software

Apple Maps: Damned If You Do, Googled If You Don’t

While still a teenager, my youngest daughter was determined to take on the role of used car salesperson when we sold our old Chevy Tahoe. Her approach was impeccable: Before letting the prospective buyer so much as touch the car, she gave him a tour of its defects, the dent in the rear left fender, the slight tear in the passenger seat, the fussy rear window control. Only then did she lift the hood to reveal the pristine engine bay. She knew the old rule: Don’t let the customer discover the defects.

Pointing out the limitations of your product is a sign of strength, not weakness. I can’t fathom why Apple execs keep ignoring this simple prescription for a healthy relationship with their customers. Instead, we get tiresome boasting: …Apple designs Macs, the best personal computers in the worldwe [make] the best products on earth. This self-promotion violates another rule: Don’t go around telling everyone how good you are in the, uhm…kitchen; let those who have experienced your cookmanship do the bragging for you.

The ridicule that Apple has suffered following the introduction of the Maps application in iOS 6 is largely self-inflicted. The demo was flawless, 2D and 3D maps, turn-by-turn navigation, spectacular flyovers…but not a word from the stage about the app’s limitations, no self-deprecating wink, no admission that iOS Maps is an infant that needs to learn to crawl before walking, running, and ultimately lapping the frontrunner, Google Maps. Instead, we’re told that Apple’s Maps may be  “the most beautiful, powerful mapping service ever.

After the polished demo, the released product gets a good drubbing: the Falkland Islands are stripped of roads and towns, bridges and façades are bizarrely rendered, an imaginary airport is discovered in a field near Dublin.

Pageview-driven commenters do the expected. After having slammed the “boring” iPhone 5, they reversed course when preorders exceed previous records, and now they reverse course again when Maps shows a few warts.

Even Joe Nocera, an illustrious NYT writer, joins the chorus with a piece titled Has Apple Peaked? Note the question mark, a tired churnalistic device, the author hedging his bet in case the peak is higher still, lost in the clouds. The piece is worth reading for its clichés, hyperbole, and statements of the obvious: “unmitigated disaster”, “the canary in the coal mine”, and “Jobs isn’t there anymore”, tropes that appear in many Maps reviews.

(The implication that Jobs would have squelched Maps is misguided. I greatly miss Dear Leader but my admiration for his unsurpassed successes doesn’t obscure my recollection of his mistakes. The Cube, antennagate, Exchange For The Rest of Us [a.k.a MobileMe], the capricious skeuomorphic shelves and leather stitches… Both Siri — still far from reliable — and Maps were decisions Jobs made or endorsed.)

The hue and cry moved me to give iOS 6 Maps a try. Mercifully, my iPad updated by itself (or very nearly so) while I was busy untangling family affairs in Palma de Mallorca. A break in the action, I opened the Maps app and found old searches already in memory. The area around my Palma hotel was clean and detailed:

Similarly for my old Paris haunts:

The directions for my trip from the D10 Conference to my home in Palo Alto were accurate, and offered a choice of routes:

Yes, there are flaws. Deep inside rural France, iOS Maps is clearly lacking. Here’s Apple’s impression of the countryside:

…and Google’s:

Still, the problems didn’t seem that bad. Of course, the old YMMV saying applies: Your experience might be much worse than mine.

Re-reading Joe Nocera’s piece, I get the impression that he hasn’t actually tried Maps himself. Nor does he point out that you can still use Google Maps on an iPhone or iPad:

The process is dead-simple: Add maps.google.com as a Web App on your Home Screen and voilà, Google Maps without waiting for Google to come up with a native iOS app, or for Apple to approve it. Or you can try other mapping apps such as Navigon. Actually, I’m surprised to see so few people rejoice at the prospect of a challenger to Google’s de facto maps monopoly.

Not all bloggers have fallen for the “disaster” hysteria. In this Counternotions blog post,”Kontra”, who is also a learned and sardonic Twitterer, sees a measure of common sense and strategy on Apple’s part:

Q: Then why did Apple kick Google Maps off the iOS platform? Wouldn’t Apple have been better off offering Google Maps even while it was building its own map app? Shouldn’t Apple have waited?

A: Waited for what? For Google to strengthen its chokehold on a key iOS service? Apple has recognized the significance of mobile mapping and acquired several mapping companies, IP assets and talent in the last few years. Mapping is indeed one of the hardest of mobile services, involving physical terrestrial and aerial surveying, data acquisition, correction, tile making and layer upon layer of contextual info married to underlying data, all optimized to serve often under trying network conditions. Unfortunately, like dialect recognition or speech synthesis (think Siri), mapping is one of those technologies that can’t be fully incubated in a lab for a few years and unleashed on several hundred million users in more than a 100 countries in a “mature” state. Thousands of reports from individuals around the world, for example, have helped Google correct countless mapping failures over the last half decade. Without this public exposure and help in the field, a mobile mapping solution like Apple’s stands no chance.

And he makes a swipe at the handwringers:

Q: Does Apple have nothing but contempt for its users?

A: Yes, Apple’s evil. When Apple barred Flash from iOS, Flash was the best and only way to play .swf files. Apple’s video alternative, H.264, wasn’t nearly as widely used. Thus Apple’s solution was “inferior” and appeared to be against its own users’ interests. Sheer corporate greed! Trillion words have been written about just how misguided Apple was in denying its users the glory of Flash on iOS. Well, Flash is now dead on mobile. And yet the Earth’s obliquity of the ecliptic is still about 23.4°. We seemed to have survived that one.

For Apple, Maps is a strategic move. The Cupertino company doesn’t want to depend on a competitor for something as important as maps. The road (pardon the pun) will be long and tortuous, and it’s unfortunate that Apple has made the chase that much harder by failing to modulate its self-praise. but think of the number of times the company has been told You Have No Right To Do This…think smartphones, stores, processors, refusing to depend on Adobe’s Flash…

(As I finished writing this note, I found out Philip Ellmer-DeWitt also takes issue with Joe Nocera’s position and bromides in his Apple 2.0 post. And Brian Hall, in his trademark colorful style, also strongly disagrees with the NYT writer.)

Let’s just hope a fully mature Maps won’t take as long as it took to transform MobileMe into iCloud.

JLG@mondaynote.com

 

Summer Fun: The HR-Less Performance Review

The idea for today’s off-topic note came to me when I read “Microsoft’s Lost Decade“, an aptly titled Vanity Fair story. In the piece, Kurt Eichenwald tracks Microsoft’s decline as he revisits a decade of technical missteps and bad business decisions. Predictably, the piece has generated strong retorts from Microsoft’s Ministry of Truth and from Ballmer himself (“It’s not been a lost decade for me!” he barked from the tumbrel).

