It’s the Competitive Spirit, Stupid

 

Legacy media suffer from a deadly DNA mutation: they’ve lost  their appetite for competition; they no longer have the will to fight the hordes of new, hungry mutants emerging from the digital world. 

For this week’s column, my initial idea was to write about Obama’s high tech campaign. As in 2008, his digital team once again raised the bar on the use of data mining, micro-targeting, behavioral analysis, etc. As Barack Obama’s strategist David Axelrod suggested just a year ago in Bloomberg BusinessWeek, compared to what they were working on, the 2008 campaign technology looked prehistoric. Without a doubt, mastering the most sophisticated practices played a crucial role in Obama’s November 6th victory.

As I researched the subject, I decided against writing about it. This early after the election, it would have been difficult to produce more than a mere update to my August 2008 story, Learning from the Obama Internet Machine. But, OK. For those of you interested in the matter, here are a couple of resources I found this week: An interesting book by Sasha Issenberg, The Victory Lab, The Secret Science of  Winning Campaigns, definitely worth a read; or previously unknown tidbits in this Stanford lecture by Dan Siroker, an engineer who left Google to join the Obama campaign in 2008. (You can also feast on a Google search with terms like “obama campaign + data mining + microtargeting”.)

I switched subjects because something jumped at me: the contrast between a modern election campaign and the way traditional media cover it. If it could be summed up in a simplistic (and, sorry, too obvious) graph, it would look like this :

The 2012 Election campaign carries all the ingredients of the fiercest of competitions: concentrated in a short time span; fueled by incredible amounts of cash (thus able to get the best talent and technology money can buy); a workforce that is, by construction, the most motivated any manager can dream of, a dedicated staff led by charismatic stars of the trade; a binary outcome with a precise date and time (first Tuesday of November, every four years.) As if this was not enough, the two camps actually compete for a relatively small part of the electorate, the single digit percentage that will swing one way or the other.

At the other end of the spectrum, you have traditional media. Without falling into caricature, we can settle for the following descriptors: a significant pool of (aging) talent; a great sense of entitlement; a remote connection with the underlying economics of the business; a remarkably tolerance for mediocrity (unlike, say, pilots, or neurosurgeons); and, stemming from said tolerance, a symmetrical no-reward policy — perpetuated by unions and guilds that planted their nails in the media’s coffin.

My point: This low level of competitive metabolism has had a direct and negative impact on the economic performance of legacy media.

In countries, regions, or segments where newsrooms compete the most on a daily basis (on digital or print), business is doing just fine.

That is the case in Scandinavia which enjoys good and assertive journalism, with every media trying to beat the other in every possible way: investigation, access to sources, creative treatment, real-time coverage, innovations in digital platforms… The UK press is also intensively competitive — sometimes for the worse as shown in the News Corp phone hacking scandal. To some extent, German, Italian, Spanish media are also fighting for the news.

At the other end of the spectrum, the French press mostly gave up competing. The market is more or less distributed on the basis readers’ inclinations. The biggest difference manifests itself when a source decides to favor one media against the others. Reminding someone of the importance of competing, of sometimes taking a piece of news from someone else’s plate tends to be seen as ill-mannered, not done. The result is an accelerating drop in newspapers sales. Strangely enough, Nordic media will cooperate without hesitation when it comes to sharing industrial resources such as printing plants and distribution channels while being at each other’s throat when it comes to news gathering. By contrast, the French will fight over printing resources, but will cooperate when it’s time to get subsidies from the government or to fight Google.

Digital players do not suffer from such a cumbersome legacy. Building organizations from scratch, they hired younger staff and set up highly motivated newsrooms. Pure players such as Politico, Business Insider, TechCrunch and plenty of others are fighting in their beat, sometimes against smaller but sharper blogs. Their journalistic performance (although uneven) translates into measurable audience bursts that turn into advertising revenues.

Financial news also fall into that same category. Bloomberg, DowJones and Reuters are fighting for their market-mover status as well for the quality — and usefulness — of their reporting; subscriptions to their service depends on such performance. Hence the emergence of a “quantifiable motivation” for the staff. At Bloomberg — one of the most aggressive news machine in the world — reporters are provided financial incentives for their general performance and rewarded for exclusive information. Salaries and bonuses are high, so is the workload. But CVs are pouring in — a meaningful indicator.

Digital newsrooms are much more inclined to performance measurements than old ones. This should be seen as an advantage. As gross as it might sound to many journalists, media should seize the opportunity that comes with modernizing their publishing tools to revise their compensation policies. The main index should be “Are we doing better than the competition? Does X or Y contribute to our competitive edge?”. Aside from the editor’s judgement, new metrics will help. Ranking in search engines and aggregators; tweets, Facebook Likes; appearances on TV or radio shows; syndication (i.e. paid-for republication elsewhere)… All are credible indicators. No one should be afraid to use them to reward talent and commitment.

It’s high time to reshuffle the nucleotides and splice in competitive DNA strands, they do contribute to economic performance.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

 

Minding The (Apple)Store

 

As I’ve written many times in the past, I’m part of the vast chorus that praises the Apple Store. And not just for the uncluttered product displays, the no-pressure sales people (who aren’t on commission), or the Genius Bar that provides expert help, but for the impressive architecture. Apple beautifies existing venues (Regent Street in London, rue Halevy near the Paris Opera) or commissions elegant new buildings, huge ones at times.

It’s a relentlessly successful story. Even the turmoil surrounding John Browett’s abbreviated tenure as head of Apple’s worldwide retail organization hasn’t slowed the pace  of store openings and customer visits. (As always, Horace Dediu provides helpful statistics and analysis in his latest Asymco post.)

It has always struck me as odd that in Palo Alto, Apple’s heartland and Steve Jobs’ adopted hometown, Apple had only a modestly-sized, unremarkable venue on University Avenue, and an even smaller store in the Stanford Shopping Center.

All of that changed on October 27th when the black veil that shrouded an unmarked project was removed, and the newest Apple Store — what some are calling a “prototype” for future venues, a “flagship” store — was revealed. (For the civic-minded — or the insomniac — you can read the painfully detailed proposal, submitted to Palo Alto’s Architectural Review Board nearly three years ago, here.)

I came back from a trip on November 2nd, the day the iPad mini became available, and immediately headed downtown. The new store is big, bold, elegant, even more so at night when the very bright lights and large Apple logo on its front dominate the street scene. (So much so I heard someone venture that Apple has recast itself as the antagonist in its 1984 commercial.)

The store is impressive… but its also unpleasantly, almost unbearably noisy. And mine isn’t a voice in the wilderness. The wife of a friend walked in, spent a few minutes, and vowed to never return for fear of hearing loss. She’d rather go to the cramped but much more hospitable Stanford store.

A few days later, I heard a similar complaint from the spouse of an Apple employee. She used to enjoy accompanying her husband to the old Palo Alto store, but now refuses because of the cacophony.

‘Now you know the real reason for Browett’s firing’, a friend said, half-seriously. ‘How can you spend North of $15M on such a strategically placed, symbolic store, complete with Italian stone hand-picked by Jobs himself…and give no consideration to the acoustics? It’s bad for customers, it’s bad for the staff, it’s bad for business, and it’s bad for the brand. Apple appears to be more concerned with style than with substance!’

