expectation of more losses next quarter. The glowing comments about cash-flow from operations ($630M, a nice number) are undercut by the disclosure of a substantial tax refund, without which the company would have eaten through $400M to $500M of cash.

As for tablets, the Blackberry PlayBook is no more, says the CEO. He’s unhappy with the device’s performance and is determined to focus on the company’s “core hardware portfolio“. (The company’s website no longer describes the product and only offers a software update for existing customers.)

Inevitably, the How Many Moves Remain? question comes up. Blackberry professes to do more than just devices, it claims to offer strong enterprise services and says it will propagate its BBM (Blackberry Messenger) to other platforms including Android and iOS. It also promotes a form of (limited) compatibility for (some) Android apps on its newer smartphones. But is anyone buying and in numbers that can save the company?

More to the point: Who wants to buy Blackberry (the company), for what reasons, and at what price?

Let’s back up. Last week, we heard that Microsoft had once again given up on its perennial hunt to capture a handset maker. This time, the prey was Nokia, Microsoft’s “special” Windows Phone licensee.

The official explanation for the Nokia blowup was that the price tag was too high, but price clearly wasn’t an issue. Nokia’s $14B market capitalization weighs in at about 5% of Microsoft’s $288B. Even when you tack on a 25% acquisition premium, the purchase should have been a reasonably easy sell, especially given Microsoft’s desire to take the handset business into its own hands, if only to counter (or mimic) the strategy established by Google and Motorola.

There’s really only one explanation, as I speculated last week: The engagement was dissolved because of Microsoft’s bleak view of Nokia’s business, that the Finnish company no longer has the technological acumen and brand loyalty that Microsoft needs to make Windows Phone a legitimate competitor with Android and iOS.

BlackBerry’s market capitalization now stands at about $6B. That’s less than half of Nokia’s. If Nokia, supported by Microsoft, can’t gain ground on Google and Apple devices, what gives us confidence that BlackBerry isn’t sliding into insignificance?

The BlackBerry name, as a brand, is strong. But a brand only exists as the carrier of a promise. A brand writes checks that the product cashes. Without a successful product, the brand dies (go ask Kodak).

While Nokia could be acquired by someone interested in the Windows Phone business, one is hard pressed to form a similar thought for Blackberry. It may be struggling, but there is a Windows Phone ecosystem, including handset makers. There is no such thing around BlackBerry. Developers aren’t writing apps for BB10 in ecosystem-making numbers, carriers have taken a wait-and-see posture, even the core group of dedicated users (I used to be one of them) appears to be losing faith.

This isn’t a brightly optimistic picture. Today, Blackberry finds itself caught between Samsung and Apple at the high end, and a rabidly fermenting crowd of Android (official or not) clones at the lower price range.

So, why not consider heresy, or apostasy: Ditch the newer BlackBerry OS too few developers believe in, and bet on Android devices to support BlackBerry’s enterprise services.

The answer is probably the same as it is for Nokia: It’s too late.

JLG@mondaynote.com

Microsoft and Nokia won’t beget a Googorola clone

 

by Jean-Louis Gassée

Microsoft, after its highly visible 2011 bet on Nokia, could have decided to go one step further and buy Nokia to become a fully integrated smartphone. That it didn’t happen doesn’t portend a great future for Windows Phone.

Last week, the Wall Street Journal outed Microsoft’s unsuccessful attempt to acquire Nokia:

Microsoft recently held advanced talks with Nokia about buying its handset business, people familiar with the matter said, as laggards in the fast-moving mobile market struggle to gain ground.

Many saw an acquisition as an inevitable next step, that by acquiring the Finnish handset maker Microsoft could “finish the job” that they started when they licensed a special Windows Phone to Nokia. It would be a blessed union of two vigilant, watchful companies: Microsoft had watched as Android and iOS made its own OS a distant also ran; Nokia, once the world’s largest cell phone maker, couldn’t help but notice that Google and Apple had killed its handset business from both the high and low ends.

But, according to the WSJ, the parlay came to a negative and apparently definitive end:

The discussions faltered over price and worries about Nokia’s slumping market position, among other issues, these people said. One of the people said talks took place as recently as this month but aren’t likely to be revived.

To call Nokia’s fall a “slump” is more than polite. The company saw its market share fall from 39% in 2009 — more than 100 million handsets per quarter — to an estimated (and angrily debated) 3% by the end of 2012.

Microsoft hasn’t done much better with its mobile software. In 2008, Windows Mobile OS held a 11% market share, even as the underlying Windows CE engine was getting long in the tooth, particularly when compared to the Unix-ish Android and iOS engines. With a modern NT kernel, Microsoft’s mobile OS was reborn as Windows Phone 8 and scored a modest 3.2% market share in Q1 2013.  This number comes from IDC, the “research” group that has assured us that come 2016, Microsoft will be the number 2 mobile OS provider with a 19.2% share:

09-table nokia

Behold the vision and precision of IDC’s psychics: Back in June 2012, they could see four years into the future and predict that Windows Phone would edge out iOS… by two tenths of a percent!

We’ve heard the Microsoft-is-buying-a-handset-maker rumors before. Starting in 2007 and recurring year after year, Microsoft was said to be eyeing RIM/Blackberry. For some, yours truly included in January 2012, the RIM story was compellingly straightforward: RIM’s clientèle of loyal, hardcore Blackberry users in businesses and governments made it an ideal fit for the Redmond giant.

Microsoft’s defenders will argue that RIM ’07 was too expensive. Priced at $200 a share (they’re running at about $14 today), RIM would have cost more than a $100B before any acquisition premium. At the time, Microsoft was valued at approximately $250B (similar to today’s $277B). Ideal or not, the match didn’t make sense for Microsoft shareholders. Then, when RIM’s price began to slide, the Blackberry was seen as having lost too much of its shine, too much of its market momentum. The company was damaged goods. (Or, as we might have forgotten, the two co-CEOs, Mike Lazaridis and Jim Balsillie, the ones who spoke in tongues, may have proved too difficult for even Steve Ballmer to deal with.)

Someday, Microsoft’s inability to grab RIM might be seen as a signal failure, a key episode in the company’s slide into irrelevance in the smartphone market. I doubt anyone will see Nokia in a similar light, as the “one who got away”.

The “MicroNokia” relationship has been challenging from the start. In February 2011, Nokia committed itself to a special partnership with Microsoft. It would ditch its operating systems (Symbian, Meego, QT) and become a beacon and standard bearer for Windows Phone 7. Money changed hands: $250M of “platform support” per quarter was sent from Redmond to Espoo in order to offset the unspecified Windows Phone licensing payments that flowed in the opposite direction.

This messy, technologically and culturally unsound arrangement only got worse when Stephen Elop, the former Microsoft exec now running Nokia, announced the switch to Windows Phone ten months before the company would end up shipping devices that ran the new (and problematic) OS. Unsurprisingly, Nokia’s revenue evaporated, leaving it with losses and a minuscule 5% market share (including Symbian-based smartphones).

Why Elop would make an announcement that effectively Osborned the business still mystifies and enrages Nokia supporters such as Tomi Ahonen who keeps calling for Elop’s head in long, irate blog posts. (In industry lore, to “Osborne” is to prematurely announce a product that so clearly obsoletes your current offering that it kills revenue. The suicidal maneuver is named in loving memory of portable computer pioneer Adam Osborne who destroyed his business by bragging that his next product would be so much better than the current one.)

I’m also mystified, but for another reason. I can’t fathom why Nokia picked Windows Phone instead of Android, whose explosive success was obvious even as early as 2010 when the company ditched its CEO. (I’m a little biased here as, in June 2010, I wrote a tongue-in-cheek piece titled Science Fiction: Nokia goes Android.)

Nokia’s excuses for not adopting Android were vague, ranging from “we don’t want to lose control of our destiny”, to Microsoft being a “stronger partner” (read: They paid us). The potential-loss-of-destiny rhetoric falls flat, especially when you look at Android’s licensing terms and see the freedom Samsung and others enjoy with their interpretations of the platform. (We’ve heard that Nokia and Google once talked, but we don’t yet know the reason for their not becoming highly visible partners.)