But I don’t come to bury Caesar — not, yet, I’ll wait until actual numbers for Windows 8 and the Surface tablets emerge. Instead, let’s consider the centerpiece of Eichenwald’s article, his depiction of the cultural degeneracy and intramural paranoia that comes of a badly implemented performance review system.

Performance assessments are, of course, an important aspect of a healthy company. In order to maintain fighting weight, an organization must honestly assay its employees’ contributions and cull the dead wood. This is tournament play, after all, and the coach must “release” players who can’t help get the team to the finals.

But Microsoft’s implementation — “stack ranking”, a bell curve that pits employees and groups against one another like rats in a cage — plunged the company into internecine fights, horse trading, and backstabbing.

…every unit was forced to declare a certain percentage of employees as top performers, then good performers, then average, then below average, then poor…For that reason, executives said, a lot of Microsoft superstars did everything they could to avoid working alongside other top-notch developers, out of fear that they would be hurt in the rankings.

Employees quickly realized that it was more important to focus on organization politics than actual performance:

Every current and former Microsoft employee I interviewed—every one—cited stack ranking as the most destructive process inside of Microsoft, something that drove out untold numbers of employees.

This brought back bad memories of my corpocrat days working for a noted Valley company. When I landed here in 1985, I was dismayed by the pervasive presence of Human Resources, an éminence grise that cast a shadow across the entire organization. Humor being the courtesy of despair, engineers referred to HR as the KGB or, for a more literary reference, the Bene Gesserit, monikers that knowingly imputed an efficiency to a department that offered anything but. Granted, there was no bell curve grading, no obligation to sacrifice the bottom 5%, but the politics were stifling nonetheless, the review process a painful charade.

In memory of those shenanigans, I’ve come up with a possible antidote to manipulative reviews, an attempt to deal honestly and pleasantly with the imperfections of life at work. (Someday I’ll write a Note about an equally important task: How to let go of people with decency — and without lawyers.)

A review must start with three key ingredients, in this order:

  • First: Because your performance meets/exceeds requirements, we’ll renew our vows, our work relationship will continue.
  • Second: Here are your new numbers: salary, bonus, stock.
  • Third: We’re sufficiently happy with your performance as it stands today, so feel free to disregard the observations and suggestions for improvement I’m about to make. Now let’s talk…

This might sound a little too “different” (that’s Californian for “batty”), but there’s a serious purpose, here. We’ve all been reviewed, we all know the anxiety — and sometimes the resentment — that precedes the event. Mealy-mouthed comments about team-spirit, loyalty, how the company cares for its people and other insufferable HR pablum only makes things worse. You tune out, you can only hear the noises in your own head: Am I being led to the exit? Am I being shafted out of a raise/bonus/stock? Am I supposed to think that loyalty is its own — and only — reward?

To be heard, the reviewer must silence these questions. Hence the preamble: Your job is safe; here are the $$; we like what you do enough that you can safely continue to behave in the manner we have come to expect, no need to course-correct.

There follows a pause to let the news sink in. Anxiety quelled, the reviewee is now prepared — and willing — to listen.

On to the observations and suggestions. It’s probably a good idea to start with the minus side of the ledger — this isn’t much different from a sales pitch: Get the product’s negatives out of the way first. Stick to specific comments about goals missed, undesirable habits, and the like. “When you arrive 20 minutes late at our staff meetings, you’re being disrespectful to your colleagues, including me.” Defensive reactions to the negative part of a review are unavoidable, so you sing the refrain: The objectionable behavior, while imperfect, doesn’t jeopardize your job.

(As an aside, and seriously: Objecting to a behavior that you insist will be tolerated because of the overall goodness of the relationship…this approach works wonders outside of work. It’s a lot more constructive than the comminatory “You must stop doing this”, which invites the sarcastic and unhelpful response: “And if I don’t? What? You’ll divorce me?”)

The review can now proceed to the positive, to praising the individual’s performance and giving thanks. Saccharine is to be avoided, examples are a must, and exaggeration is only welcome in moderate doses.

Finally, ask for feedback… but don’t kid yourself: Hierarchy trumps honesty, so you may have to ask twice. Explain that you understand the challenge in giving feedback to the reviewer. You might get some useful tidbits, especially if they sting a bit.

Back in the real world, this simple, direct approach might not fit a large organization where you need to protect the rest of the team from the demoralization of a metastasized employee. The habitual backstabber, the knee-jerk naysayer, the self-appointed “Fellow” must be excised before too much harm is done. It’s a difficult task that requires a degree of human judgment and courage that’s not afforded by a mechanical ranking system.

Next week, we might return to topics such as Apple’s uneasy relationship with file systems, Android tablets and phablets, or some such tech disquisition.

Why Apple Should Follow Michelin

What’s the use of offering more than 500,000 wares if customers can’t find their way through the gigantic bazaar? I know, I already harped on about the lack of curation in Apple’s App Store, but that was 16 months ago…when the Store contained a “mere” 250,000 apps.

Since then, the iPhone has sold in ever larger numbers (we’ll soon see if the December quarter number crossed the 30 million units line, and by how much) and with more than 18 billion downloads, the App Store is an unmitigated success. If this is what “broken” looks like, why fix it? And how?

To answer the question, let’s take a trip back a hundred years to Clermont-Ferrand, home of Michelin. Known for its tires and tourists guides, Michelin is a very old company (incorporated in 1888), but they’ve always been at the forefront of their technology. Tires are complex products whose role in the safety, comfort, and economy of our driving experience lead Michelin engineers to joke that cars are peripheral to their lovingly engineered creations. (If you find yourself traveling through the center of France, treat yourself to a visit to L’Aventure Michelin, a really interesting museum that recounts the company’s many adventures, most of which are unknown, surprising, or forgotten.)

Edouard and André Michelin weren’t just good techies, they were astute businessmen and marketing geniuses. They seized on an obvious idea: If people take more road trips, we’ll sell more tires. And they shone in the execution that followed this intuition, they went far and well in their efforts to encourage and guide automobile travel. Michelin became famous for its world class roadmaps, for the Red Guides that grade hotels and restaurants, and Green Guides for regions, historic sites, and countries. The company also published literary Guides Bleus, forgoing culinary delights for a more cultural angle in their interpretation of locales. (I’ll skip their other marketing inventions, such as the Bibendum character and the iconic Michelin kilometer stones and road signs.)

Michelin had a staff of agents at the ready to devise an itinerary for your trip, all you had to do was write or call.