Ouch.

The sound problem stems from a combination of the elongated “Great Hall”, parallel walls, and reflective building materials. The visually striking glass roof becomes a veritable parabolic sound mirror. There isn’t a square inch of sound-absorbing material in the entire place.

A week later, I returned to the store armed with the SPL Meter iPhone app. As the name indicates, SPL Meter provides a Sound Pressure Level (SPL) measurement in decibels.(Decibels form a logarithmic scale where a 3 dB increase means roughly twice as much sound pressure — noise in our case; +10 dB is ten times the sound pressure.)

For reference, a normal conversation at 3 feet (1m) is 40 to 60 dB; a passenger car 30 feet away produces levels between 60 and 80 dB. From the Wikipedia article above: “[The] EPA-identified maximum to protect against hearing loss and other disruptive effects from noise, such as sleep disturbance, stress, learning detriment, etc. [is] 70 dB.”

On a relatively quiet Saturday evening, the noise level around the Genius Bar exceeded 75 dB:

Outside, the traffic noise registered a mere 65 dB. It was 10 db noisier inside the store than on always-busy University Avenue!

Even so, the store on that Friday was a virtual library compared to the day the iPad mini was launched, although I can’t quantify my impression: I didn’t have the presence of mind to whip out my iPhone and measure it.

Despite the (less-than-exacting) scientific evidence and the corroborating anecdotes, I began to have my doubts. Was I just “hearing things”? Could Apple really be this tone deaf?

Then I saw it: An SPL recorder — a professional one — perched on a tripod inside the store.

I also noticed two employees wearing omnidirectional sound recorders on their shoulders (thinking they might not like the exposure, I didn’t take their pictures.) Thus, it appears that Apple is taking the problem seriously.

But what can it do?

It’s a safe bet that Apple has already engaged a team of experts, acousticians who tweak the angles and surfaces in concert halls and problem venues. I’ve heard suggestions that Apple should install an Active Noise Control system: Cancel out sound waves by pumping in their inverted forms — all in real time. Unfortunately, this doesn’t work well (or at all) in a large space.

Bose produces a rather effective solution…in the controlled environment of headphones.

This prompted the spouse mentioned above to suggest that Apple should hand out Bose headphones at the door.

Two days after the noisy Apple store opened its doors, Browett was shown the exit. Either Tim Cook is fast on the draw or, more likely, my friend is wrong: Browett’s unceremonious departure had deeper roots, most likely a combination of a cultural mismatch and a misunderstanding of his role. The Browett graft didn’t take on the Apple rootstock, and the newly hired exec couldn’t accept that he was no longer a CEO.

Browett’s can’t be scapegoated for the acoustical nightmare in the new Apple Store. Did the rightly famous architectural firm, Bohlin Cywinski Jackson, not hear the problem? What about the highly reputable building contractor (DPR) which has built so many other Apple Stores? Did they stand by and say nothing, or could they simply not be heard?

Perhaps this was a case of “Launchpad Chicken”, a NASA phrase for a situation where many people see trouble looming but keep quiet and wait for someone else to bear the shame of aborting the launch. It reminds me of the Apple Maps fiasco: An obvious problem ignored.

What a waste spending all that money and raising expectations only to move from a slightly undersized but well-liked store to a bigger, noisier, colder environment that turns friends away.

Having tacitly admitted that there’s a problem, Apple’s senior management can now show they’ll stop at nothing to make the new store as inviting as it was intended to be.

JLG@mondaynote.com

The press, Google, its algorithm, their scale

 

In their fight against Google, traditional media firmly believe the search engine needs them to refine (and monetize) its algorithm. Let’s explore the facts.

The European press got itself in a bitter battle against Google. In a nutshell, legacy media want money from the search engine: first, for the snippets of news it grabs and feeds into its Google News service; second, on a broader basis, for all the referencing Google builds with news media material. In Germany, the Bundestag is working on a bill to force all news aggregators to pay their toll; in France, the executive is pushing for a negotiated solution before year-end. Italy is more or less following the same path. (For a detailed and balanced background, see this Eric Pfanner story in the International Herald Tribune.)

In the controversy, an argument keeps rearing its head. According to the proponents of a “Google Tax”, media contents greatly improve the contextualization of advertising. Therefore, the search engine giant ought to pay for such value. Financially speaking, without media articles Google would not perform as well it does, hence the European media hunt for a piece of the pie.

Last week, rooting for facts, I spoke with several people possessing deep knowledge of Google’s inner mechanics; they ranged from Search Engine Marketing specialists to a Stanford Computer Science professor who taught Larry Page and Sergey Brin back in the mid-90′s.

First of all, pretending to know Google is indeed… pretentious. In order to outwit both competitors and manipulators (a.k.a, Search Engine Optimization gurus), the search engine keeps tweaking its secret sauce. Just for the August-September period, Google made no less than 65 alterations to its algorithm (list here.) And that’s only for the known part of the changes; in fact, Google allocates large resources to counter people who try too game its algorithm with an endless stream of tricks.

Maintaining such a moving target also preserves Google’s lead: along with its distributed computing capabilities (called MapReduce), its proprietary data storage system BigTable, its immense infrastructure, Google’s PageRank algorithm is at the core of the search engine’s competitive edge. Allowing anyone to catch up, even a little, is strategically inconceivable.

Coming back to the Press issues, let’s consider both quantitative and qualitative approaches. In the Google universe — currently about 40 billion indexed pages –, contents coming from media amount to a small fraction. It is said to be a low single-digit percentage. To put things in perspective, on average, an online newspaper adds between 20,000 and 100,000 new URLs per year. Collectively, the scale roughly looks like millions of news articles versus a web growing by billions of pages each year.

Now, let’s consider the nature of searches. Using Google Trends for the last three months, the charts below ranks the most searched terms in the United States, France and Germany (click to enlarge):


Do the test yourself by going to the actual page: you’ll notice that, except for large dominant American news topics (“Hurricane Sandy” or “presidential debate”), very few search results bring back contents coming from mainstream media. As Google rewards freshness of contents — as well as sharp SEO tactics — “web native” media and specialized web sites perform much better than their elder “migrants”, that is web versions of traditional media.

What about monetization ?  How do media contents contribute to Google’s bottom line? Again let’s look at the independent rankings of the most expensive keywords, those that can bring $50 per click to Google — through its opaque pay-per-click bidding system. For instance, here is a recent Wordstream ranking (example keywords in parenthesis):

Insurance (“buy car insurance online” and “auto insurance price quotes”)
Loans (“consolidate graduate student loans” and “cheapest homeowner loans”)
Mortgage (“refinanced second mortgages” and “remortgage with bad credit”)
Attorney (“personal injury attorney” and “dui defense attorney”)
Credit (“home equity line of credit” and “bad credit home buyer”)
Lawyer (“personal  injury lawyer”, “criminal defense lawyer)
Donate (“car donation centers”, “donating a used car”)
Degree (“criminal justice degrees online”, “psychology bachelors degree online”)
Hosting (“hosting ms exchange”, “managed web hosting solution”)
Claim (“personal injury claim”, “accident claims no win no fee”)
Conference Call (“best conference call service”, “conference calls toll free”)
Trading (“cheap online trading”, “stock trades online”)
Software (“crm software programs”, “help desk software cheap”)
Recovery (“raid server data recovery”, “hard drive recovery laptop”)
Transfer (“zero apr balance transfer”, “credit card balance transfer zero interest”)
Gas/Electricity (“business electricity price comparison”, “switch gas and electricity suppliers”)
Classes (“criminal justice online classes”, “online classes business administration”)
Rehab (“alcohol rehab centers”, “crack rehab centers”)
Treatment (“mesothelioma treatment options”, “drug treatment centers”)
Cord Blood (“cordblood bank”, “store umbilical cord blood”)

(In my research, several Search Engine Marketing specialists came up with similar results.)