Today, investors say Nokia is worth about $15B, a tenth of its 2007 peak (I’m excluding the 2000 Internet Bubble number from the comparison). Even with a “25% acquisition premium”, a Nokia acquisition would cost Microsoft less than 10% of its capitalization. So, contrary to the charitable explanation offered to the WSJ by “persons familiar with the matter”, price couldn’t have been an obstacle. That leaves us with Nokia’s “slump”: Microsoft thinks Nokia would be unable to carry Windows Phone to an influential, sustainable market position.

Now, what?

Nokia’s revenue keeps sliding down and, after a brief incursion into the black, it keeps losing money. Is there anything in sight that will reverse the trend? It’s doubtful that the company can try for the high end by offering better hardware than Samsung, nor can they squeeze into a low end that’s inhabited by official and unofficial Android clones that are swiftly killing off feature phones. This leaves Nokia’s future as an independent company in doubt and logically gives rise to more acquisition speculation.

And what will happen to Windows Phone? We now hear that Microsoft is paying developers as much as $100,000 to write or port an application to the platform. This is a rational move on Microsoft’s part, an attempt to create the critical mass that doesn’t seem to be able to happen naturally. But it can also be seen as desperation, an admission that Windows Phone is having trouble gaining momentum as developers and customers are embraced in a downward spiral.

One can’t imagine that Ballmer will call it a day and cede the field to Google and Apple. Personally, I admire his never-give-up attitude, always talking up the future, unfazed by past bold pronouncements gone wrong, but enthusiasm isn’t a strategy. And in the smartphone market, Microsoft doesn’t have many moves left. Regardless of the technical merits of its new mobile OS, momentum seems elusive; market forces that once worked against Windows competitors in the PC field now seem to confine Windows Phone to an insignificant market share against the two dominant and their complementary business models.

We don’t know yet how Google’s acquisition of Motorola will fare, but the Android platform is healthy enough without it. The same can’t be said of Windows Phone without Nokia, which leads one to believe there will be a forced marriage between the once proud Finnish handset maker and an ambitious player, probably Chinese — with Microsoft providing a substantial dowry once again.

In the meantime, we can count on IDC to provide fresh numbers… for 2017.

JLG@mondaynote.com

Goodbye Google Reader

 

Three months ago, Google announced the “retirement” of Google Reader as part of the company’s second spring cleaning. On July 1st — two weeks from today — the RSS application will be given a gold watch and a farewell lunch, then it will pack up its bits and leave the building for the last time.

The other items on Google’s spring cleaning list, most of which are tools for developers, are being replaced by superior (or simpler, friendlier) services: Are you using CalDAV in your app? Use the Google Calendar API, instead; Google Map Maker will stand in for Google Building Maker; Google Cloud Connect is gone, long live Google Drive.

For Google Reader’s loyal following, however, the company had no explanation beyond a bland “usage has declined”, and it offered no replacement nor even a recommendation other than a harsh “get your data and move on”:

Users and developers interested in RSS alternatives can export their data, including their subscriptions, with Google Takeout over the course of the next four months.

The move didn’t sit well with users whose vocal cords were as strong as their bond to their favorite blog reader. James Fallows, the polymathic writer for The Atlantic, expressed a growing distrust of the company’s “experiments” in A Problem Google Has Created for Itself:

I have already downloaded the Android version of Google’s new app for collecting notes, photos, and info, called Google Keep… Here’s the problem: Google now has a clear enough track record of trying out, and then canceling, “interesting” new software that I have no idea how long Keep will be around… Until I know a reason that it’s in Google’s long-term interest to keep Keep going, I’m not going to invest time in it or lodge info there.

The Washington Post’s Ezra Klein echoed the sentiment (full article here):

But I’m not sure I want to be a Google early adopter anymore. I love Google Reader. And I used to use Picnik all the time. I’m tired of losing my services.

What exactly did Google Reader provide that got its users, myself included, so excited, and why do we take its extermination so personally?

Reading is, for some of us, an addiction. Sometimes the habit turns profitable: The hours I spent poring over computer manuals on Saturday mornings in my youth may have seemed cupidic at the time, but the “research” paid off.

Back before the Web flung open the 10,000 Libraries of Alexandria that I dreamed of in the last chapter of The Third Apple my reading habit included a daily injection of newsprint.  But as online access to real world dailies became progressively more ubiquitous and easier to manage, I let my doorstep subscriptions lapse (although I’ll always miss the wee hour thud of the NYT landing on our porch…an innocent pleasure unavailable in my country of birth).

Nothing greased the move to all-digital news as much as the RSS protocol (Real Simple Syndication, to which my friend Dave Winer made crucial contributions). RSS lets you syndicate your website by adding a few lines of HTML code. To subscribe, a user simply pushes a button. When you update your blog, it’s automatically posted to the user’s chosen “feed aggregator”.

RSS aggregation applications and add-ons quickly became a very active field as this link attests. Unfortunately, the user interfaces for these implementations – how you add, delete, and navigate subscriptions — often left much to be desired.

Enter Google Reader, introduced in 2005. Google’s RSS aggregator mowed down everything in its path as it combined the company’s Cloud resources with a clean, sober user interface that was supported by all popular browsers…and the price was right: free.

I was hooked. I just checked, I have 60 Google Reader subscriptions. But the number is less important than the way the feeds are presented: I can quickly search for subscriptions, group them in folders, search through past feeds, email posts to friends, fly over article summaries, and all of this is made even easier through simple keyboard shortcuts (O for Open, V for a full View on the original Web page, Shift-A to declare an entire folder as Read).

Where I once read four newspapers with my morning coffee I now open my laptop or tablet and skim my customized, ever-evolving Google Reader list. I still wonder at the breadth and depth of available feeds, from dissolute gadgetry to politics, technology, science, languages, cars, sports…

I join the many who mourn Google Reader’s impending demise. Fortunately, there are alternatives that now deserve more attention.

I’ll start with my Palo Alto neighbor, Flipboard. More than just a Google Reader replacement, Flipboard lets you compose and share personalized magazines. It’s very well done although, for my own daily use, its very pretty UI gets in the way of quickly surveying the field of news I’m interested in. Still, if you haven’t loaded it onto your iOS or Android device, you should give it a try.

Next we have Reeder, a still-evolving app that’s available on the Mac, iPhone, and iPad. It takes your Google Reader subscriptions and presents them in a “clean and well-lighted” way:

For me, Feedly looks like the best way to support one’s reading habit (at least for today). Feedly is offered as an app on iOS and Android, and as extensions for Chrome, Firefox, and Safari on your laptop or desktop (PC or Mac). Feedly is highly customizable: Personally, I like the ability to emulate Reader’s minimalist presentation, others will enjoy a richer, more graphical preview of articles. For new or “transferring” users, it offers an excellent Feedback and Knowledge Base page:

Feedly makes an important and reassuring point: There might be a paid-for version in the future, a way to measure the app’s real value, and to create a more lasting bond between users and the company.

There are many other alternatives, a Google search for “Google Reader replacement” (the entire phrase) yields nearly a million hits (interestingly, Bing comes up with only 35k).

This brings us back to the unanswered question: Why did Google decide to kill a product that is well-liked and well-used by well-informed (and I’ll almost dare to add: well-heeled) users?

I recently went to a Bring Your Parents to Work day at Google. (Besides comrades of old OS Wars, we now have a child working there.) The conclusion of the event was the weekly TGIF-style bash (which is held on Thursdays in Mountain View, apparently to allow Googlers in other time zones to participate). Both founders routinely come on stage to make announcements and answer questions.

Unsurprisingly, someone asked Larry Page a question about Google Reader and got the scripted “too few users, only about a million” non-answer, to which Sergey Brin couldn’t help quip that a million is about the number of remote viewers of the Google I/O developer conference Page had just bragged about. Perhaps the decision to axe Reader wasn’t entirely unanimous. And never mind the fact Feedly seems to already have 3 million subscribers

The best explanation I’ve read (on my Reader feeds) is that Google wants to draw the curtain, perform some surgery, and reintroduce its RSS reader as part of Google+, perhaps with some Google Now thrown in:

While I can’t say I’m a fan of squirrelly attempts to draw me into Google+, I must admit that RSS feeds could be a good fit… Stories could appear as bigger, better versions of the single-line entry in Reader, more like the big-photo entries that Facebook’s new News Feed uses. Even better, Google+ entries have built in re-sharing tools as well as commenting threads, encouraging interaction.