Did this “content”, as we would now call it, make money for Michelin? Possibly, but the revenue was negligible compared to the amount their tires generated. Michelin’s maps, guides, and services were created with one goal in mind, one mission: sell hardware. That’s where the real margins were, and still are.

Is Apple’s situation, it’s mission, all that different? Hardware revenue and margins are the sacred business model. Everything else, including the App Store, must support the ultimate goal. (For reference, the App Store generates less than 2% of Apple’s revenue, and much less than 2% of its profits.)

The scale of the App Store’s success, probably unforeseen by its creators, could lead management into complacency: Look at these numbers, ain’t they great? This is an incumbent’s attitude. And we know what happens to those.

But ask developers and, most important, users. For all its demonstrable success, the App Store feels broken. It’s too big and confusing, the app reviews are dry and the ratings are unreliable, search is primitive…

Label me naif, but I think Apple could do well by following the century-old Michelin model. It won’t take billions to implement, nor will it require the administration of the Apple Genii, just competent people and hard work. Here’s what a possible solution looks like:

Apple sets up a team in charge of publishing an App Store Guide. The editorial team writes opinionated (and presented as such) reviews of apps by category: Productivity, Games, Utilities, and the like. Published daily on a blog and accumulated in an on-line Guide, these reviews, one to two pages long, present the writer’s experience and opinion, culminating in a ranking in stars or numbers. It sounds simple, often the sign of a twisty road ahead…

Trouble starts quickly.

First obstacle: It’s already being done. True. How many iOS App Review Sites there are? According to this blog, the answer is…116! This is good news: Apple’s customers have an appetite for reviews, but which sites and reviewers can they trust? How do these reviewers make money? There’s no dispassionate, incorruptible Consumer Reports for apps.

Second, there’s Apple’s penchant for control. True, again — but irrelevant. Going back to Michelin, their opinion of a restaurant might be controversial, but the company has no financial gain in the number of stars they assign. They sell tires, not meals. Similarly, Apple wants to move hardware, not generate App Store revenue by favoring one app over another.

Third, attempting to sift through 500,000 apps amounts to boiling the ocean. How can one even hope to ‘‘make a dent” in that universe? But that’s no reason to sit on one’s hands. Let’s say that after a year the Apple App Guide has featured “only” 2,500 reviews, an average of 50 reviews a week, ten a day. Is that bad compared to today’s mess?

Fourth, the expense. Let’s do a gross, back-of-the-envelope overestimation: 20 reviewers at $250K/year “fully loaded” with management overhead and office expenses included. This gets us to $5M/year. Apple is notoriously cautious, if not downright stingy with (most) expenses, but $5M would be lost in the income statement noise. And this miniscule investment would exert a healthy influence on the rest of the app review ecosystem, just as the Apple Store raised the game for its independent retailers.

Fifth, the people. Will readers trust the opinions of enlisted Apple employees, or will they insist on “independent” voices? An employee’s loyalty is to the company, and there could be grumblings that a staff of corporate reviewers would choose apps that, above all else, show off the platform and the Apple brand. On the other hand, independent contractors are just that: independent. As such, they’re much more susceptible to “external influences.” There are any number of gadget blogs that smell of greasy palms and astroturfing.

Apple possesses [five s’s in a nine-letter word!] a treasure of closely-guarded user data — off-limits to a contractor — that could prove very helpful in rating apps. It’s “simply” a matter of finding, hiring, training, and managing competent and honest curators.

Today, Apple already demonstrates a type of curation when it decides which apps get featured as New and Noteworthy, or Staff Favorites. They might as well go all the way and please their users with subjective, personal reviews. Encourage the kommentariat to cluck its disapproval, allow dinged developers to rage online. If presented as an honest, competent effort — occasionally wrong but always with the Apple imprimatur — the review process will be as respected as any other high-quality editorial effort.

I hope Apple’s success won’t blind it to the need to give app seekers more than today’s skimpy categories and unreliable user reviews. Who knows, if Amazon or Google were to wake to the opportunity, their moves could spur Apple into action.

JLG@mondaynote.com

Windows 8: BFD — Big Forking Decision

Whether we’re living in a post-PC world, as many think today when they look at growth rates and profits, or it’s PC-Plus, For Ever, as Microsoft’s very literate chief ideologue staunchly maintains, it doesn’t really matter. When the Redmond giant comes up with a new version of Windows, it’s a Big Festive Deal that will impact the lives of hundreds of millions of PC users, and twist the fates of PC makers and application developers.

This year’s festive occasion was the Build conference held last week in Anaheim, California, where Microsoft revealed “Windows reimagined”, a.k.a. Windows 8. If you have the time and inclination, you can watch the keynote sessions and download the Developer Preview, which I did. (See Lifehacker for tips on how to install Windows 8 on a virtual machine. They worked for this accident-prone user.)

For this long-time Windows user, two things stick out:

  • The innovative Metro UI and its “have your cake and eat it” coexistence with the more traditional Windows look.
  • More important, the forking of apps on the ARM version of Win 8.

The Metro UI, a close relative of the elegant and justly-praised Windows Phone 7 UI, welcomes you when you log in:

The idea is to present a “touch ready”, customizable set of tiles that address our favorite everyday activities. The Metro UI is a step along the “Windows Everywhere” road that leads to a single, elegant UI for all Microsoft-powered devices, whether they’re PCs, smartphones, or tablets. (I know…Microsoft isn’t keen on using the “T” word. As Frank Shaw tells us, they’re “companion devices” that surround the center stage PC.)

Touch the Desktop tile and…

…the familiar Windows UI is back…but this time with a Ribbon, the same feature that was introduced with Office 2007 and that figured more prominently — some say intrusively — in Office 2010 applications.

You might see this mix of new and old as a lack of coherence, a clash of UI models.

Personally, I perceive it as keeping with Microsoft’s traditional incremental approach: Never break with the past, introduce new features while keeping a strong link with what users and developers already know. More

Ballmer’s latest acquisition

In a bold move, Microsoft acquires Nokia and catapults itself to the top of the smartphone world. The full integration of Windows Phone 7 software into Nokia hardware will result in a better user experience for customers, a zero-fragmentation platform for developers, easier deployment of a smaller number of SKUs for retailers, and more reliable update management for carriers.

It’s worked before. Microsoft’s hardware/software integrated devices, Xbox and Kinect, are enjoying strong revenue growth and great margins: $1.9B revenue last quarter, 50% more than last year, with 10% operating profit.