You see where I’m heading to. By construction, traditional media do not bring money to the classification above. In addition, as an insider said to me this week, no one is putting ads against keywords such as “war in Syria” or against the 3.2 billion results of a “Hurricane Sandy” query. Indeed, in the curve of ad words value, news slides to the long tail.

Then, why is Google so interested in news contents? Why has it has been maintaining  Google News for the past ten years, in so many languages, without making a dime from it (there are no ads on the service)?

The answer pertains to the notion of Google’s general internet “footprint”. Being number one in search is fine, but not sufficient. In its goal to own the semantic universe, taking over “territories” is critical. In that context, a “territory” could be a semantic environment that is seen as critical to everyone’s daily life, or one with high monetization potential.

Here are two recent examples of monetization potential as viewed by Google: Flights and Insurance. Having (easily) determined flight schedules were among the most sought after informations on the web, Google dipped into its deep cash reserve and, for $700m, acquired ITA software in July 2010. ITA was the world largest airline search company, powering sites such as Expedia or TripAdvisor. Unsurprisingly, the search giant launched Goolge Flight Search in Sept 2011.

In passing, Google showed its ability to kill any price comparator of its choosing. As for Insurance, the most expensive keyword, Google recently launched its own insurance comparison service in the United Kingdom… just after launching a similar system for credit cards and bank services.

Over the last ten years, Google has become the search tool of choice for Patents, and for scientific papers with Google Scholar. This came after shopping, books, Hotel Finder, etc.

Aside of this strategy of making Google the main — if only — entry point to the web, the search engine is working hard on its next transition: going from a search engine to a knowledge engine.

Early this year, Google created Knowledge Graph, a system that connects search terms to what is known as entities (names, places, events, things) — millions of them. This is Google’s next quantum leap. Again, you might think news related corpuses could constitute the most abundant trove of information to be fed into the Knowledge Graph. Unfortunately, this is not the case. At the core of the Knowledge Graph resides Metaweb, acquired by Google in July 2010. One of its key assets was a database of 12 million entities (now 23m) called Freebase. This database is fed by sources (listed here), ranging from the International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) to the Library of Congress, Eurostat or the India Times. (The only French source of the list is the movie database AlloCine.)

Out of about 230 sources, there are less than 10 medias outlets. Why? Again, volume and, perhaps even more important, ability to properly structure data. When the New York Times has about 14,000 topics, most newspapers only have hundreds of those, and a similar number of named entities in their database. (As a comparison, web native medias are much more skilled at indexation: the Huffington Post assigns between 12 and 20 keywords to each story.) By building upon acquisitions such as Metaweb’s Freebase, Google now has about half billion entries of all kinds.

Legacy media must deal with a harsh reality: despite their role in promoting and defending democracy, in lifting the veil on things that mean much for society, or in propagating new ideas, when it come to data, news media compete in the junior leagues. And for Google, the most data-driven company in the world, having newspapers articles in its search system is no more than small cool stuff.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

Tablets Trade-Offs And Compromises

 

A couple of hours after landing in SFO from Paris, I find myself setting up two new tablets: a Microsoft Surface and an iPad mini. While on the road, I had read much on both products and felt reasonably well prepared for the tasks.

This proved correct. But the product experience was another thing.

First, the Surface: Unpack, plug in, boot up, no problem. The magnetic touch keyboard and power adapter latch onto the tablet-PC without ado, the machine’s virgin launch is a breeze: I answer a few simple questions, enter my hotmail credentials and I’m in business… sort of.

In order to get a taste for the full Surface experience, I fire up Word 2013 (included with the tablet) to write this Monday Note. Not so slick, the keyboard and touchpad aren’t very helpful. When I ordered the Surface, I chose the slim $119.99 Touch Cover combo rather than the thicker $129.99 Type Cover. Building a keyboard into a protective cover is a great idea, but, as the name implies, the Touch version doesn’t have a real keyboard. Instead, you have to work with an unsatisfying, felt-like surface without tactile feedback. For “real” typing, I need the “real” Type Cover. I’m off to Stanford’s MS Store to correct my expensive mistake.

Keyboard problem solved, I hit another snag. While Word 2013 does a good job zooming using a two-finger touch, the Control Panel and other essential parts of Windows RT are (barely) touch-enabled retreads from Windows 7; they ignore your zoom. I discover this when I need to type accented characters such é or ñ, characters that, of course, don’t appear on the keyboard. Normally, this isn’t a problem; go to the Windows Control Panel, select the English International keyboard as the input mode, and you’re set. You type ~ followed by n to get ñ.

But how does this actually work in the reimagined Windows RT? I fumble around and finally find my old friend, the Control Panel:

From there, I go to Clock, Language, and Region, pop open the Input Method menu… and select the wrong mode. Because of the lack of zoom, picking the right option in a list a game of chance. You need the sanded fingertips Steve Jobs famously derided when asked about smaller tablets.

If I use the Touch Cover trackpad instead of directly touching the Control Panel on the ironically named Surface screen, things improve dramatically: My fat fingers now become delicate. This might explain why Microsoft insists on selling a keyboard with its Surface tablet. Without one, in my admittedly limited experience, it’s not quite useable.

Then there’s the UI formerly known as Metro. In the current state of Windows 8 and Windows RT, it’s only skin-deep: Using Office apps or modifying system settings quickly calls up the old Windows 7 UI. It’s not the end of the world, the UI will evolve with future versions but, in the meantime, the much-hyped Surface tablet cum PC feels far from polished and consistent. And the no-less-touted reimagination of Windows doesn’t go much deeper than the very neat and imaginative UI on its… surface.

At least the vaunted Surface kickstand works quite well… although only in landscape mode, and, even then, only if you’re sitting. If you type while standing or want landscape mode, forget the kickstand.

I’ll keep using the product in personal writing and presentations to make sure I’m not missing some killer feature. In the meantime, I’d be interested to know if Steve Ballmer or Microsoft Board Members use a Surface tablet rather than a MacBook Air running Windows 8, a truly excellent combination in my own paid-for experience.

On to the iPad mini.

Like its forebears — and its current competitors — setup is fast and easy. If you already have an iPad or an iPhone backed-up in iCloud, everything syncs and downloads nicely.

But what about the “mini” part?