We know Google takes the long view, often with great results. We’ll see if killing Reader was a misstep or another smart way to draw Facebook users into Google’s orbit.

It may come down to a matter of timing. For now, Google Reader is headed for the morgue. Can we really expect that Google’s competitors — Yahoo!, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft — will resist the temptation to chase the ambulance?

–JLG@mondaynote.com

 

Android vs. Apple. Market Share vs. Profit Share, Part 255

 

Conventional wisdom and badly reconstructed history can lead to seemingly comfortable but in reality fragile conclusions. Prepare to be confused. 

Ever since the Android platform emerged as the only real competitor to Apple’s iOS devices, we’ve been treated to a debate which I’ll oversimplify: If Apple makes all the money but Android gets all the volume, who will win? A cursory survey of tech journals and blogs would lead one to believe that the case is closed: Market Share trumps Profit Share. It always does.

So Apple should call it a day? I’m skeptical. Not about the conclusion — Market Share isn’t exactly a dark horse — but about the arguments that are trotted out. False memories of Apple’s past have become a template for its future. For example, a recent Wall Street Journal article ends thus [and, sorry, you need a subscription to see the entire article]:

“Unfortunately, Apple has seen this movie before. A generation ago, it also had a top product whose market share was undercut by cheap, inferior rivals. It hopes the iPhone’s story isn’t a sequel to the Mac’s.”

(I emailed the WSJ writer asking three simple, clarifying questions. No answer, but that’s standard practice, as witheringly described by Philip Elmer-DeWitt at the end of this post.)

I was there “a generation ago”. In 1981, when IBM introduced the IBM PC, I was starting Apple France. Big Blue had made startling changes to its old ways, boldly calling its new machine The Personal Computer (we thought the “The” was ours). In an even bolder move, IBM loosened its tie and its dress code, and tried (successfully) to speak to the “common man” by using a Charlie Chaplin imitator as a mascot:

An interesting choice, particularly when juxtaposed with the real Chaplin’s cine-commentary on “labor-saving devices”:

The original PC from IBM’s Boca Raton group was a faithful homage to the Apple ][, right down to the cassette interface. But it wasn't a cheap imitation. There was one important difference:  Where the Apple ][ used a 8-bit 6502 processor, IBM splurged on the much-more-powerful 16-bit Intel chip.

Almost overnight, the pages of InfoWorld, previously replete with salivating reviews of Apple products, were filled with IBM PC articles. The new machine got a major boost with the launch of Lotus 1-2-3, a multi-function spreadsheet that became the gold standard for office applications, especially on desktops that sported hard disks and large color screens. Against the Apple ][, the IBM PC was a superior product -- and deftly marketed.

For the next few years, the Apple ][ family stumbled. The Apple ///, beset by early hardware failures, didn't answer the 16-bit question. It wasn't the modernization of the Apple ][ that the company had promised. The Apple II GS was even worse, not compatible enough with the Apple ][ and not powerful enough to attract developers, particularly Bill Gates who saw no potential for Microsoft applications.

That brings us to 1984. The Macintosh changed the game, right?

Hardly. At its coming out party, the Mac was two years behind schedule. I recall the "Mac's Last Slip" jibes at company meetings. No one would deny the obvious potential, the elegance, the innovative user interface, the clean square pixels on the bit-mapped screen, the fonts, the LaserWriter connection... But the Mac didn't support external hard drives until 1986, and it would be another year before internal disks, additional modularity, and a great Trinitron color monitor were added.

By that time, IBM had had the market to itself for half a decade, and its PC creation had morphed into the Wintel clone industry.

Contrary to the revisionist WSJ story, the "generation ago" Mac never had a market share to undercut. Apple's flagship product -- innovative, elegant, a generation ahead – was a dreamer's machine. Down-to-earth market wisdom said the Mac was perfect for Stanford undergrads, but not serious enough for real business use. The common view was application developers wouldn't be able to afford the investment in time and hardware. Starved of competitive software, the Macintosh was doomed to irrelevance and, ultimately, failure.

It almost happened, especially after Apple's desperate attempt to prop up platform share numbers by licensing Mac clones, a move that resulted in a brutal drop in Apple's margins. Market share vs. Profit Share...

The Mac was saved by Gil Amelio's unintentionally self-sacrificing decision to hand the Apple reins back to Steve Jobs. What followed was the most amazing turnaround our industry has ever seen, and it started with two controversial moves: Jobs rescinded the Mac OS license, and he made a deal with the Microsoft Devil. He convinced Gates' company to "invest" $150M in non-voting Apple shares and develop new Mac versions of the Explorer browser and Office apps (although, in reality, the agreement was part of a settlement of an older IP dispute).

We know the rest of the story, including a meme-adverse fact: For close to seven years, the Mac has consistently gained market share at the expense of PC clones.

Since the advent of another flagship product, the iPhone this time, the riches-to-rags Mac meme has led to predictions of a similar fate: Death by drowning in a sea of "cheap" Android clones. Apple's high price ($650 per iPhone on average) gives too much low-end room for competitors. The price will be undercut, there will be a decline in unit share that, in turn, will lead to lower profits, lower developer interest, lower ability to invest in future products. The road to irrelevance is paved with high margins and low market share.

Never mind two differences. First, the iPhone never lacked apps, 750,000 of them at last count. And never mind that it is immensely profitable, that Apple is embarrassingly flush with more cash than all its high-tech colleagues combined. The pundits won't accept evidence as an answer. Market Share will trump Profit Share. Why let facts cloud a good argument?

One is tempted to point to the race to the bottom that PC clone makers have experienced over the past decade. HP enjoys the largest Market Share of all PC makers, but it also "enjoys" less than 4% operating profit for its efforts. Meanwhile, Apple's margin is in the 25% range for its Mac line. That may not be as enjoyable as the 60% margin for the iPhone, but it's a solid business, particularly when you consider that the clone makers, HP and Dell foremost, are angling to get out of the business altogether. (See an earlier MN: Post-PC: Wall Street Likes the View.)

Returning to the iOS vs Android debate, I will state an opinion - not to be confused with a prediction, let alone The Truth: I think the vertical simplicity of Apple's business will tilt the field in its favor as the complicated Android world devolves into anarchy. Apple vs Google isn't Apple vs Microsoft/Intel/IBM.

Let's back up a bit. Google's 2005 acquisition of Android was a visionary move. (Some say Google's vision was sharpened by Eric Schmidt's presence on Apple's Board as the company worked on the future iPhone. Jobs was furious about Google's decision and summarily asked Schmidt to leave.) Android's unprecedented growth -- more than 50% share of the smartphone market in the US, and even more worldwide – is a testament to the "open" approach. Google gives away the Open Source Android OS; processors are another kind of "open", custom-designed under ARM licenses open to all payers.

But Android is a "cushion shot", it's an indirect way for Google to make money. Android is a Trojan horse that infects smartphones so it can install services that collect the user data that feeds Google's true business: advertising.

Now, Google faces several problems. Android's openness leads to incompatibilities between devices, a problem for developers that didn't happen under Microsoft's rule in the PC era. Worse (for Google), the many diverging versions of Android (a.k.a. forks) -- especially those created in China -- carry no Google services. They harvest no data and so they bring no advertising revenue potential back to Google.

This is clearly a concern for Google, so much so that the company now offers "pure" Android smartphones by Samsung (for $650) and HTC (for $599) on its Google Play site.

On the other hand, Android 2013 is a mature, stable OS. It isn't Windows '95, which was nothing more than a shell bolted on top of DOS. While the Mac's system software wasn't fully developed when it first came out, many saw it as superior -- or potentially superior -- to Microsoft's OS. Android is a tougher competitor than Windows was at the same age.

Then there is Google's subsidiary Motorola Mobility and the relationship with Samsung, the most powerful Android handset maker. As discussed last week, Motorola's stated intention is to push Android phone prices well below the $650 (unsubsidized) level. Is Samsung in a position to wag the Android dog? And if so, how will they react to Motorola's moves?