In a prepared statement, Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer says:

‘I welcome Stephen Elop back into my executive staff. His brief leave of absence has allowed us to more fully explore the possibilities of combining the best smartphone hardware, Nokia’s, with the best OS, Windows Phone 7.
Google’s anticompetitive Android free and open licensing practices unfairly tilted the playing field against our better product; they made it impossible for us to sell Windows Phone 7 software. Instead, we‘re now ready to do battle with Apple from a superior position: a stronger product carrying the Windows Everywhere flag, wider carrier distribution around the world, and more retail partners in US, Europe, and BRIC nations. With our acquisition of Nokia, we’re now a $100B company, back where we belong: at the top of the high-tech industry.’

When I woke up, I heard a different story: Microsoft bought Skype for $8.5B.

We all know Skype: free voice and video calls from computer to computer, plus paid services if you need to dial a phone. As Skype prepared for its long-awaited IPO, we got financial data from their S-1 filing with the SEC. S-1s are always instructive: This is usually the first time a private company opens the kimono — and the SEC watches closely as you prepare to sell shares to widows and orphans.

The Profit & Loss statement in Skype’s S-1 looks like this:

With revenue of $860M in 2010, Skype’s Operating Profit is a modest $20M, with a Net Loss of $69M due to interest expenses stemming from $686M in long-term debt. Except for in 2008, when they saw a $42M profit, Skype has racked up huge losses, including $1.4B in 2007 and $370M in 2009.

(Technically, these figures straddle two different corporate structures because of Skype’s complicated history. Started in 2003 as an independent European company, Skype was acquired by eBay in 2005 for a price pegged between $2.6B and $3.1B. After the acquisition, eBay discovered its ownership of Skype was “encumbered”: A crucial piece of Skype’s technology was owned by another company, Joltid, which was essentially in the hands of Niklas Zennström, one of Skype’s founders. eBay settled with Joltid for about 14% of Skype. This caused wags to say the crafty Skype founders sold the company twice — and it certainly didn’t make the ex-management consultants running eBay look so sharp. In 2009, eBay sold 70% of Skype to private equity and venture investors in a transaction that valued the company at $2.75B.)

Why did Microsoft pay $8.5B — 10 times the company’s revenue – for a business that has changed hands so many times, never made money, and comes with substantial debt? (Admittedly, the $686M debt number is manageable — for Microsoft).

One eloquent answer comes from Ben Horowitz, a partner at the Andreessen Horowitz venture firm started by Netscape’s founder. Horowitz invokes the network effect: A large number of users attracts more users and so on, in a kind of gravitation well:

- 500,000 new registered users per day
- 170 million connected users
- 30 million users communicating on the Skype platform concurrently
- 209 billion voice and video minutes in 2010

And he concludes:

Today, I tip my hat to an old rival, Microsoft. By acquiring Skype, Microsoft becomes a much stronger player in mobile and the clear market leader in Internet voice and video communications. More importantly, Microsoft gets a team, ably led by the exceptional Tony Bates, that can compete with anyone.

Well, this is a nice encomium to the guys who transformed the venture firm’s $50M investment in Skype a few months ago into a $150M payday. My own venture investor hat is tipped to MM. Andreessen and Horowitz.

But not so much to Steve Ballmer.

Looking at Microsoft’s recent quarterly numbers, we see the continuation of a now old and getting older tradition: losses in the Online Services Division. Only a few weeks ago, TechCrunch wondered: When Will Microsoft’s Internet Bloodbath End? Business Insider provided a vivid illustration for the problem:

In just the past 12 months, Microsoft has lost $2.5B in its Online business. They spend $2 to make $1 in revenue. Buying and “integrating” Skype will make the picture even redder.

So, again, why spend $8.5B on Skype?

The official explanation is that Skype will be targeted at professional users. For these, Microsoft already has a product called Lync, although not many have heard of it. And they have Messenger for consumers. (Actually, it’s Windows Live Messenger for Windows and Microsoft Messenger for the Mac.) I don’t think it’s unfair to ask how, how well, and when Microsoft’s Grand Unified Messaging platform will effectively exist, and how it will be monetized.

Given Microsoft’s track record, there isn’t much evidence of its ability to perform such integration, nor of its ability to move a big platform forward at a competitive pace, certainly not faster than what Google seems able to do with Google Voice, Talk and Google Video for Business.

The theory must be that every Windows PC will come with “Skype inside.” But that isn’t much progress: There are already 170 million connected Skype users, and 500,000 new registrations everyday. And imagine how carriers will react when they see a Skype client bundled with every Windows Phone 7 device, further pushing them towards their preordained destination: dumb pipes.

Today, Skype is joyfully used in both consumer and business environments. It’s not perfect, but the price is right and Skype is now a verb. The next thing we know, Microsoft will take a good if imperfect service and “improve” it by integrating it with Office or SharePoint (a good product on its own). And, at some point, Microsoft will try to make us pay for it. In more ways than one.

But, again, the history isn’t there. Microsoft’s ability to successfully charge for a formerly free product is lacking.

Reactions to the Skype deal have been negative, if not downright derisive. Many see the Skype acquisition as more evidence that Microsoft can’t innovate, or even effectively copy and out-implement anymore. One local exec asked, rhetorically, how much it’d take to re-implement Skype. $100M? $1B? It’s not a question of money. Microsoft spends tons in R&D: 15% of sales, about $9B per year. (Apple spends 2% of revenue, less than $2B.) Think of iTunes: it’s been out there for close to ten years and there’s no iTunes clone coming out of Redmond. Microsoft has to buy what it no longer has the people or the culture to create — or copy.

David Pogue, the NY Times’ tech guru, thinks this acquisition will go where so many went before: to failure by mediocrity and to poisoning by matrix management.

Ben Brooks, a Microsoft shareholder — and not the disgruntled kind — comments on the Skype deal and concludes: The Ballmer Days Are Over. Perhaps, but who can tackle the job of turning Microsoft around?

In last year’s May 30th Monday Note, I wrote Ballmer had opened the “Second Envelope”. He was running out of explanations: first blame your predecessor, then fire a few subordinates. Next, you’re out of excuses and out the door.

Since then, a few more subordinates have decided to “spend more time with their families”: CTO Ray Ozzie, who wrote a long, long farewell memo (don’t do that, it doesn’t make you look good); Tablet executive Bill Mitchell; Bob Muglia, President of the Server and Tools Division. We’ll exclude Stephen Elop, the President of the Business Division who went on to rescue Nokia, as he might have left of his own volition — or of his seeing Ballmer looking for the next excuse.

Last year, I noted Microsoft’s stock had been stagnant for almost ten years. Things haven’t improved since then:

In the past 12 months, Microsoft’s stock has fallen by 11% while the Nasdaq climbed 25%, Google 7%, and Apple 44%.