I bought a Nexus 7 when it came out and liked the fact I could pocket it, whether in jeans or in jacket. The iPad mini is larger than the Nexus, slightly more than half an inch (14.7mm) wider. Still, the “mini” will fit inside the front pocket of most jeans. Unfortunately, it’s too tall for most shallower back pockets, but it’ll fit nicely in outside jacket and topcoat pockets (as measured in this August 2nd, 2009 Monday Note where I hoped for a pocketable Apple tablet) — and doctors’s and nurses’ lab coats…

Regardless of how you carry it, the iPad mini’s hardware is neatly detailed. It’s thin and light and the “aluminium”, as Sir Jonathan Paul Ive (KBE) rightly pronounces it in the Queen’s English, works well with the white front bezel. The (stereo) speakers sound good although, to my ears, they’re surprisingly no better or louder than the latest iPhone’s, themselves a marked improvement over earlier generations.

Turning to the screen, I agree with the many who are less than thrilled with the mini’s display. I think this is the result of a compatibility decision: The mini has the same number of pixels (1024 by 768) as the iPad 2, but at a higher density (163 pixels per inch vs. the original 132 ppi). With the same pixel count as the iPad 2, all apps run unchanged, their screen rendition is just smaller. The visual experience isn’t as pleasant as on the iPad 2 itself, let alone the iPad “3″ and its higher pixel density display.

When you read a Kindle or iBook novel, a magazine such as Bloomberg Businessweek, or the NY Times on your iPhone, the content isn’t simply the iPad version squeezed to fit into the phone’s tiny display. These applications reformat their content, they adapt to be legible… no squinting, no eye strain. Let’s hope these apps will be updated to make better use of the iPad mini screen, as opposed to offering squished iPad 2 rendering.

(We’ve also read the complaints that the mini isn’t a “Retina” device…but on this topic, I must recuse myself: I’ve twice mistaken an iPad 2 for the higher resolution device. Last Spring, as I had just gotten a new high-resolution iPad, at Soho’s Les Amis bistro, I watched a gentleman at the next table flip through beautiful pictures on his iPad. I leaned over and asked how he liked his new iPad “3″. ‘What? No, it’s last year’s iPad 2…’.

A few days later in Paris, I reset my iPad 2 in order to hand it to my Mother-In-Law, a replacement for the MacBook Air that was giving her — and me — headaches. Oops, I actually reset my new Retina iPad, mistaking it for the older iPad 2. No harm done, the iCloud backup resuscitated my new tablet.)

So, which of these two devices will enjoy the brighter future? The “inadequacy” of the mini’s screen quality is an issue — and could become a problem as both Android and Amazon ecosystems keep improving (and continue to undercut Apple’s prices). But I think the improved portability (size, weight), the elegant design and material quality, plus the instant compatibility with the hundreds of thousands of iPad apps will count for a lot.

As for the future of Microsoft’s Surface, as Peter Bright (a noted Microsoft analyst) concludes in his review of Redmond’s new tablet, it really needs a keyboard and pointing device in order to be usable with Office applications. This makes a good case for Apple’s decision to keep laptops and tablets separate, freeing each to do what it does best.

JLG@mondaynote.com

 

The New York Times’ shifting model

 

At the NYT Company, in ten years, the share of quarterly revenue attributed to circulation grew from less than 30% to more than half today… 

The stock market brutally punished the New York Times for its worse-than-expected quarterly earnings. Are financial analysts completely blind? How come they didn’t foresee the decline in advertising revenue that affects the NYTimes — and any publication in the world outside of the BRIC zone? This is incomprehensible. A simple look at the overall ad sector (see the previous column featuring the Internet Split) causes one to realize how much worse the New York Times numbers could have been.

In any event, the demise of the ad market will accelerate the transformation of the Times. Here are the highlights for the third quarter of 2012 that particularly disappointed Wall Street (comparisons are for Q3 2012 vs. Q3 2011, full earnings release here):
– Total revenue decreases by -0.6%
– Advertising revenue drops by -9% across the board. Print ad takes a -11% dive and  digital ad revenue is off by -2.2% (for the second quarter in a row.)
– Costs are not contained enough (again, according to analysts) and rise by 2.3%, mostly because of benefits, performance-based and stock-based compensation and… printing costs.

Thursday, Wall Street dumped the stock, causing its biggest drop since 1980: It plunged by 22% to $8.31. Since the beginning of the year, NYT shares are up by about 6% vs. 12% for the S&P index.

On the bright side: Circulation revenue grew by 7% vs. last year. This is mostly due to the rise in digital subscribers. (Print gains reflect a recent price hike). Paid subs for the NYTimes and the International Herald Tribune totaled 566,000 for the 3rd quarter, a remarkable growth of 11% vs. the 2nd quarter of 2012 (+57,000 subs.)

In hard dollars, though, circulation figures no longer offset the loss in advertising. For the first nine months of 2012, revenue coming from circulation grew by $55m to $695m vs. a $47m loss in ads. But, for last three months, the NYT lost more in ads (-$18m) than it added in circulation (+$17m). In the earnings call with analysts, CFO Jim Follo points to a difficulty with his company’s business model: When advertising revenue goes down, 90% of the decrease translates into a margin loss, but circulation revenue gains generate additional costs.

The last 10 years show an interesting evolution for the advertising vs. circulation ratio. Between 2001 and 2011, revenue for the New York Times Media Group (primarily the newspapers and digital operations), fell by 30% in dollars adjusted for inflation. Advertising revenue decreased by 45% as Circulation revenue grew by 9% (and the “Other” category was slashed by 51%.

As shown in the table below, the New York Times’ revenue stream now relies mostly on circulation: 55% today vs. 29% in 2001. As digital subscriptions gain traction and advertising plummets, the trend accelerates when comparing the full 2011 year with the 3rd quarter of 2012:

              2001   2011  Q3-2012 
Advertising    62%    49%   39%
Circulation    29%    45%   55% 
Others          9%     6%    6%
Source: NYT Co. Financial statements

This evolution shows the strategic importance of the digital subscription system setup by the NY Times 15 months ago. So far, it works fine (see also a previous column NYT Digital Lessons). Thanks to its paywall, the NYT collects an average of 4750 new subscribers each week. Even the Boston Globe grew: +13% digital subscribers (currently 3,000) for this quarter when compared to the previous one .

The system has yet to unleash its full potential. For now, the NYTimes maintains a great deal of paywall porosity. Unlike the FT.com, there is no mandatory registration. It is actually pretty easy to circumvent the limit of 10 free articles per month: simply use different computers and devices. But the New York Times execs in charge of the system are in no rush to tighten the reins. They know mandatory registration will boost the transformation of registered users into full-paid-for ones, but it will be costly in terms of traffic.

Audience-wise, the paywall’s impact is uncertain. Times’ insiders said it had no effect. But, according to GigaOM’s Mathew Ingram (who quotes ComScore data), unique viewers would have fallen by 20% since March 2011 (from 34m Unique Visitors to 27m) and page views by 15%. Ingram suggests this trend could contribute to the erosion in ad revenue (although there is plenty of evidence showing that CMPs — cost per thousands page views — are indeed higher behind a paywall.)