Let's not forget "the small matter of execution", one that might prove more important than lofty "strategic" considerations. And, to further complicate predictions, we have the herd's tendency to assume Company X will make all the mistakes while its competitors will play a perfect game.

Confused? Then I have accomplished one of my goals, to show how unhelpful the old bromides are when trying to guess what will happen next.

-- JLG@mondaynote.com

PS: I'd be remiss if I didn't direct you recently discovered articles by John Kirk, who calls himself a recovering attorney and indeed writes tightly reasoned posts on Techpinions. I'll whet your appetite with two quotes. One from Does The Rise Of Android's Market Share Mean The End of Apple's Profits? [emphasis mine]:

Steve Jobs wanted, and Apple wants, market share. But they want the RIGHT market share. Apple wants customers who are willing to pay for their products. And Apple wants customers who are good for their platform. In other words, Apple wants market share in their target demographic. Based on the fact that Apple is taking in 72% of the mobile phone profits with only 8% or 9% of the market share, it sure sounds like they’ve aquired the right market share to me.

Does the rise of Android’s market share mean the end of Apple’s profits? Hardly. You can argue as loudly as you like that developers and profit share must necessarily follow market share. But the facts will shout you down.

The other is from 4 Mobile Business Models, 4 Ways To Keep Score where he concludes:

And if you’re going to prophesy that market share alone gives Google data that will someday, somehow, be worth something to someone, then you need to go back and re-read how the “razor-and-blades” business model is scored.

What we desperately need in analyzing mobile computing is far more attention paid to profits and far less attention paid to prophets.

—-

Please, Please Uncle Tim, Tell Us A Story…

 

I’m back from D11, the 11th yearly edition of the Wall Street Journal’s tech conference. The conference site gives you the complete speaker roster, commentary, and full videos of the on-stage interviews as well as demos and hallway conversations.

With such a complete and well-organized reproduction of the event, why even go?

For the schmoozing, the in-the-moment impressions of speakers, the audience reactions… This is the only conference I attend (I’ve only missed it once). I enjoy rubbing scales with aging crocodiles and watching new and old saurians warily eying one another.
Speaking of attendees, I’m struck again by the low, almost non-existent European participation. Most pointedly, Fleur Pellerin, France’s Minister in charge of the Digital Economy, wasn’t there… even though she will be in the Valley this week. Had Minister Pellerin spent a day or two with us in Rancho Palos Verdes, she would have seen, heard, felt, and learned more than in the half dozen limousine hops she’ll make from one Valley HQ to another where she’ll be subjected to frictionless corporate presentations that have been personalized with a quick Search and Replace insertion of her name and title.
At D11, the rules of Aristotelian Unities apply: unity of action, place, and time. The entire ecosystem is represented: entrepreneurs, investors, CEOs of large companies, consultants, investment bankers, journalists, headhunters. What better place to contemplate the Knowledge Economy’s real workings, its actors and its potential to lift France out of its unemployment malaise?

(Of course, Pellerin might also be looking to mend fences after Yahoo’s attempt to acquire DailyMotion was blocked by another French minister. My own view is that the French government did Yahoo a favor. From what I think I know about the company and the political climate surrounding it, Marissa Mayer and Henrique De Castro, her COO, probably had no idea what awaited them.)

The conference formula is refreshingly simple:  Walt Mossberg, the Journal’s tech guru, and Kara Swisher, his co-executive, sit down and interview an industry notable (or sometimes two). No speeches allowed, no PowerPoints…
In the early days, I felt the questions were a little too soft — with the regrettable exception of Kara’s condescending grilling of Mark Zuckerberg four years ago. She clearly didn’t take him seriously. But Uncle Walt once told me he trusts his audience to do our job, to correctly decode the answers, the body language — and to look at one another and roll our eyes on occasion.
Once again, we were treated to phenomenal speakers. I liked Dick Costolo, Twitter’s witty, deeply smart (and best-dressed) CEO; and was impressed by Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg’s deft handling of questions about business, gender, and politics. Sandberg is a  veteran of Washington, where she worked for Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, her thesis adviser at Harvard, and Google  — where she worked for another Larry. Reading her best-selling and inevitably controversial Lean In doesn’t replace seeing her on stage.


Another highlight was the one exception to the No PowerPoint rule: Mary Meeker’s high-speed walk through the freshest version of her rightly celebrated Internet Trends deck. And, while we’re at it, take a look at this astounding (no exaggeration, I promise) zettabyte (1 billion terabytes, 10^21 bytes) Internet traffic projection by Cisco.
Then we have the perplexing interview with Dennis Woodside and Regina Dugan, CEO and Sr. VP, respectively, of Motorola Mobility, now a Google subsidiary. (Regular attendees will recall that Dugan was on stage at D9 as Director of DARPA , the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency that gave birth to the Internet).

Woodside stated that Motorola would deliver a range of new phones later this year, including a “hero device” with better integration of sensors into the User Interface as well as class-leading autonomy. He also added that Motorola would sell it for much less than the various $650 smartphones available today, probably meaning no-contract Samsung, HTC and Apple top-of-line phones at Verizon and other carriers.
A smarter-but-much-cheaper phone… it’s a bold but credible claim. Keep in mind that Motorola doesn’t exist to make money for itself. It’s part of what I call Google’s 115% Business Model: Advertising makes 115% of Google’s profits and everything else brings the number back down to 100. The smartphone market could become even more interesting if, after making a free smartphone OS, Google subsidizes the hardware as well.

Less credibly, however, Woodside insisted that Google has not and will not give its captive Motorola special access to Android code, because this is something Google simply doesn’t do. Perhaps he doesn’t recall that Google gave advanced access to upcoming Android builds to chosen partners such as Samsung, HTC, and, if memory serves, LG.
Just as interesting, if a bit troubling, Regina Dugan gave us insights into individual identification research work at Motorola. She proudly displayed a tattoo on her forearm that incorporates an RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) antenna that lets you log onto services without the usual annoyances. Or you can swallow an “authentication” pill that’s powered by digestive acids. As Dugan puts it, “your entire body becomes your authentication token.”  Hmmm… A tattoo on one’s forearm, a pill that emits an ID signal that you can’t turn off (for a while)…

Last but not least, Tim Cook’s interview. The low point in the Apple CEO’s appearance came during the Q&A section at the end (it’s around the 1:10:35 mark if you want to fast forward). A fund manager (!!) plaintively begged Cook to make him dream, to tell him stories about the future, like Google does. “Otherwise, we’ll think Mike Spindler and Gil Amelio…” (I’m paraphrasing a bit).


Cook refused to bite. As he’d done many times in the interview, he declined to make announcements, he only allowed TV and wearable devices were areas of “intense interest”. And, when asked if Apple worked on more “game changers” like the iPhone or the iPad, he had no choice but promise more breakthroughs. Nothing new here, this has been Apple’s practice for years.
Which raises a question: What was Apple’s CEO doing at D11 less than two weeks before the company’s Worldwide Developer Conference where, certainly, announcements will be made? What did the organizers and audience expect, that Tim Cook would lift his skirt prematurely?
Actually, there was a small morsel: Cook, discussing Apple TV, claimed 13 million current generation devices had been sold to date, half of them in the past year… but that’s food for another Monday Note.
Audience and media reactions to the lack of entertainment were mixed.

For my part, perhaps because of my own thin skin, I find Tim Cook’s preternatural calm admirable. Taunted with comparisons to Spindler and Amelio, dragged onto the Senate floor, being called a liar by a NYT columnist, constant questioned about his ability to lead Apple to new heights of innovation… nothing seems to faze him. More important, nothing extracts a word of complaint from him.
This is much unlike another CEO, Larry Page, who constantly whines about “negativity” directed at Google, a conduct unbecoming the leader of a successful company that steamrolls everything in its path.
I have my own ideas about Cook’s well-controlled behavior, they have to do with growing up different in Mobile, Alabama. But since he’s obviously not keen to discuss his personal life, I’ll leave it at that and envy his composure.
New Apple products are supposed to come out later this year. You can already draft the two types of stories: If they’re strong, this will be Tim Cook’s Apple; if not, it’ll be We Told You So.