Having run out of ideas and envelopes, is Ballmer spending $8.5B of Microsoft’s $50B cash, its biggest acquisition so far, as a desperate tentative to keep the company, or himself, in the game?

Back to the fantasy: Today, Nokia’s market cap is about $32B, a bit less than four times Skype’s price. In theory, Microsoft would have to pay a premium…but imagine Nokia’s situation if Microsoft hadn’t generously “lent” them Stephen Elop and struck a Windows Phone 7 deal “worth billions” to the Finnish company. What would be the market cap for a rudderless Nokia?

And Nokia comes with revenue, about $40B last year. The Nokia Devices and Services business alone makes about $3B in profits per year — almost as much as Microsoft’s Online division lost in 2010.

That would get attention, and credibility, and criticism, and hope. Instead, we got a yawn.

JLG@mondaynote.com

What I want for my Mac

by Jean-Louis Gassée

I was a happy man. After twelve years of Windows use at work — the usual Outlook excuse — I was about to be saved by Vista.

On January 30th 2007, 8:00 am, the doors opened at Fry’s in Palo Alto. I showed up early to claim my prize, a 17” HP laptop with Vista factory-installed. I walked in and found that I was more than first in line — I was alone. Unfortunately, I didn’t take this as a warning. I bought the macho machine and completed the expedition with a $400 Office 2007 DVD.

That same morning, I flew to an industry conference, sat in the last row (as usual) so I could play with my new machine — and began to realize my mistake. I had become comfortable with Windows XP, deriving geek pride from my ability to juggle firewall settings, virus and malware countermeasures, I answered the Genuine Windows Advantage challenges and made coffee while the system checked for updates.

But Vista defeated me. I cracked. I walked down University Avenue to the Palo Alto Apple Store and bought a black MacBook (and Parallels software so I could still run Windows XP during the detox period).

The following Monday, my VC partners did a double take when they walked into the conference room: They saw the big Apple logo on the laptop and Microsoft Outlook projected on the big screen. Four years later, one by one, my partners are moving to the Light Side. (I also have a Dell netbook running Windows 7 — but it’s for “research.”)

During those four years, (some of) my Apple prayers have been answered: I have a new 11” MacBook Air, a neatbook I can really use on an airplane — even when the large gentleman sitting one row ahead suddenly reclines the back of his seat. Some days I wish I had a Mac as small and pocketable as my 2001 Toshiba Libretto but, all in all, my 11” Air is the most pleasant laptop I’ve ever owned, even more so than my dearly departed (stolen in Paris) 1991 PowerBook Duo.

Enough nostalgia, I also have unanswered prayers. We’ll start with two easy ones.

My iPad, which I use less often now that I have the MacBook Air, has 3G connectivity. On my laptop I have to use a modem, the Verizon MiFi 3G. It converts the cellular data connection into a WiFi hotspot in my pocket and can support up to five ‘clients’. I use a similar but even smaller device from Orange when I’m in France. I could, of course, use my Android phone as a hotspot (again, for ‘‘research’’), and there are recurrent rumors that someday AT&T will let my iPhone play the same role, but I’d like to cut out the middle man. Now that we know the Verizon iPhone 4 uses the bi-sexual ecumenical CDMA/GSM radio chip, there is hope that all future mobile devices from Apple, MacBook Air included, will have worldwide cellular connectivity.

Less important, but still helpful for this klutz who breaks toes in the dark against furniture, I’d like Jon Ive, Apple’s design guru, to take a weekend afternoon and whip up a black envelope for my laptop. The one he designed for the iPad spares me embarrassment and money every time I drop my tablet.

More difficult: I’d like a MobileMe that works.

MobileMe is erratic, the Back to My Mac feature works, then stops working, and then works again for no apparent reason. Synchronization between machines is so haphazard I finally switched to DropBox — it’s free for up to 2GB of impeccably Cloud-synced files, and a mere $10/month for 50Gb. DropBox hasn’t always worked well on OS X, but the latest version seems to be stable and manages to sync data for a large number of platforms and applications. As an example, it syncs my 1Password passwords across all my desktop and mobile devices, including Android and Windows.

As described in a previous Note, I bought the family pack for OS X and iLife updates even though the ‘’single” version can be installed on any number of machines. That alone probably gets me into the lower tier of the Friendly Idiot database somewhere in Apple’s Cloud, but the fact that I also pay $100/yr for MobileMe upgrades me to Platinum status.

Two days ago, I left a Word file open on my office iMac. At home, when I realized my mistake, I thought I could reach into the office using Back to My Mac, close the file and then open the copy that had been stored/synced through DropBox. Back to My Mac refused to work that night, but I could still open the file from DropBox and continue writing.

At the office the next day, the “old” document was tagged for deletion when I opened the newer version from DropBox. It sounds complicated and it is: Subtle conflicts of timing and location can make syncing difficult for normal humans.

I thought that’s why we have Apple, the non-IT company that caters to The Rest of Us, but, unfortunately, its Cloud services are messy, unpredictable, and filled with rigid silos. The Apple Cloud is supposed to smooth the seams of synchronization but fails to do so because information isn’t properly shared between its various functions.

I experienced another example of Cloud rigidity when I bought a new $99 Developer subscription. I used the Apple ID and the credit card I use all the time for MobileMe and iTunes purchases. The sale went through, Apple took my money…

…but right after the successful cashectomy a cranky algorithm complained about inconsistencies and refused to activate my subscription. Instead, I got an email message asking me to send a notarized copy of my ID by fax:

I’m sure the robot meant well; perhaps its poorly-fed algorithm causes it to bark at shadows. I emailed twice, requesting help and conceding that I may have contributed to the problem. But, ahem, why did you take my money? And why resort to such antiquated means to resolve the situation? Can’t a human use judgment and an email or phone call to correct the misunderstanding?

24 hours later, no one had gotten back to me.

So, why am I enrolling in the Apple Developer Program? I want to test an early version of the next OS X release, Lion, which is rumored to borrow some of the look and spirit of the iPad. In last November’s Monday Note, I criticized the Finder for being too complicated. I’m curious to see if Lion will simplify the UI, fulfill its promise of moving to a more intuitive way of organizing and navigating the content of our machines.

[Apple Insider just published a neat series of posts covering many of Lion’s new features.]

(Interestingly, the new developer release is distributed through one of Apple’s Cloud services, the Mac App Store, the one that continues to enthusiastically embrace my Apple ID — and credit card.)

Still, if I could have only one wish, what would it be?

Without a doubt, it’d be a working MobileMe. Free? Nice, but I’ll take working over free.