One sure thing: before adding further paywall restrictions, The New York Times wants to find the perfect formula. On the Q3 earnings call, Denise Warren, who oversees the revenue side, explicitly referred to the topic: “We are exploring entry level opportunities as well as higher-ends as well”. In other words, her team is testing all possible prices and packages; current offers are likely to be sliced into multiple segments.

Overall, NYT’s management remains bearish on advertising for the next quarter at least. Jim Follo and Denise Warren invoked business leaders’ evaporating trust in the economy and also mentioned the oversupply in digital inventories (too many page views for sale, everywhere). They also point a finger to the shift in buying practices with, as they call it, “programmatic buying channels” (ad exchange, real-time bidding), who take over the market, pushing prices further down. One exception to this deflationary spiral is the luxury segment, stronger than ever, and well-tapped by The New York Times’ ability to provide customized campaigns.

Future Times revenue streams also lie in its ability to expand abroad. Last summer, the NYT.com launched its Chinese version (under Beijing’s strong vigilance). Next year, says Chairman Arthur Sulzberger, the Times will launch a Portuguese version aimed at the vast Brazilian market (and there are rumors of a Spanish language version.)

Denis Warren, also referred to what she called an “untapped demand in the corporate education segment”. Strangely, her statement echoes Harvard professor Clayton Christensen’s interview with the Neiman Journalism Lab where he discusses his favorite topic, the disruption of legacy businesses:

For the Harvard Business School — we’ve been saying for about 13 years now that management education is going to be disrupted by in-house corporate universities. And nobody just ever imagined that it would happen. In fact, every metric of goodness at the Harvard Business School has been improving and still continues to improve — even as last year the number of people applying to Harvard MBA programs dropped off 22 percent. In the prior year, it went down 11 percent. I really believe that the business schools are just going off the cliff.

I’m concerned: If business schools are going off the cliff, who will produce next generation of media analysts?…
frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

What happened to the iPad?

 

On October 23rd, Apple announced the widely expected iPad mini. The company also surprised most by also introducing a faster “4th generation” iPad, swiftly replacing the one launched on March 7th this year, seven and a half months ago.
That same day, Tim Cook proudly proclaimed a an iPad milestone: 100 million shipped since its April 2010 debut. Impressive.
No less impressively, Wall Street analysts quickly did their subtractions and concluded Q4 iPad shipments — to be officially announced two days later — were going to miss expectations.
They were right.
Where seers expected somewhere between 15 and 16 million iPads, the actual Q4 number was 14 million. Using the Average Selling Price (ASP) we’ll discuss in a moment, a “miss” of 2 million units translates into more than $1B in missed revenue.

Compared to the 17 million iPads shipped in Q3 (ending in June), Q4′s 14 million units look like a steep decline. This isn’t in keeping with the fast growth the iPad had shown since its 2010 beginning. On a “Quarters After Launch” basis, the iPad used to grow faster than the iPhone. Now, we see a decline from the 15.4 million units shipped in Q1 (ending December 2011), and only a modest 26% increase from last year’s Q4. Where are the go-go days of 70% or even 100% year-to-year growth?
Two days later, at the October 25th Earnings Conference Call, Apple’s CEO tried to put a better face on that strangely anemic 26% growth. As noted by Horace Dediu, Tim Cook pointed to a different number: sell-thru, units actually delivered to customers, grew by 44%. Not great, but not as tepid as 26%.
(See Philip Ellmer-Dewitt’s detailed explanation here. In essence, when product ships, it “changes hands”: the channel partner “takes title”, meaning it moves from Apple’s books to the reseller’s. For Apple, the items thus shipped count as revenue, even if they’re not sold-thru, that is sold to end customers. When the volume of products Apple ships to retailers is less than the volume sold-thru, channel inventories decline, more sales out than shipments in. This is how Apple sees revenue go up by 26% while sell-thru increases by 44%. A likely explanation for last quarter’s depletion of channel inventory is making room for the two new iPad models.)
Resorting to sell-thru numbers as a way to put iPad numbers in a better light could be habit-forming, it could force Apple’s management to provide more detailed inventory numbers more regularly.
On the end-customer demand side, Apple execs attributed the low Q4 iPad number to several months of intense and detailed rumors ahead of the iPad mini launch.
So, the iPad story could look this: Last year, the yearly iPhone refresh moved from June to October; as a result, Q4 iPhone shipments disappointed; but fast growth resumed once the new model shipped; the pattern now applies to the iPad as well.

No, the iPhone and the iPad behave more differently than in the above scenario. I went back to SEC filings and extracted data for the following graph tracking iPhone and iPad ASP’s for the past eight quarters:

The iPhone ASP is stable. Carriers keep indulging in (wooden) saber-rattling, complaining about “excessive” iPhone subsidies. Here, subsidy means the difference between the price carriers pay for a handset and the typical end-user price: $199 for the phone with a two-year contract. In such a $199 arrangement, for the past five years, Apple has been able to extract more money from carriers than any of its competitors. Paraphrasing Horace Dediu, the explanation for such an enduring advantage is a simple one: For carriers, the iPhone is a better salesman, it generates more revenue, a higher ARPU (Average Revenue Per User). As a result, carriers pay the iPhone salesman a higher commission, meaning a higher handset price. (And they sound like the grouchy bosses who complain their star sales person makes too much money…)

For the iPad, there is no such arrangement, no two-year contract, no subsidy. For example, AT&T will sell an iPad with a no-commitment, month-to-month wireless data contract. Without a two-year commitment, carriers have no incentive to sell the iPad at a particularly attractive price, causing customers to face the price without a subsidy fig-leaf. (One might argue smartphone contracts lead customers to borrow money, the $400+ subsidy, at usurious rates, but such habits are hard to break. Rare is the carrier that will offer a cure, a lower monthly contract if you pay full price for the phone.)

How do iPad customers react to the cold price truth? All we know is the ASP has been falling for five quarters. And we can also surmise price figures more actively in competitive situations than it does with smartphones. Or, for that matter, with notebooks and desktop computers: ASP for Macs is stable or growing a little, from $1282 last year to $1344 last quarter. These prices don’t prevent Apple from being number one on desktops and notebooks in the US — as Tim Cook reminded everyone on October 23rd.

The surprise iPad refresh can be seen as a reaction to competitive pressures, existing or upcoming ones. And, for the iPad mini, we have an interesting combination: premium price and an avowed lower gross margin, ‘significantly below our cooperate average‘ says Apple’s CFO during the October 25th Earnings Conference Call.

The iPad definitely behaves differently, neither a bigger smartphone, nor a smaller PC, thus confirming it belongs to a new category whose rules are still being established. The next few quarters will be even more interesting than recent ones: Google, Amazon and Microsoft have new products worth watching, they all intend to fight for a dominant role in the new space.

JLG@mondaynote.com

The Internet Split

 

Web sites will soon fall into two categories: high audience low yield, low audience higher yield. Such a divide will impact digital advertising.

This Autumn, whomever you talk to will tell you this: internet advertising yields are taking a dive. CPMs (cost per thousand page views), now down to single digits, keep falling. This you hear on both sides of the Atlantic. Economic conditions, concerns with the level of debt (both private and public), business-hostile tax policies (see Jean-Louis’ Monday Note on French Entrepreneurs Revolt), the upcoming fiscal cliff in the United States, the fragility of the Eurozone are all pointing in the same direction. Even Google’s cash machine is showing weakness.