JLG@mondaynote.com

Post-PC: Wall Street Likes the View

 

The conventional PC business is now on the decline and yet share prices for of key players Microsoft and HP are moving up. Why?

In an April press release, IDC painted a bleak picture for the PC. Compared to last year’s first quarter, worldwide shipments of PCs are down 13.9%, the “steepest decline ever in a single quarter”. US numbers are about the same: -12.7%. On a graph, the trend is unmistakable:

Is this a trend Wall Street likes?

When you consider Microsoft, it seems so. In a corporate blog post titled Windows 8 at 6 months, the company proudly claims to have “recently surpassed the 100 million licenses sold mark for Windows 8.” This is an interesting number. A quarter ago, MS announced it had sold 60 million licenses, meaning that only 40 million were sold in the last three months. That’s a 33% drop…hardly a rousing success. (The “licenses sold” phrase requires caution, it doesn’t only mean “sold with new PCs”, there are also updates to existing machines, with or without enthusiasm for the new Windows OS.)

“Ignore the Windows 8 numbers and IDC analysis”, says Wall Street. While the tech-heavy Nasdaq climbed only 6.6% in the last 60 days, Microsoft shares went up by 21%.

The same apparent illogic holds for Hewlett-Packard. Last week, the largest PC maker disclosed its second quarter numbers. Compared to the same quarter last year, they’re not exactly pretty:

Revenue down by 10% to $27.6B
Operating Margin at 5.8%, down by about 20% (HP prefers “down 1.4 points”)
EPS (Earnings Per Share) at 55 cents, down 31%

Zeroing on HP’s PC business, things look worse:

Revenue down by 20% to $7.6B
Operating Margin at 3.2%, down 44% (“down 2.2 points” sounds better)

As one would expect, Wall Street reacted, and HP shares went…up. By 17.8% the day after the announcement:

What was the good news for investors? Resorting to one of the usual bromides, HP “handily beat Street expectations” by posting Earnings Per Share (EPS) of $0.55 vs. a projected $0.30 to $0.40.

As discussed in the December 16th Monday Note, Chapter 2 of the Turnaround Artist Manual prescribes exactly what we’re seeing: Drastically lower expectations within days of taking on the job. “Things are worse than I was told. We’ll have to touch bottom before we bounce back…’”

Following the script, HP CEO Meg Whitman called 2013 a “fix and rebuild year”. Everyone should expect a “broad-based profit decline”. But a 17% rebound in the stock price can’t be explained solely by a collective sigh of relief when the actual numbers aren’t as bad as the CEO had led everyone to expect.

(In its earnings release, HP still calls itself “The world’s largest technology company”. I guess they think smartphones and tablets aren’t “technology”, but PCs and printers are…)

As quoted in a VentureBeat post, Whitman thinks that the other US PC maker, Dell, is in no better shape:

“You saw a competitor, Dell, completely crater earnings,” Whitman said in response to a question. “Maybe that is what you do when you are going private. We are setting up the company for the long term.”

Ironically, and without a hint of self-awareness, she accuses Dell of playing the Setting Artificially Low Expectations game:

She implied that Dell did that on purpose, since Michael Dell is motivated to repurchase shares in the company as cheaply as possible, and deliberately lowering earnings is a good way to get the share prices to fall.

 Actually, Whitman must envy what Dell is attempting to do: Get out of the PC clone Race To The Bottom. Because PCs make half of Dell’s revenue, getting out of that hopelessly commoditized business would cause trouble if done in public. Going private allows Dell to close the curtain, perform the unappetizing surgery out of view and, later, return to Wall Street with a smaller company endowed with a more robust earnings engine, focused on higher-enterprise gear and services.

This helps explain the apparent paradox: Wall Street doesn’t like HP and Microsoft shares despite their lower PC numbers but because of them. Investors want to believe that future earnings (the ones they count on when buying shares today) will come from “Post-PC” products and services instead of being weighed down by shrinking PC volumes and margins. In particular, those who buy HP shares must believe that the company will sooner or later exit the PC clone business. For Microsoft, the bet is that the company will artfully manage a smooth transition to higher Enterprise and Entertainment revenues and their fatter margins.

I’m not in fond of the “Post-PC” label, it lacks nuance and it’s premature. The desktop and laptop machines we’ve known for more than three decades may no longer be the sole incarnations of our personal computing – our affection, time, and money have shifted smartphones and tablets – but the PC will continue to live in our offices and homes.

Regard Lenovo, the Chinese company that seized on IBM’s PC business when Big Blue decided to exit the race. They’re doing quite well, posting a record $34B in revenue for this year.

There is life left in the PC business, just not for US incumbents.

JLG@mondaynote.com

 

Otellini’s Striking Confession

 

We know Intel shunned ARM processors and played virtually no role in the smartphone revolution. But we now learn Steve Jobs asked Intel to build the iPhone microprocessor. Paul Otellini, Intel’s departing CEO, admits he should have followed his gut – and made the smartphone world a very different place.

CEO valedictions follow a well-known script: My work is done here, great team, all mistakes are mine, all good deeds are theirs, I leave the company in strong hands, the future has never been brighter… It’s an opportunity for a leader to offer a conventional and contrived reminiscence, what the French call la toilette des souvenirs (which Google crudely translates as toilet memories instead of the affectionate and accurate dressing up memories).

For his farewell, Paul Otellini, Intel’s departing CEO, chose the interview format with The Atlantic Monthly’s senior editor Alexis Madrigal. They give us a long (5,700+ words) but highly readable piece titled Paul Otellini’s Intel: Can the Company That Built the Future Survive It?

Photo: Guardian.co.uk

The punctuation mark at the title’s end refers to the elephantine question in the middle of Otellini’s record: Why did Intel miss out on the smartphone? Why did the company that so grandly dominates the PC market sit by while ARM architecture totally, and perhaps irretrievably, took over the new generation of phones — and most other embedded applications?

According to Otellini, it was the result of Intel’s inertia: It took a while to move the machine.

Madrigal backfills this uneasy explanation with equal unease:

“The problem, really, was that Intel’s x86 chip architecture could not rival the performance per watt of power that designs licensed from ARM based on RISC architecture could provide. Intel was always the undisputed champion of performance, but its chips sucked up too much power. In fact, it was only this month that Intel revealed chips that seem like they’ll be able to beat the ARM licensees on the key metrics.”

Note the tiptoeing: Intel’s new chips “seem like” they’ll be fast enough and cheap enough. Madrigal charitably fails to note how Intel, year after year, kept promising to beat ARM at the mobile game, and failed to do so. (See these 2010, 2011 and 2012 Monday Notes.) Last year, Intel was still at it, dismissively predicting “no future for ARM or any of its competitors“. Tell that to ARM Holdings, whose licensees shipped 2.6 billions chips in the first quarter of this year.

Elsewhere in the article, Otellini offers a striking revelation: Fresh from anointing Intel as the microprocessor supplier for the Mac, Steve Jobs came back and asked Intel to design and build the CPU for Apple’s upcoming iPhone. (To clarify the chronology, the iPhone was announced early January, 2007; the CPU conversation must have taken place two years prior, likely before the June, 2005 WWDC where Apple announced the switch to x86. See Chapter 36 of Walter Isaacson’s Jobs bio for more.)

Intel passed on the opportunity [emphasis mine]:

“We ended up not winning it or passing on it, depending on how you want to view it. And the world would have been a lot different if we’d done it, […]

Indeed, the world would have been different. Apple wouldn’t be struggling through a risky transition away from Samsung, its frenemy CPU supplier; the heart of the iPhone would be Made In America; Intel would have supplied processors for more than 500 million iOS devices, sold even more such chips to other handset makers to become as major a player in the smartphone (and tablet) space as it is in the PC world.

Supply your own adjectives…

Indulging briefly in more What If reverie, compare the impact of Intel’s wrong turn to a better one: How would the world look like if, at the end of 1996, Gil Amelio hadn’t returned Apple back to Steve Jobs? (My recollection of the transaction’s official wording could be faulty.)