[This isn’t my lucky week. After I wrote the above, I bought the $0.99 FaceTime app for Brigitte’s Mac and for mine. This turned into another obstacle course of inconsistencies in Apple’s Cloud, to say nothing of UI trouble. Who tests these things? Engineers or mere mortals?]

JLG@mondaynote.com

Mobile World Clusterf#^k — 2011 Edition

Plus ça change…et plus.

We are at this year’s Mobile World Congress, held last week in Barcelona. One of the usual suspects, AT&T CEO Randall Stephenson, stands and delivers the new and improved party line: App Stores are bad. Stephenson wants cross-platform apps delivered through the Wholesale Applications Community (WAC), whose “commercial launch’’ takes place at the conference.

At last year’s conference, carriers made similar noises, dutifully reported in this 2010 Mobile World Clusterf#^k Monday Note, and no less diligently mocked in TechCrunch

(“The Wholesale Applications Community Sounds Like a Disaster in the Making.”) Now that AT&T is no longer the exclusive iPhone carrier in the US, the App Store that used to boost their iPhone sales (with a fat $100/month ARPU) also benefits Verizon.

AT&T’s carrier-centric view of the world remains unchanged: Phones are a commodity. Their sole raison d’être is to act as a transmission medium, a hard-to-disconnect hose attached to our wallets that sucks out as much money as possible…in legal ways, of course…most of the time.

To Mr. Stephenson, a financial executive (he used to be CFO of Southwestern Bell), Apple’s App Store and its ilk violate the carrier’s birthright. Unveiled last year and re-announced last week, the path to redemption is clear: WAC, a cross-carrier, cross-platform “community.” Who wouldn’t want the security of a carrier-hosted universal application library? Simple, no?

No.

Software is the music of smartphones. Picture two musical instruments, a pipe organ and a spinet piano. Consider the organ in the picture, three keyboards, a pedalboard, the “ranks” (sets of pipes) controlled by stops along the sides:

The organ’s sonic palette is broad and deep: A wide ambitus of pitch, from the gut-wrenching near-subsonic to the hair-raising upper reaches; a panoply of timbres; infinite sustain; capable of terrifying volume…

The spinet…

Music written for an organ transcribed — cross-platformed — for a spinet…it’s just not the same. Why aim for the lowest common denominator?

Metaphor aside, restricting the features and capabilities of an app so it fits on every smartphone doesn’t inspire hardware and software innovation.

Just as important — and I’m not sure I can put this diplomatically — in matters of application software and, more generally, taste, what’s the carriers’ record? Do they think customers care more about “one size fits all” sophistry than they do about quality? Subscribers have proven their willingness to pay a premium for products that demonstrate attention to form and function.

AT&T’s “get off my lawn” attitude reeks of nostalgia for the Good Old Days when carriers dictated features and prices. The inevitable disintermediation of their business started with the iPhone apostasy and will soon expand when an unlocked smartphone from Mediatek (see Stephen Elop’s memo) running an Android derivative (OMS/oPhone or Tapas) can be had for $79 or less.

The cross-carrier/cross-platform WAC will make as much progress this year as it did in the last 12 months. Next year’s PowerPoint slides won’t need much editing.

But that was just the appetizer.

The pièce de résistance at this year’s MWC was the MicroNokia CF:

Nokia has given up on its smartphone platforms and has adopted Windows Phone 7.

  • Symbian (Nokia’s current platform) will be “harvested,” which mean Symbian will be flogged until MicroNokia handsets ship in sufficient volume.
  • Meego (a Linux derivative and Nokia’s former future) has been put to pasture…but will ship as a face-saving “research project.”
  • Qt, Nokia’s cross-platform UI framework, has been abandoned. Microsoft will provide the UI.

This is supposed to reverse Nokia’s well-documented market share and profit decline.

Last year, Nokia fired its CEO, OPK (Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo) and hired a Microsoft executive, Stephen Elop. If you click on the link, you’ll see Nokia’s future CEO with a Nokia exec, Kai Öistämö, now reporting to him. Titillating as they might be, we’ll skip the conspiracy theories, they shed no light on the MicroNokia’s future.

It’s not going to be pretty.

Nokia faces an extremely difficult business model transition. One foot in the “we own everything” boat, the other in the Windows Phone 7 skiff. The integrated business model is sinking, and the new Microsoft smartphone platform isn’t floating very well. Consumers and carriers might desert Symbian devices faster than MicroNokia handsets gain acceptance. (Actually, “handsets” is the wrong word. As discussed in Elop’s Burning Platform memo, “ecosystem” is more appropriate: devices + applications + app store + services + content distribution + carriers.)

It gets worse. Today, Nokia sells huge volumes everywhere around the world (except in the US), more than 120M phones per quarter, of which 28M are Symbian devices. How will Nokia’s business fare against the surge of unlocked $79 “Android” derivatives?

We hear Nokia’s explanation for not choosing Android: Not enough differentiation, Windows Phone 7 will give us more control over our destiny, we have a “special partnership” with Microsoft. Special, differentiated…but how? What about other Windows Phone 7 licensees? How will Microsoft succeed in creating a thriving ecosystem if one partner is more equal than the others?

Then there’s the money behind the deal. “Billions,” we’re told, but without further details. Will it be cash, considerations in kind, support, licensing rebates, marketing budget? In time, we’ll get more data.

Such alliances have a way of not working with Microsoft, whose record on the matter is terrible. On his Asymco site, Horace Dediu lists Microsoft’s failed smartphone partnerships. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, the common factor in those failures is Microsoft, its culture, its ways.

(But wait, the MicroNokia alliance is different. Stephen Elop is a cultural diplomat, he’s familiar with the Microsoft ethos, he was the executive in charge of the Office documents partnership with Nokia…)

Microsoft is no longer the successful, dominant player that it was in the PC business. It’s trying to get back into a race that RIM, Google, and Apple are winning. As a result, Microsoft is willing to provide incentives to application developers and handset makers. Big incentives.

And big incentives are justifiable. Microsoft execs realize they no longer have the upper hand, that they must use “all means necessary” to get back into the smartphone revolution, the biggest high-tech rocket we’ve ever seen, combining three engines: Cloud, Social, and Very Personal Computers a.k.a. Smartphones.

To Microsoft’s credit, another tenet of its culture is “never give up.” Like the Harvard football coach he once was, Steve Ballmer tells his troops to keep trying and trying until they succeed, and he has the resources, the money, the people — and his board’s support — to keep at it. I take issue with his wanton disregard for annoying facts, but, good faith or not, I can’t help but admire the unwavering leader and the expert showman.

Still, I doubt this MicroNokia deal will be enough to put Microsoft back in the smartphone and tablets race.