In such times, advertising budgets are usually the first ones to get the ax. Slowing down an industrial production line can get complicated, but slashing an ad campaign can be done with a mouse click. In the Fall, when everyone struggles with next year’s projections, a marketing director is inevitably tempted to hit the delete key to embellish his/er spreadsheet (remember: we are all short-termists.)

According to ZenithOptimedia’s recent forecasts, Eurozone ad expenditures will end this year in the red: -3.1% overall. But all countries are not equal: Just to illustrate the reactivity of advertising expenditures to economic conditions, consider three regional economies badly impacted by Europe’s downturn:

Italy:       -6.5% in ad spending vs. 2011
Spain:       -12.2%
Portugal:    -12.2%

And just for the sake of it, let’s award a special prize to the Greek economy: its advertising expenditure will be down 33.2% this year and it will be off its 2007 peak by… 63%! This shows how the ad market reacts and amplifies an economic crisis. (For 2013, Zenith predicts +0.9% growth in the Eurozone, but has since it downgraded its entire Western Europe 2012 projections from +0.4% in June to -0.7% in September. As a result, no one seriously believes Zenith’s projection for upcoming year.)

For digital media, such a trend will be the underlying cause of three evolutions:
- A rise in paid-for-performance advertising
- A rise in alternate formats beyond traditional display — for better or worse
- And a split between volume-driven and quality-driven digital properties.
To an extent, the third trend is a consequence of the other two. Let’s give it a closer look.

First, this graph:

A quick disclaimer: To avoid offending anyone, note there is no scale, nor any proportions between media outlets. The point is to map out clusters among various brands, to see who sits where relatively to others.

On the top left part of the chart, high audience but low yield: The Guardian (£40-50m in revenue for a stunning 60+ million uniques visitors), Business Insider, The Huffington Post and TV networks web sites. However, they have different ways of gathering huge audiences: The Guardian does it thanks to its fantastic journalistic machine and its unabated investment in digital (read this interesting story in last summer’s GQ); as for the Huffington Post, it has elevated clicking-techniques to an art.

Business Insider has become a class in itself. In the last two or three years, it drifted from a good tech/business blog to a compilation of eye-grabbing-headlines (a rather profuse one: I counted more than 90 items on BI’s home page this weekend.) Having said that: it remains interesting reading, and its crew sometimes gets scoops. But the entire editing is built on grabbing attention. And it works beautifully, so to speak. Here are some examples of stories and how they score:

12 Long-Dead Brands That Are Ripe For Resurrection:
55,000 views
Stunning Images From The Best Wildlife Photo Competition Of The Year:
78,000 views
19 Chinese White Collar Criminals Who Were Handed The Death Sentence :
104,000 views
There Is Simply No Other Plane In The World Like Air Force One :
650,000+ views
These Pictures May Give You Nightmares About Canada’s Oil Sands :
1.17 million views

Buried deep inside this accumulation of SEO-dreams-come-true items, there are some serious stories, but their scores are paltry:

Here’s The Big Mystery With Google’s $8 Billion Mobile Business :
7000 views
Jeff Bezos: People Who Are Right Are People That Change Their Mind A Lot :
6400 views

Well, you get my point. Again, I’m not judging here. With incredibly hard work, Henry Blodget and his team have built a great franchise, and I’d wish more business sites would learn — just a little bit, say 5% — how to stage business news and catch readers. And to be fair with Business Insider, let’s underline that its must-read 139 slides about The State of the Internet, attracted nearly 5 million viewers in three weeks.

Coming back to the chart above: on the bottom left, web sites like Slate or Salon (there are many others) enjoy strong reputation, loyal readership… but — as unfair as it sounds — tiny ones. On the upper right corner, we have the exception(s), lead by the New York Times: high audience, high ARPU (about $160m-200m in advertising revenue, recently supplemented by a $60-100m in subscription revenue that didn’t exist 15 months earlier.)

Let’s wrap up with advertising formats. Bottom line: ad agencies and their clients will always seek to blur the distinction between editorial and commercial contents. In that respect, the future lies, again, in the Business Insider model, which pushes the envelope pretty far (in my own, probably conservative opinion.) On this weekend’s home page, you can see how BI morphs its editorial team into sales reps with this story : 15 Tips For Getting The Perfect Tailored Suit, an advertorial for a wannabe hip Manhattan tailor. The package looks entirely like news coverage and it comes into two stages. Linked to the We-Give-You-Great-Tips treatment, you get the full monty: The secret suit shop underneath Mazza’s swank Chelsea sports bar, complete with a 20 pics slide-show and a glowing profile of the owners. The two stories gathered more than… 100,000 views (including mine — note that I linked to the stories because I’m pretty sure you’ll click on it…) But it’s pocket change compared to the rather straightforward Here’s Why Peter Luger Is The Best Steakhouse In New York City which collected an amazing 244,000 views. (Business Insider wins on both ends: for the advertorial — Henry, please, don’t tell me you do that for free — and the ads surrounding it.)

With very few exceptions, the editorial independence of lifestyle and consumer sections is now long gone (this includes “respectable” legacy media.) But this obvious violation of the separation between Church and State is bound to percolate into more pernicious “brand content” (see this earlier Monday Note) for more serious subjects than food or clothing. That’s where the credibility issue will set in.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

 

Apple, ARM, and Intel

 

Apple and Samsung are engaged in a knives-out smartphone war, most infamously in the courts but, more importantly, in the marketplace. In its latest ad campaign, Samsung has cleverly “borrowed” a page from Apple’s own marketing playbook, posturing the iPhone as the choice of autumn-aged parents and brainwashed queue sheep.

But when it comes to chips, the two companies must pretend to be civil for the sake of the children: Samsung is the sole supplier of ARM-based processors for the iPhone.

Something has to give.

Since no one sees Samsung getting out of its booming smartphone business, the conclusion is that Apple will assume full custody, it will take its iDevices processor business elsewhere.

But where? There are rumors (which we’ll get to), and none of them so much as hint at Intel.

Except for the rare cameo appearance, Intel is nowhere in the Post-PC world (or, as Frank Shaw, the literate and witty head of Microsoft’s corporate PR obdurately insists, the “PC Plus” world). Becoming Apple’s ARM source wouldn’t just put the Santa Clara company in the race, it would vault them into the lead.

They’ve been there before: Intel scored a coup when Apple switched to the x86 architecture for its Macintosh line in 2005. An iDevice encore would mark an even bigger score as smartphones and tablets have already reached much higher volumes and grow much faster.

So… Why hasn’t Intel jumped at the chance?

The first explanation is architectural disdain. Intel sees “no future for ARM“, it’s a culture of x86 true believers. And they have a right to their conviction: With each iteration of its manufacturing technology, Intel has full control over how to improve its processors. They can reduce x86 power consumption by using smaller building blocks (they’re already down to 22 nanometers wide). They can micro-manage (literally) which parts of a complex chip will be turned on, off, or somewhere in between, in a kind of hibernation.