So, again, what happened?

At the end of the day, there was a chip that they were interested in that they wanted to pay a certain price for and not a nickel more and that price was below our forecasted cost. I couldn’t see it. It wasn’t one of these things you can make up on volume. And in hindsight, the forecasted cost was wrong and the volume was 100x what anyone thought.

A little later, Otellini completes the train of thought with a wistful reverie, a model of la toilette des souvenirs:

“The lesson I took away from that was, while we like to speak with data around here, so many times in my career I’ve ended up making decisions with my gut, and I should have followed my gut,” he said. “My gut told me to say yes.”

The frank admission is meant to elicit respect and empathy. Imagine being responsible for missing the opportunity to play a commanding role in the smartphone revolution.

But perhaps things aren’t as simple as being a “gut move” short of an epochal $100B opportunity.

Intel is a prisoner of its x86 profit model and Wall Street’s expectations. It’s dominant position in the x86 space give Intel the pricing power to command high margins. There’s no such thing in the competitive ARM space, prices are lower. Even factoring in the lower inherent cost of the somewhat simpler devices (simpler for the time being; they’ll inevitably grow more complex), the profit-per-ARM chip is too thin to sustain Intel’s business model.

(Of course, this assumes a substitution, an ARM chip that displaces an x86 device. As it turns out, the smartphone business could have been largely additive, just as we now see with tablets that cannibalize classical PCs.)

Another factor is the cultural change that would have been required were Intel to have gotten involved in making ARM devices. As both the designer and manufacturer of generation after generation of x86 microprocessors, Intel can wait until they’re good and ready before they allow PC makers to build the chips into their next products. The ARM world doesn’t work that way. Customers design their own chips (often called a System on a Chip, or SoC), and then turn to a semiconductor manufacturer (a foundry) to stamp out the hardware. Taking orders from others isn’t in Intel’s DNA.

And now?

The answer might lie in another French expression: L’histoire ne repasse pas les plats. Google Translate is a bit more felicitous this time: History does not repeat itself. I prefer the more literal image — History doesn’t come around offering seconds — but the point remains: Will there be seconds at the smartphone repast?

Officially, Intel says its next generation of x86 processors will (finally!) topple the ARM regime, that their chips will offer more computing might with no cost or power dissipation penalty. In their parlance “the better transistor” (the basic unit of logic processing) will win.

I doubt it. The newer x86 devices will certainly help Microsoft and its OEMs make Windows 8 devices more competitive, but that won’t prevent the spread of ARM in the legion of devices on which Windows is irrelevant. For these, Intel would have to adopt ARM, a decision Otellini has left to the new tandem leadership of Brian Krzanich (CEO) and Renée James (President). Will they stick to the old creed, to the belief Intel’s superior silicon design and manufacturing technology will eventually overcome the disadvantages of the more complex x86 architecture? Or will they take the plunge?

They might be helped by a change in the financial picture.

In 2006, that is after throwing Jobs in Samsung’s arms (pun unintended), Intel sold its ARM business, the XScale line, to Marvell. The reason was purely financial: for similar capital expenditures (costly fabs), ARM processors achieved much lower per-unit profit, this because of the much more competitive scene than in the x86 space.

Now, if Intel really wants to get a place at the smartphone table with new and improved x86 devices, the company will have to price those to compete with established ARM players. In other words, Intel will have to accept the lower margins they shunned in 2006. Then, why not do it with the ARM-based custom processors Apple and others require?

JLG@mondaynote.com

—————————-

(I’ll confess a weakness for The Atlantic and, in particular, for its national correspondent James Fallows, a literate geek and instrument-rated pilot who took upon himself to live in Beijing for a while and, as a result, can speak more helpfully about China than most members of the Fourth Estate. Going back to last week’s reference to the Gauche Caviar, when my Café de Flore acquaintances fall into their usual rut of criticizing my adopted country for its lack of “culture”, I hold out that The Atlantic — which sells briskly at the kiosk next door — is one of many examples of American journalistic excellence.

And, if you’re interested in more strange turns, see this other string Alexis Madrigal piece in the same Atlantic: The Time Exxon Went Into the Semiconductor Business (and Failed). I was there, briefly running an Exxon Information Systems subsidiary in France and learning the importance of corporate culture.)–JLG

Elon Musk’s Sweet Revenge

 

Elon Musk, Tesla’s CEO, saw its latest creation, the Model S – and himself – criticized by traditional media. Now, Tesla just scored its first profitable quarter and Consumer Reports put the Model S at the top of its rankings, making it possible for Musk’s company to become more than a niche player.

Palo Alto is known, primarily, as the cradle of high-tech. Its birth registry stretches from pre-World War II Hewlett-Packard, to Cisco, Sun Microsystems (after Stanford University Network), Logitech, and on to Google and Facebook.

But there’s an aspect of the town that’s rarely remarked upon. As a happy Palo Alto resident for 25 years as well as a half-century regular at the Café de Flore and Au Sauvignon, I can attest that Palo Alto vies with Paris’ Left Bank as the cynosure of the Gauche Caviar — the Caviar Left, the Volvo Liberals as they were known eons ago. Palo Altans, like the residents of the sixth arrondissement, have money and they’re willing to spend it (this isn’t constipated New England, after all) — but they only spend it in the proper way. And there’s no better way to demonstrate that you’re spending your money in a seemly fashion than to be seen driving the proper car.

The combination of tech culture, money, and sincere (if easily lampooned) social/ecological awareness make Palo Alto an interesting place to watch automotive fashion wax and wane.

Walking Palo Alto’s leafy streets in the early 2000′s, I witnessed the rise of the Prius. Rather than grafting “green” organs onto a Camry or a disinterred Tercel, Toyota’s engineers had designed a hybrid from the tires up…and they gave the car a distinctive, sui generis look. It was a stroke of genius, and it tickled us green. What better way to flaunt our concern for the environment while showing off our discerning tech taste than to be spotted behind the wheel of a Prius? (I write “us” without irony: I owned a Gen I and a Gen II Prius, and drive a Prius V in France.) Palo Alto was Prius City years before the rest of the world caught on. (Prius is now the third best-selling car worldwide; more than a million were sold in 2012.)

The cute but artificial Volkswagen Beetle came and went. The Mini, on the other hand, has been a success. A coupling of British modesty and German engineer (the car is built by BMW), the Mini proved that Americans could fall in love with a small car.

The Smart, an even smaller car, hasn’t fared well at all. There are now more older Citroëns than Smarts on our streets. I also see some tiny Fiat 500s, but too few so far to call it a durable trend.

Then there’s Tesla. In 2008, when the Tesla Roadster came out, I watched it with mixed feelings: some in my neighborhood ended up on flatbeds, but I smiled as I saw Roadsters smoothly (and silently) outrun a Porsche when the traffic light turned green.

As much as I admired Elon Musk, Tesla’s founder and a serial entrepreneur of PayPal fame, I was skeptical. A thousand-pound battery and electric drive train in a Lotus frame…it felt like a hack. This was a beta release car, a $100k nano-niche vehicle. It wasn’t seemly.

Musk muscled his way through, pushed his company onto firmer financial ground, and, in June 2012, Tesla began delivery of the Model S. This is a “real” car with four doors, a big trunk (two, actually, front and back), and a 250 mile (400 km) range. Right away, the sales lot at Tesla’s corporate store in nearby Menlo Park was packed. I started to see the elegant sedan on our streets, and within a few months there were three Model Ss in the parking garage at work. With their superior range, they rarely feed from the EV charging stations. (The Nissan Leaf, on the other hand, is a constant suckler.)

This was a big deal. The company had jumped straight from beta to Tesla 2.0. The bigwigs in the automotive press agreed: Motor Trend and Automobile Magazine named the Model S their 2012 Car of the Year.

Actually, not all the bigwigs agreed. The New York Times’ John Broder gushed over the Model S’s futuristic engineering (“The car is a technological wonder”), but published an ultimately negative story titled Stalled Out on Tesla’s Electric Highway. The battery wouldn’t hold a charge, the car misreported its range, Tesla support gave him bad information… The car ended up being hauled off on a flatbed.