With this in mind, why not acquire Nokia and its worldwide manufacturing and distribution?  For Microsoft, this wouldn’t be a first. They went “integrated” (or, if you prefer, “Apple”) with the Xbox business and controlled the platform in its entirety. The MicroNokia marriage would be a difficult one, certainly, but it would give Microsoft more control over its own destiny. Suitable explanations would be provided: It’s a new era, we have an opportunity to become the largest smartphone maker, and (while we’re being cheeky) it’s a way to thwart the looming Google/Android licensing monopoly.

Who knows, Ballmer might change his mind. If he doesn’t, he might put yet another failed partnership on his résumé.

JLG@mondaynote.com

Mac App Store: Soon But Controversial

by Jean-Louis Gassée

This year, three wishes were on top of my list: A smaller, lighter MacBook, an app store for the Mac, and a curated iOS app store. I got two out of three. The 11” MacBook Air works quite well when the passenger in front of me fully reclines his seat; and Apple, following its own iOS example, did indeed launch a Mac App store. We’ll have to wait for curated help finding our way through the hundreds of thousands of apps for iPhones, iPads, and iPod Touches, but there’s always next year.

The Mac App Store, announced October 20th, is still in the Coming Soon state, likely to open its ports mid-to-late January 2011. Mac developers have been able to bring their offerings to Apple’s altar since the beginning of November and, last week, we got a new set of Mac App Store Review Guidelines (see the PDF here). No real surprise, and a nice conclusion I’ll quote in full:

Thank you for developing for Mac OS X. Even though this document is a formidable list of what not to do, please also keep in mind the much shorter list of what you must do. Above all else, join us in trying to surprise and delight users. Show them their world in innovative ways, and let them interact with it like never before. In our experience, users really respond to polish, both in functionality and user interface. Go the extra mile. Give them more than they expect. And take them places where they have never been before. We are ready to help.

Except for the tired “surprise and delight” marketing BS, it’s a crisp envoi, a sendoff to a fresh set of tasks and opportunities. And, as befits anything Apple does, the Mac App Store kicks up a new and improved set of arguments.

Unavoidably, we have the C-word heat: ‘Steve Jobs is a Control freak. After Closing the iPhone ecosystem, he wants to exert the same dictatorial control over the Mac. Yet another Walled Garden’. The following Fair and Balanced extract from the Wikipedia Mac App Store article lays it out:

The centralization of downloads in the Mac App Store have caused controversy among apple developers in the blogosphere. It has been criticized for creating a monopoly since users are encouraged to get their applications from one specific place. This creates a hard situation for programmers that might feel like they can’t afford to stay outside apple store. Apple also charges a fee for programmers to publish their applications in the store. In order to host an application a user need to give 30% of the applications sales price. This is way more than the 8% that software providers like Kagi, eSellerate, or FastSpring charges. The developers doesn’t only have to pay for selling their apps but also to develop them. Special tools are needed that can only be licensed from Apple. Developers have also criticized Apple for cutting their connections with the customers when App store is being used, since they have to follow Apples rules it’s impossible to use for example Shareware versions and control how updates are done.

This hasty, one-sided—and badly written—piece is a good illustration of Wikipedia’s limits. As a counter, I’ll hasten to point you to the much more complete App Store article. The latter exemplifies Wikipedia at its best: Wide, deep, accurate, filled with numbers and links to other sources.

The main beef against the Mac App store seems to be that it will hurt developers. In an extension of the iOS App Store authoritarian regime, developers will lose the freedom to sell their software as they please.

That’s simply unfounded, and counterproductive paranoia: Mac software will continue to be sold (and sellable) on shelves and on Web sites. But who gets to approach these venues? Small, independent app developers have a terrible time getting shelf space in retail stores. Making money by selling one’s wares on the Web isn’t an easy task either. See here a 1995 Dilbert strip that depicts the hard life of an application developer trying to raise VC money. Fifteen years later, having moved to The Dark Side, I can assure you VCs haven’t gotten more generous…unless you write code for the Apple or Google app stores. In 2008, Kleiner Perkins, the famed Sand Hill Road VC firm, launched a special $100M iFund dedicated to iPhone apps. Two years later, the iFund has doubled in size. Knowing we VCs aren’t non-profit charities, one has to assume we see the victims of app store monopolies making lots of money, of which we’ll get our customarily modest share.

When the Wikipedia piece professes to lament Apple’s 30% take, it shows a deep misunderstanding of the money one needs to sell application software on the Web. You must build and run a commercial site, and, if you’re too small to get a commercial Visa or PayPal account, you also pay a commission to Kagi and similar agents. Then you have to attract customers by spending advertising dollars and buying Google AdWords. That’s why Google’s rich and you’re not.

Microsoft can afford to get shelf and Web space for Office, but a small developer who’s written a neat text editor, or a Website design tool, or a small $10 UI-tweaking utility has a hard time making a living.

At least for today.

Tomorrow, just like with Android and Apple smartphones, the most expensive process will be writing the app, and the occasionally irritating part will be the review process.

Yes, there will be a loss of “freedom.” Today on Macs (and PCs) you can sell code that modifies the machine at any level. It can yield very useful results, or it can wreak havoc, there are (almost) no limits. Tomorrow, the Mac App Store will impose restrictions. Some will irritate, some will be acceptable. We’ve seen Apple back down from some of the more aggressive interpreter restrictions for iOS apps, for example. But your neat $10 utility will find customers, updates will be managed, payment processing won’t be a problem.

And there will be other beneficial effects. Most Mac applications install with a simple drag and drop to the Application folder or icon on the Dock. Uninstalling is equally simple: Drag the app to the Trash and you’re done…most of the time. I won’t name the apps that are, in my experience, the worst offenders but suffice it to say that they sprinkle my system with bits that are very hard to cleanly uninstall. And, just like in Windows, removing one application might maim another program from the same vendor because they both rely on the same module. This is likely to disappear over time as Mac users contrast and compare app installation and updating behaviors inside and outside the walled garden.

It’ll be interesting to watch how prices evolve, if they do. The iPad version of Pages, Apple’s Word processor, sells for a mere $9.99. On the Macintosh, Pages is part of the iWork suite which includes Numbers (a spreadsheet) and Keynote (Steve Jobs’ own presentation software) and sells for $79, or a Family Pack (5 licenses) for $99. Will those prices stand? Perhaps, especially if Apple wants to make room for Scrivener or DevonThink, to name but two examples.

And what about Microsoft? Today, Microsoft Office for Mac 2011 retail prices ranges from $149 to $279, depending upon the version and number of licenses (two for the priciest).