A further problem is that Intel would need to change roles. Today, the company designs the microprocessors that it manufactures. It tells PC clone makers what these chips will do, how many they will get, when, and for how much. Its development model (called Tick Tock in industry argot) essentially defines the schedules and finances of hardware makers.

This dictatorial model won’t work for iDevices. Apple crossed the border into Intel’s chipset empire back in the Macintosh era, but, today, it has far too much invested in its ARM design to again surrender complete control. As evidenced by the A6 processor running inside the iPhone 5, Apple goes to great lengths to customize the basic ARM cores, adding graphic processors, memory, and large amounts of support logic, and even resorts to aggressive hand-optimization of the silicon layout — as opposed to just letting CAD software tools do the job.

Intel would have to accept Apple’s design and “pour” it into silicon — it would become a lowly “merchant foundry“. Intel knows how to design and manufacture standard parts, it has little experience manufacturing other people’s custom designs…or pricing them.

Which leads us to the most likely answer to the Why Not Intel question: Money. Intel is a sophisticated business entity that expertly balances both terms of the profit equation. On the one hand, they use brand identity, marketing incentives, and a little strong-arming to keep prices “acceptable”, while on the other, the Tick Tock technology and product development pushes its costs down.

The company meticulously tunes the price points for its processors to generate the revenue that will fund development as well as the Intel Inside campaigns that have cost hundreds of millions of dollars over the years, to say nothing of the more recent $300M Ultrabook fund.

One way to visualize Intel’s money pump is to think of what the industry calls a Wafer Start. Here, “wafer” refers to the basic silicon “galette” that will go through the manufacturing steps and emerge with thousands of chips ready to be diced out. For Intel, profit comes from the difference between the cost of running a wafer through the $5B manufacturing unit (a “fab” in our argot) and the revenue that the marketplace will grant each chip.

Intel’s published prices range from a “low” $117 for a Core i3 processor to $999 for a top-of-the-line Core i7 device. Of course, these are the publicly advertised price tags, so we can assume that Acer, Lenovo, and HP pay less… but compare this to iSuppli’s estimate for the cost of the A6 processor: $17.50.

Even if more A6 chips could be produced per wafer — an unproven assumption — Intel’s revenue per A6 wafer start would be much lower than with their x86 microprocessors. In Intel’s perception of reality, this would destroy the business model.

In the meantime, the rumor of the day is that Apple will use TSMC, a well-regarded Taiwanese foundry, the world’s largest. TSMC is known to have made test runs of the A4 last year, and is now reportedly doing the same for the A5 processors that power the new iPad. Furthermore, “industry insiders” have reported that Apple attempted to secure exclusive access to TMSC’s semiconductor output but were rebuffed. (Qualcomm tried, as well; same result.)

This raises a big Disruption question for Intel: In the name of protecting today’s business model, will it let TSMC and others take the huge mobile volume, albeit with lower profit per unit? Can Intel afford to shun ARM?

For all of Intel’s semiconductor design and manufacturing feats, its processors suffer from a genetic handicap: They have to support the legacy x86 instruction set, and thus they’re inherently more complicated than legacy-free ARM devices, they require more transistors, more silicon. Intel will argue, rightly, that they’ll always be one technological step ahead of the competition, but is one step enough for x86 chips to beat ARM microprocessors?

JLG@mondaynote.com

 

Losing The Plot

 

It’s a beautiful sight when, year after year, a company stays true to its original idea. But when a business loses the plot, we witness a sorry spectacle, an expensive slide into mediocrity. Every wayward company is wayward in its own way: Accountants masquerading as product planners; wannabe visionary execs jealousy trying to prove that they, too, can put a dent in the universe; board members panicking over bad press. But the result never varies: Customers leave.

A few weeks ago I was in France, enjoying the benefits of the French Paradox and happily testing its limits: Lots of duck fat washed down with an ethanol tincture of polyphenols. It was in this fulfilled state that I watched the launch of the latest iteration of an iconic product. There was a little stretch in one dimension, a little squeeze in another, measurable weight loss, more power better utilized, bigger screen for navigation…

The kommentariat were unanimous, the sum of the improvements equals a blockbuster.

I’m not talking about the boring iPhone 5. The occasion was the seventh iteration of the Volkswagen Golf, introduced at the 2012 Paris Motor Show (or, in the modest French appellation, the Mondial de l’Automobile).

The praise is deserved. Golf 7.0 comes with plenty of new features, yet stays backwards-compatible with previous releases…it’s still recognizable as a Golf.

Born in 1974, the Golf (then dubbed the Rabbit in the US) managed to stay true to Volkswagen’s overall corporate brief — its “People’s Car” mandate — while giving the idea new life by walking away from the Beetle’s design. The engine and drive wheels moved upfront; Giorgetto Giugiaro, the legendary and extraordinarily prolific designer, outlined the hatchback’s iconic silhouette, still recognized and loved 38 years later.

Admittedly, the Golf strayed a bit over the years, it gained weight, developed haunches. At one point, it grew to nearly twice its original mass. Worse, reliability was up and down, as were the experts’ opinions of its drivability.

But despite the swerves and cul-de-sac design details, Volkswagen managed to return to the original concept of a sexy, functional hatchback. And the customers didn’t leave — more than 30 million Golfs have been sold.

The Honda Civic story isn’t nearly pleasant. The Civic was introduced in 1967 as a tiny kei car hatchback called the N360 — for the 360 cubic centimeters of its motorcycle engine. In 1972, the little hatchback grew a pair of additional cylinders and became an auto industry icon, the first for Honda.

Year after year, Honda lovingly improved the Civic: Larger, smoother body; more comfortable interior; cleaner, more powerful engine; smoother suspension. For about twenty years, the Civic was a model of neat progression, of staying true to the original hatchback idea.

But in the mid-nineties, the Civic lost its unmistakable identity. No longer satisfied with being a versatile, dependable transportation machine, the Civic wanted to be treated with respect, it wanted…valet parking. A few years later, the Civic suffered a midlife crisis and tried to become a sports car.

What happened? Was it because of a change of the guard inside the company? Honda was often taken to task for being too much of a maverick; did the Japanese company try too hard to placate critics and become more “normal”?

The parallel Golf and Civic stories show a sharp contrast between the two companies. In many respects, the Civic started as a technically superior product. It had a better engine, better manufacturing, and legendary reliability. But Volkswagen stuck to the original concept and is well rewarded as a result.

There are even sorrier examples of lost plots in the auto industry — think Citroën — but it’s time to turn to our industry.

Regard Hewlett-Packard, serial plot loser.

In the early 70’s, HP owned the PC market (and forgive the anachronism…back then they were called “desktop computers”). Using the technical and financial might it had earned with its late-sixties “programmable calculator” line, HP developed a range of “discrete logic implementations” (integrated circuits) of their 2100 series minicomputer instruction set. It was a clean, visionary strategy. Very quickly, HP’s 9800 series of desktop computers flattened every competitor in its path: Wang, Olivetti, Tektronix, Seiko…

Then, in 1972, Intel introduced the 8008 microprocessor. HP looked down its nose at these  cheap, woefully underpowered 8-bit gizmos…there was no way these toys could compete with HP’s fast, powerful, 16-bit desktop devices — why, even HP’s old 9810A calculator used a 16-bit brain.