Broder’s review didn’t evince much empathy from Elon Musk, a man who clearly doesn’t believe the meek will inherit the Earth. In a detailed blog post backed up by the data the data that was logged by the car, Tesla’s CEO took Broder to task for shoddy and fallacious reporting:

As the State of Charge log shows, the Model S battery never ran out of energy at any time, including when Broder called the flatbed truck…
During the second Supercharge… he deliberately stopped charging at 72%. On the third leg, where he claimed the car ran out of energy, he stopped charging at 28%.

More unpleasantness ensued, ending with an uneasy statement from Margaret Sullivan, The NYT’s Public Editor: Problems With Precision and Judgment, but Not Integrity, in Tesla Test, and with Musk claiming that the NYT story had cost Tesla $100M in market cap.

Other writers, such as David Thier in Forbes, rushed to Broder’s defense for no reason other than an “inclination”:

I’m inclined to trust the reporter’s account of what happened, though at this point, it barely matters. The original story is so far removed that mostly what we have now is a billionaire throwing a temper tantrum about someone who said mean things about him.

In “Why the great Elon Musk needs a muzzle” (sorry, no link; the article is iPad only) Aaron Robinson of Car and Driver Magazine condemns Musk for the sin of questioning the infallibility of the New York Times:

(There’s no need to pile onto this argument, but let’s note that the NYT’s foibles are well-documented, such as, I can’t resist, its tortured justification for not using the word “torture” when dealing with “enhanced interrogation”.)

None of this dampened the enthusiasm of customers living in our sunnier physical and psychological clime. I saw more and more Model Ss on the streets and freeways. Most telling, the Model S became a common sight in the parking lot at Alice’s Restaurant up the hill in Woodside, a place where bikers and drivers of fashionable cars, vintage and cutting edge, gather to watch and be watched.

Publishing deadlines can be cruel. A few days after Robinson’s story appeared in Car and Driver, Tesla released its quarterly numbers for Q1 2013 (click to enlarge):

Tesla’s $555M in revenue is an astonishing 20x increase compared to the same quarter a year ago. Tesla is now profitable; shares jumped by more than 37% in two trading sessions. On Wall Street paper, the company’s $8.77B market cap makes it worth about 20% of GM’s $42.93B capitalization… Musk got his “lost $100M” back and more.

Curiously, the numbers also show that while Operations were in the red, the company recorded a Net Income of $11M. How is that possible? The explanation is “simple”: If your car company manufactures vehicles that surpass (in a good way) California’s emissions standards, the state hands you Zero Emissions Vehicle Credits for your good behavior. You can then sell your virtue to the big car companies – Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda — who must comply with ZEV regulations. For Tesla, this arrangement resulted in “higher sales of regulatory credits including $67.9 million in zero emission credit sales”.

Tesla is careful to note that this type of additional income is likely to disappear towards the end of 2013. (For a more detailed analysis of Tesla’s numbers see this post from The Truth About Cars, a site that recommends itself for not being yet another industry mouthpiece.)

The numbers point to a future where Tesla can leave its niche and become a leading manufacturer in a too-often stodgy automotive industry. And, of course, we Silicon Valley geeks take great pleasure in a car that updates it software over the air, like a smartphone; that has a 17″ touchscreen; and that’s designed and built right here (the Tesla factory is across the Bay in the NUMMI plant that was previously occupied by Toyota and GM).

A last dollop of honey in Elon’s revenge: Coinciding with the Car and Driver screed, Consumer Reports gave the Model S its top test score. After driving a friend’s Model S at adequate freeway speeds, I agree, it’s a wonderful car, a bit of the future available today.

Some say the Model S is still too pricey, that it’s only for the very well-off who can afford a third vehicle, that it will never reach a mass audience. It’s a reasonable objection, but consider Ferrari: It sold 7318 cars in 2012 and says it will restrict output in 2013 to less than 7,000 to “keep its exclusivity” – in other words, it must adapt to the slowing demand in Europe and, perhaps, Asia. Last year, Land Rover sold about 43,000 cars in the US. By comparison, Tesla will sell about 20,000 cars this year and expects to grow further as it opens international distribution.

One more thing: Elon Musk is also the CEO of SpaceX, a successful maker of another type  of vehicles: space-launch rockets.

JLG@mondaynote.com

Carriers Still Think We’re Idiots

 

“Carriers are confident we won’t read the small print that contradicts their tricky advertising. Once in a while, a public servant really does his job and forces a retraction. Why so rarely?.”

‘My goal in life has been to have just enough money to ignore 8-point Helvetica!’ Thus spake a close friend one night in a quiet San Francisco bar. His objection was neither stylistic nor ophthalmologic. We were, once again, lamenting the shenanigans and ruses, the hidden fees and “some restrictions apply” (see, if you can, Sprint’s mendacious use of Truly Unlimited here and here), the roach motels of mileage plans, the nickels and dimes extracted by subterfuge, legally or not. In a word, or six, the tyranny of the fine print.

By accumulating “just enough money”, my friend has the luxury of not having to fight the schemers to the last dollar, of not spending hours on the phone arguing with a robohuman who has been cruelly programmed to confuse and outlast the overly-curious customer. His benign neglect allows him to keep a sunny view of life and a calm mind.

Lucky man.

Most of us don’t lead such a charmed life. We can’t, or shouldn’t, ignore the amendments, refinements, and exceptions that belie the marketing come-ons. But the fine printers — the airlines, credit card companies, internet providers and, most of all, the cell phone carriers — rely on our neglect, benign or not. They think they can prey on us, that we’re too stupid or lazy to fight back, to protest their obfuscating plans and bizarre bills.

Because of their ubiquity, the cell phone carriers get the most heat. They’ll sell you a $650 iPhone for a mere $200…and then recoup the $450 shortfall by adding a bit of the difference to each installment of your (mandatory) 24 month “service” contract. If you try to break the manacles, you’ll pay for the fractured iron. It’s right there in the fine print.

Last year, a group of concerned professionals called for an end to the confusing and wasteful smartphone subsidies. The group? The carriers themselves (see Carriers Whine: We Wuz Robbed!).

Verizon and AT&T make a spectacle of groaning under the weight of these awful subsidies. They get the Wall Street Journal and others to repeat their stories wholesale in articles such as this one: How the iPhone Zapped Carriers.
Horace Dediu, for one, doesn’t buy the sob story:

“I repeat what I’ve mentioned before: The iPhone is primarily hired as a premium network service salesman. It receives a ‘commission’ for selling a premium service in the form of a premium price. Because it’s so good at it, the premium is quite high.”

Dediu’s observation applies equally well to all the top smartphone brands. They’re all bait, a great way to hook the customer into a revolving 24 month agreement, with high ARPUs (Average Revenue Per User) stemming from the nature, the breadth and attractiveness of services provided by these high-end devices.

T-Mobile, the perennial dark horse, has been one of the more vocal plaintiffs. Besides clearly stating that the company didn’t need the iPhone, T-Mobile has hinted that it would get rid of the blood-sucking payments to handset makers altogether.
Last month, the hints became reality. T-Mobile “re-imagined” itself as the Un-Carrier:

T-Mobile’s pitch:

With no more annual service contract required, we don’t lock you into a big commitment with our Simple Choice Plan.

It’s a clever idea: T-Mobile has seemingly decoupled hardware and service. If you bring your own phone, you just pay for service. If you need a phone, T-Mobile will be happy to sell you one, let’s say a 16Gb iPhone 5 for $99…and as an added convenience (watch the left hand), they’ll offer you a 24-month contract at just $20/month! You want out before serving your 2-year sentence? No problem! Just pony up the full price of the phone; other terms and conditions may apply.

Inexplicably, some pundits (who should know better) have fallen for the pitch. Here’s David Pogue in the New York Times:

“Last week, the landscape changed. T-Mobile violated the unwritten conspiracy code of cellphone carriers. It admitted that the emperors have no clothes.”