Do we think Microsoft gives less than 30% margin to the total wholesaler + retailer food chain? Of course not, the distribution network’s take is traditionally much higher, sometimes exceeding 50%. Which is to say even Microsoft will like the Mac App Store “strictures”. We’ll have to see how they whine if they’re rejected for infringing some arcane guideline…

This is a good moment to remind ourselves of Apple’s true nature and goals: Apple is a hardware company. For all the beautiful noises they make about software, they don’t care much about making money from it. Software is a means to an end: Hardware margins.

Microsoft puts a code on the Windows disk to protect its OS revenue. Have you seen a license number on an OS X disk? No, you can install it on as many machines as you like…Apple machines, that is. A multiple install from a “single” disk might be in breach of the formal licensing agreement, but unless you’re manufacturing Mac clones, I doubt Apple’s attorneys will be looking for you. (They seem to be very busy fighting patent wars.)

The “blogosphere controversy” blithely ignores the only source of money that matters: The paying customer. Does the new Mac App Store benefit the user? Easier everything: buying, installing, updating. On the iOS platform, there have been more than 7 billion downloads from a library of more than 300,000 apps. We’re probably not going to see such numbers on the Mac version. There are far fewer applications, a smaller installed base (in approximate quarterly numbers, think 3 million Macs versus 15 million iPhones), and alternate venues for selling applications. Nonetheless, even if the new app store has a more modest debut and subsequent growth, it’ll be a good vehicle for smaller developers who struggle with the inconvenience and cost of today’s channels. It might even have the effect of attracting new developers to the OS X platform.

A controversial idea indeed.

And as for Steve Jobs’ controlling manners, who’s complaining? Customers, shareholders?
Oppressed employees? See the Stockholm Syndrome at work below:

JLG@mondaynote.com

Google Apps: The Future or Yesterday’s War?

by Jean-Louis Gassée

One must be at least a little skeptical of product reviews, and, even more so, product reviewers. They usually don’t spend their own money on the product and they’re under constant pressure to produce more newspaper columns, or blog post after blog post.
There are exceptions: I trust Consumer Reports (they buy the products they test); Walt Mossberg and David Pogue provide consistent, intelligent reviews. I don’t always agree with them, but I respect their intellect and ethics.

I’m not a “professional” reviewer; I buy the gadgets that I read about (just ask my wife, Brigitte, who claims there’s “one of each” in various rats nests around the house). And I don’t test them; instead, I do my best to use them in a real project.

This brings us to Google Apps. (For a look Under The Hood, see the May 24th 2010 Monday Note here.)

For Google Apps, the real project was (and still is) a French newsletter and blog imaginatively named Note du Lundi. I buy a domain name and the paid-for Premiere version, the one where they answer your tech support questions. If you do it right—that is, if you buy your domain with your Google Checkout account and register it through godaddy.com—the process is easy, the domain registrar offers hosting services, and the on-phone tech support is competent and pleasant.

I fire up the Google Docs app that comes with my newly-purchased domain and start writing a newsletter article. Wanting to make a point by using a graphic, I drag and drop a picture from my Pictures folder. No dice. Instead of this:

I get this:

Google Docs knows where the image lives, and it also knows its type (PDF)—but it can’t insert it into the document I’m creating. An “antique” desktop word processor would have no trouble with the task.

I try another path: There’s an Insert Image icon in Docs that lets you browse to an image file on your hard drive. You click on the file and it’s uploaded to the Cloud and into your Docs repository. More

The iPadification of OS X – Part II

by Jean-Louis Gassée

Two weeks ago, I argued that iOS will evolve into the operating system for future incarnations of iMacs and MacBooks. The comments on the article provided abundant food for thought, so much so that I decided to argue the opposite point of view: Yes, OS X and iOS share some bits of DNA…but that’s irrelevant. No, iOS will not evolve into an OS X replacement for future iMacs and MacBooks.

The OS hairball is ugly enough as it is. Why try and merge two feature sets, two philosophies? More lines of code inside the OS. That’s what the world needs!

Take a look at this:

And now this:

Same company, but two very different views of personal computing.

Today’s Macintosh is the result of more than a quarter century of evolution, refinement, fixes, and additions. It’s highly functional but complicated, perhaps needlessly so. Ask most Mac users if they know what this Finder button is for:

Or ask about Exposé, Spaces, Stacks in Grid or Fan view… The first two are helpful for advanced users who work with a large number of documents and windows at the same time. As for the Grid and Fan, I’m not a fan, I think they add new modes without providing a payoff for the investment in learning.

Or try the joy of writing UNIX commands in a Terminal window:

defaults write com.apple.Dock showhidden -bool YES

defaults write com.apple.finder QLEnableXRayFolders 1

Both are cute and harmless. The first causes the Dock icon of an app to become translucent when the app is hidden. The second adds a clever flourish to the Quick Look of a folder, letting you peek at the folder’s content through its semi-transparent cover.

See Mac OS X Tips for more such neat, well-crafted features that you can add and subtract almost ad infinitum—if you have the need or the lust. Or, depending on the type of user you are, the tips present a mind-boggling array of functions, buttons to click, keyboard shortcuts to memorize, uncountable ways of doing things that aren’t always coherent.

That said, Apple’s personal computers are doing just fine, Consumer Reports and others invariably rate them high, their market share grows year after year. One is tempted to resort to a post hoc ergo propter hoc justification: Adding features adds market share.

Looking at the iPad’s Home screen, we see the other extreme. Apple’s tablet is so “transparent” that most users, this geek included, forget that it doesn’t have a windowing system. Yes, it has a Dock, but there’s no Finder, no windows, no file system, no sidebar. Just icons, applications that launch and quit without delay. Downloading and installing applications is simple (although finding them isn’t always easy. I think the App Store needs curation and better discovery tools; see a past Monday Note on this very topic here).

We iPad users lead a simpler, cleaner life. Why would we want the bewilderment of a slower, more complicated OS? The answer is as old as mankind: Because we want to have it both ways. Intuitive and simple but loaded with features,  “optioned-out” says the car salesman.
We want both postures: Leaning back to watch NetFlix, and leaning forward to type these Monday Notes.

Today, that’s not really possible. Going back to the example I cited two weeks ago, adding a docking keyboard to an iPad creates awkward ergonomics. You have to lift your hand and reach out and touch the screen to move the insertion point in your text. So, then, can’t we have a Magic Trackpad next to the keyboard, or a keyboard with an integrated trackpad, like a laptop? For the time being, the answer is no. As discussed here, the iPad doesn’t “know” what a pointing device is, it doesn’t have cursor control. A hypothetical clamshell iPad, with a laptop-like folding keyboard and trackpad wouldn’t help. More