We know the rest of the story: The inexpensive devices Pac-Manned their way into HP’s PC business. The 9800 series was displaced by a crowd of entrants, many powered by Microsoft software, including the Apple ][, whose Basic Applesoft interpreter came from Redmond.

It wasn’t until 2002 that HP regained the PC industry’s top spot — and it only did so by acquiring Compaq, the deposed king of PCs. (Ironically, Compaq’s history is similarly predatory: It vaulted to the top when it acquired DEC, another erstwhile king, albeit of the  minicomputer industry. DEC missed the PC revolution entirely.)

Ten years later, after a sorry successions of CEOs, HP’s PC business has become a lackluster, low-margin (5%) endeavor, and Lenovo (or will it be Acer?) is about to assume the number one position in sales.

There is more.

HP was once the king of “mobile computing”. Starting with the HP 35 pocket device (1972), the company grew a phenomenally successful range of iconic devices such as the HP-80 and the HP-12C, the darlings of financial users.

In 1974, the HP-65 topped the range with its magnetic stripe reader for external program storage. The HP-80 had such high margins it provided most of the company’s meager profits during a mid-70‘s financial downturn. (Or so I, lowly HP trenchworker at the time, was told by “upper management”. I’ve researched the record but haven’t been able to confirm the factoid.)

HP owned the pocket-sized form factor, but they’ve since lost the mobile computing plot. There have been a few spasms — the iPaq devices, an iPod dalliance, the amazingly botched $1.2B Palm acquisition– but now HP plays no part in the mobile revolution.

HP CEO Meg Whitman knows this is a problem, that it must be fixed. She tells us that the company must “offer a smartphone because in many countries of the world that is your first computing device.” Her solution? HP won’t have a smartphone in 2013. (Whitman has also announced losses for this year, more losses for next year, and plans to lay off 29,000 people.)

Indeed, for more and more people, in both developing and developed countries, the smartphone has become the first computing device, the really personal computer. So what does “No Smartphone In 2013″ say?

There’s no dearth of Taiwan companies ready with customizable designs. That’s how Nokia got its first Lumia phones from Compal. So why isn’t HP coming up with a Windows Phone 8 device in the next few months? There’s only one possible answer: margins. The smartphone business, dominated as it is by Samsung and Apple, is now in a clones race to the bottom. For HP, this is an all-too-familiar plot line.

How can HP, with its new Make it Matter slogan, continue to lose its key plots? Waiting until 2014 to re-enter the smartphone race won’t help. And competing against Lenovo, Acer and others in the Windows 8 PC-cum-tablet space won’t make HP’s clone business more profitable.

JLG@mondaynote.com

 

Brand x Device = Reach

 

Combine the enduring strength of media brands with emerging mobility reading habits: the result could boost digital news.  

The equation in the headline is based on a simple, important fact: By and large, digital users still trust old news outlets. In the new world, media brands are far from dead, predictions of their extinction have been vastly exaggerated. In fact, we can see an opportunity for the new reading patterns seen in smartphone and tablet to provide welcome help to legacy media in their painful transition.

Last week, the Poynter Institute released interesting data Surveying Americans who define themselves as news consumers:
=> 53% get their primary digital news from web native outlets (Huffington Post, portals like Yahoo, AOL, or shallow verticals like Drudge or TMZ — the celebrity news-breaker).
=> 83% seek a secondary source for confirmation or amplification right after getting breaking news.
=> 60% do so by relying on established media brands such as the digital version of newspapers, TV networks, etc.

Let’s pause for a moment and reflect on the latest figure, the six-out-of-ten who go for the trusted brands.

Traditional media missed the train for digital breaking breaking news; this is barely a surprise. We know the factors only too well: newsrooms were too slow to catch the wave; publishers didn’t foresee the audience battle; they didn’t invest in relevant technologies, they got swamped in the battle of free vs. paid; they stayed fixated on avoiding cannibalization of the (dying) flagship product, newspapers, broadcast news, etc. In doing so, legacy outlets left an open field for more agile, less scrupulous, traffic-obsessed young ventures. The new entrants started with a blank slate which, indeed, cannibalized the old league thanks to their speed and ubiquity.

As a result, a new vulgate emerged: newcomers would eat “old” brands alive. They would do this by capturing every segment of news:  the “commodity” format (near-live news, same everywhere for everyone, and free); the sophisticated treatments (long forms, in-depth reporting, profile…). Pundits speculated the Yahoos and the Googles of the new Digital World Order would soon hire talent and build newsrooms giants from scratch.

Fact is: it didn’t happen. Some internet brands did a great job addressing niches in politics, society or business. But, broadly speaking, once the predictions dust settled, ancestral brands seems to have been able to salvage the quality part of their franchise. Unfortunately, this one is the costliest and the less audience-driving segment. The HuffPo might have a huge audience, its readers are essentially looking for snapshots of news. For serious complement, they go for the New York Times or the trusted brand of their preference.

As for social media, the Poynter survey reframes the debate in a rather blunt way:

Despite all the social sharing buttons littering news sites, the study finds the top methods of sharing news are still word of mouth and email. (See earlier:Limited use of sharing buttons Sharing buttons look “a little desperate“.)

Having said that, for the younger generation, social networks are a key source of primary news: 35% of the Generation Y, 23% of the Gen X and 11% of the Boomers find their news there. As they get older and better educated, they could, supposedly, rely more on traditional media.

Let’s now talk about the Grand Disruption, namely how the rise of the smartphone and tablet impacts the news. According to the Poynter survey, established media benefit more from mobile devices than web native sources do. It goes like this:

The prime reason is reader engagement. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, exposes this in two 90-page surveys : The Future of Mobile News, produced in collaboration withe the Economist Group (PDF here), and the Trends in News Consumption 1991-2012 (PDF here).
First, the 11-years evolution of how people “got their news yesterday”:

The rise of the mobile is obvious (So is the free fall of the newspaper.) According to the Pew survey:
=> Among smartphone users (44% of the US adults) : 62% get their news weekly and 36% daily.
=> Among tablet users (22% of the US adults): 64% get their news weekly and 37% daily.

In addition, numbers reveal a high level of engagement among tablet users:
=> 78% read more than one in-depth article during a sitting (nine times out of ten for personal interest).

… and the tablet appears to be a remarkable vector for serendipitous use:
=>  72% of users end up reading in-depth articles they were not initially looking for.

More broadly, the tablet format induces further reading:
=> 69% end up reading a full article after checking headlines.

And more than one device equals more time with news:


To close the loop, the Pew survey confirms the Poynter’s findings on the preeminence of trusted brands on mobile — and more specifically on tablets as 60% of tablet users read long form journalism from publications they regularly keep up with.

The tablet is indeed the next bing thing for media. Apple is no longer the only one (I put my hand on the €200 Google Nexus 7 and it’s an excellent product). The market is now poised for a real takeoff. The tablet is the most favored vector for more in-depth news — which is legacy media’s core value proposition. And since device and media both address the most solvent segment of the population, a sustainable model is bound to emerge.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com