The forums buzzed with the party line: It’s the end of contracts and subsidies.
But the company’s too-clever way with words didn’t sit well with other observers. The no-contract claim is obviously disingenuous; it only applies to people bringing their own phone, a tiny minority. For typical customers — those who get their phones from their carriers — the manacles are too familiar.
The claim also didn’t sit well with Bob Ferguson, Washington State’s Attorney General. Ferguson didn’t dither, saying “No Dice” to T-Mobile’s deceptive “No-Contract” advertising:

“As Attorney General, my job is to defend consumers, ensure truth in advertising, and make sure all businesses are playing by the rules.” 

T-Mobile backed down. The company admitted that there actually is a contract, a subsidy, and they offered to make things right with customers who accepted the agreement under murky pretenses.
Happy ending, congratulations to the vigorous AG.

Still, what were T-Mobile execs thinking? Did they really think that we’re such idiots that we can’t see a 24 month obligation as a contract? What sort of corporate culture produces this type of delusion?
In theory, T-Mobile was onto a good idea. You bring your own phone, you truly pay less and you’re not tied to a contract. Come in, stay as long or as little as you’d like, pay by the month.
But this isn’t how the market works in practice. The rapid succession of new phones makes the latest model more desirable. As a result, carriers have an opportunity to tie their customers down by offering the newest device at an artificially low price — and get a comfortable two-year income stream to recoup the subsidy.
Meanwhile, there’s other news in the carrier world:

  • Verizon is locked in difficult negotiations for the purchase of Vodafone’s 45% share of the company. This is in a context where, two years ago, Vodafone made the decision to shed its participation in other carriers such as Orange, SFR or China Mobile. In their bid/ask conversations, Vodafone and Verizon are $30B apart, Verizon offering a mere $100B while Vodafone won’t take a penny less than $130B.
  • Softbank and Dish Network are in a bidding war for Sprint, probably out of gluttony for more punishment. Masayoshi Son, Softbank’s leader, graciously spared us the carrier-as-victim lament. But if Dish Chairman Charlie Ergen prevails, we can be sure this seasoned sob story practitioner will fit right in once he becomes a cellular operator.

These are the people who tell us subsidies are killing them. They really do think we’re idiots.

JLG@mondaynote.com

Apple Buys Intel

 

Getting rid of Samsung as a processor supplier and, at the same time, capturing the crown jewel of the American semiconductor industry. How could Apple resist the temptation to solve its cash problem and make history again?

Halfway through the second quarter of the 2013 fiscal year, most of Apple’s top execs meet at an undisclosed location (Eddy Cue’s chair is empty – he’s been called away to a Ferrari board meeting). They’re joined by a few trusted industry insiders: Bill “the Coach” Campbell, Apple and Intuit Director and adviser to Google’s founders, Mssrs. Page and Brin; Larry Sonsini, the Silicon Valley consigliere of more than three decades; and Frank Quattrone, the star investment banker with nine lives.

The meeting isn’t about the company’s dwindling profit margins. The smaller margins were expected and invited: The reduced-price iPad and heavy promotion of the “old” iPhone 4 as an entry-level product are part of the long term strategy of guarding Apple’s lower end (so to speak). And no whining about AAPL’s grim slide over the last six months, a problem that has only one solution: Apple needs to record a series of better quarters.

The problem of the day is, once again, what to do with Apple’s obscene pile of cash.

By the end of December 2012, the company held about $137B in cash (or equivalents such as marketable securities), including $23B from operations for the quarter.

CFO Peter Oppenheimer delivers the bad news: It looks like operations will disgorge another $35B this quarter. The stock buy-back and dividend program that was designed to bleed off $45B over the next few years (see this March 2012 Monday Note) won’t be enough if the company continues at this rate.

Apple needs something bigger.

Quattrone has been sitting quietly at the end of the table. He clears his throat and speaks:

Buy Intel.

Well, yes, Frank (says Tim Cook), we’ve been buying Intel processors for the Mac since 2005.

Not the chips. The company. The planets are aligned for Apple to strike a blow that will leave the industry forever changed. Make history, acquire Intel.

Quattrone has their attention. He unfolds the celestial calibration:

  • Apple needs to extract itself from the toxic relationship with Samsung, its ARM supplier.
  • Intel is the best large-scale silicon manufacturer in the world. They have the people, the technology, and the plant capacity to match Apple’s needs for years to come.
  • “But Intel doesn’t do ARM!” you say. Indeed, Intel has no interest in the fierce competition and small margins in the ARM-based SoC market. Joining the ARM fray would severely disrupt Intel’s numbers and infuriate Wall Street. But if Intel were to essentially “go private” as Apple’s semiconductor manufacturing arm (pun intended), catering to all of Apple’s x86 and ARM needs (and whatever else Bob Mansfield is secretly plotting), Wall Street would have no such objection.
  • Intel is flailing. The traditional PC market – Intel’s lifeblood – continues to shrink, yet the company does nothing to break into the ARM-dominated mobile sector. In the meantime, the company makes perplexing investments such as buying McAfee for $7.68B.
  • There’s a leadership vacuum at Intel. Six months after announcing CEO Paul Otellini‘s “retirement”, Intel’s Board has yet to find a replacement who can sail the ship in more competitive waters. Apple could commission Pat Gelsinger, a 30-year Intel veteran and former CTO (Intel’s first) who fled to VMware after his career stalled at Intel. Despite being a bit of a Bill Gates look-alike (once upon a time), Gelsinger is a real technologist who would fit well within Apple, especially if he were given the opportunity to really “go for” the ARM architecture instead of iteratively tweaking x86 devices.
  • Last but not least, Intel’s market cap is about $115B, eminently affordable. The company is profitable and generates a good deal of cash, even after the heavy capital expenditures required by its constant need to build new and expensive manufacturing plants.
  • …oh, and one more thing: Wouldn’t it be fun to “partner” more closely with Microsoft, HP and Dell, working on x86 developments, schedules and… pricing?

A lively discussion ensues. Imagine solving many of Apple’s problems with a single sweeping motion. This would really make Cupertino the center of the high-tech world.

It’s an interesting idea, but there will be obstacles, both cultural and legal.

The Coach goes first: “Knowing both of these companies more than a little bit, I can attest to the pride they have in their respective cultures. They’re both disinclined to reconsider their beliefs in any meaningful way. Merging these two dissimilar groups, shedding unnecessary activities such as McAfee and the like would be dangerously disruptive to Apple’s well-honed, cohesive culture. As a general rule, merging two large organization rarely succeeds… unless you consider merging airlines a success…”

Finally, the Consigliere speaks: “It’s a tempting fantasy, it will mean years of work for my firm and many, many others, but as a friend of the company, as a past confidant of your departed Founder, don’t do it. There will be too much legal trouble with the Feds, with competitors, with Intel partners. Most fantasies aren’t meant to be enacted.”

I won’t dwell on the reality of the meeting: I made it up as a way to explain why Apple really has no choice other than submit to another cash phlebotomy, this time for an additional $60B. And, as with real-world phlebotomies, the procedure will treat the problem, but it won’t cure it. With $30B from operations per quarter, the $60B lancing will have to be repeated.

Some read the decision to return gobs of cash to shareholders as an admission of defeat. Apple has given up making big moves, as in one or more big acquisitions.

I don’t agree: We ought to be glad that the Apple execs (and their wise advisers) didn’t allow themselves to succumb to transaction fever, to a mirage of ego aggrandizement held out by a potential “game changing” acquisition.

A final word on taxes. To return the additional $60B (for a total of $100B when including the ongoing program announced last year) through increased dividends and repurchased shares, Apple will have to borrow money.

Borrow? When they have so much cash?

Yes, thanks to our mangled tax code. As explained here, about $100B of Apple’s cash is stored overseas. If repatriated, it would be “heavily” (read “normally”) taxed. Like most US companies that have international operations, Apple plays complicated, entirely legal tax games that allow their international profits to be taxed at very low rates as long as the profits — and the resulting cash — stay outside Uncle Sam’s reach. And thus we have the apparent paradox of borrowing money when cash-rich.

The benefit of these tax code contortions is difficult to explain to normal humans — as opposed to legislators who allowed the loopholes.

All this now makes Apple a different company. Once a fledgling challenger of established powerhouses such as IBM, Microsoft or HP, it now makes “too much cash” and is condemned to a life of paying dividends and buying back shares — like the old fogies it once derided.

JLG@mondaynote.com