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Microsoft Makes Clever Moves

 

by Jean-Louis Gassée

While Microsoft Office for mobile is a satisfying success, the company can’t seem to create — or even buy — a mobile operating system that can compete with iOS and Android. Perhaps they’ve been looking in the wrong direction and can return to their “trusted” Embrace and Extend tactics.

Microsoft published its numbers for its Fiscal Year 2015 2nd quarter ending in December 2014. While the company isn’t the money machine it once was, it is healthy: Revenue grew 8% to $26.5B, Operating Income declined only a bit (- 2%) at $7.8B, there will be another $.31 dividend for the quarter, and cash reserves stand at $90B.

Such numbers give Satya Nadella the space he needs to implement the Mobile First – Cloud First vision he outlined last year. A key component of this plan is to spread Office applications across all platforms and devices: PCs, tablets, and smartphones – native apps as well as Web versions. Last week, Microsoft took another step in this direction with the release of its historic Outlook PIM (Personal Information Manager) app for Android and iOS.

While the Outlook release was warmly received, I’ve learned to take enthusiastic press reviews with caution. I prefer to “play customer”: I buy and use the product in klutzy ways engineers can’t foresee and, as a result, I get a better idea of how the product will fare in the real world. So, I installed Outlook on my iPad mini and, not to pour salt on some wounds… It Just Works. It runs my Exchange account at work, and it speaks Gmail and iCloud as well. No ifs, no buts.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the release is that it completes the core components of the native MS Office bundle: Word, PowerPoint, Excel, and now Outlook. It doesn’t matter which platform you use — Windows, Mac, Android, or iOS — you now have the full complement of Microsoft’s productivity apps built specifically for your device.

I used to think that if Apple could get its software house in order and work out the  (numerous) bugs, iWork could easily displace Microsoft Office on Mac, iCloud, and iOS. After all, iWork is free… Now, I’m not so sure. With this release, MS Office provides a fit and finish, a safe and effective cross-platform solution that’s worth the price of admission, particularly in the Enterprise world.

But Apple isn’t the competitor Microsoft worries about. Cross-platform Office is a powerful countermove against Google Apps. Microsoft doesn’t have a dog in the old Web vs. Native Apps fight, it offers both everywhere.

In other matters, however, things aren’t entirely rosy for Microsoft. Its smartphone hardware business isn’t doing well. A look at the recent 10-Q and at the slide presentation for the Earnings Release shows hardware revenue of $2.3B, for 10.5M Lumia phones and 39.7M on-Lumia devices:

Phone Hardware

Microsoft’s smartphone business is still dealing with the Nokia acquisition trauma, so these numbers are less reliable than in a stable business. But even if we proceed with caution, when we divide the $2.3B revenue number by 50.2M (the total number of devices), we get a meager ASP (Average System Price) of $46.

One could argue that the computation is misleading because it throws Non-Lumia phones — such as the Nokia X running Android — into the same pot as worthier Lumia devices. So let’s take take another stab at the numbers: Let’s imagine that all non-Lumia phones are simply given away, $0 ASP. That leaves us with 10.5M Lumia phones divided into $2.3B revenue for a yield of $219 ASP. Compare this to the $687 ASP Apple got for its iPhones last quarter. Playing with numbers a bit more, if you assume a $20 ASP for non-Lumia “dumbphones”, the ASP for Lumia smart devices comes to $143.

As discussed here last December, even with “forever” cash reserves, why bother? Big enterprises such as Bank of America and Chase that have discontinued Windows Phone support agree.

After fruitlessly jumping into a Broad Strategic Partnership with Nokia and then promptly Osborning it, Microsoft acquired the company’s smartphone business rather than letting it die. It’s still not working and, as the most recent industry numbers show, there’s little hope that Microsoft’s phone hardware business, while saddled with the hapless Windows Phone OS, will be anything other than a waste of time, money, and reputation. Many have suggested that Microsoft drop its OS efforts and fork Android, returning, in Ben Thompson’s words, to “its roots of embracing and extending”.

That brings us to Cyanogen. In the grand tradition of Homebrew Computing that gave birth to Microsoft, Apple and countless others, developers have taken the Open Android operating system and opened it even more, creating a raft of improved versions.

Initially, many thought these variants were just for the hacker who wanted to play with his Android device, reflash its ROM, and grow hair on his chest. But one Android strain, CyanogenMod, exhibited such vitality hat it spawned an organized, for-profit company. In 2012, Benchmark and Redpoint led a $7M Series A investment in Cyanogen, Inc. (“Series A” is typically the first serious VC money, after a Seed Round.) In December, 2014, there was a more substantial $23M Series B round, led by another member of the Valley’s VC nobility, Andreessen Horowitz. And now, there is talk of a $70M round…  in which Microsoft might be a “minority” player.

Kirk McMaster, Cyanogen’s CEO, has been unusually candid about the company’s goal [emphasis mine]:

“I’m the CEO of Cyanogen. We’re attempting to take Android away from Google.”

and…

We’ve barely scratched the surface in regards to what mobile can be. Today, Cyanogen has some dependence on Google. Tomorrow, it will not. We will not be based on some derivative of Google in three to five years. There will be services that are doing the same old bulls— with Android, and then there will be something different. That is where we’re going here.”

Ambitious words, indeed, but they’re backed by some of the Valley’s smartest money.

Microsoft’s role in Cyanogen is probably just a minor one; perhaps it will help with the patent portfolio it unleashes on Android OEMs. But the company’s involvement at all could be seen as part of its long battle with Google. Recall that “Google acquired Android in 2005 as a defense against Windows Mobile dominating smartphones just as Windows dominated PCs.” Later, in 2008, Microsoft acquired Android founder Andy Rubin’s previous company Danger, whose Sidekick design inspired Google’s pre-iPhone G1 devices.

Cyanogen has long been in Google’s cross-hairs. In its early days, CyanogenMod (since renamed to Cyanogen OS) was perceived as such a nuisance — or a threat — that its users suddenly found that they needed to perform contorted workarounds to load Google’s proprietary apps (Google Map, YouTube, GTalk, and so on). Can Microsoft resist the temptation to aid this Google irritant?

Tantalizing as the Cyanogen investment is, it might not be enough to keep Microsoft in the brutal smartphone hardware business, but it’s consistent with the company’s efforts to undermine Google’s ecosystem by any means necessary. Including gathering allies to do to Android what Bill Gates once did to Lotus 1-2-3.

Let’s keep in mind that the mobile industry is no more mature than the PC industry was in the mid eighties. Things could get interesting as Cyanogen reveals more of the business model its muscular investors have bought into. And they will become particularly interesting if the company can corral support from industry players who are eager to get out from under Google’s thumb.

JLG@mondaynote.com

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News on mobile: better be a Danish publisher than a Japanese one

 

This is the second part of our Mobile facts to Keep in Mind (see last week Monday Note – or here on Quartz). Today, a few more basic trends and a closer look at healthy markets for digital news. 

Last week, we spoke about the preeminence of mobile applications. Not all readers agree, of course, but I found more data to support the finding; among many sources, the remarkable Reuters Institute Digital News Report (PDF here) is worth reading:

47% of smartphone users say they use mainly apps for news

According to the report, this figure has risen by 6 percentage points in just one year. By contrast, 38% of the news consumption is made via a browser — which is losing ground: -4% in just a year.

The trend is likely to accelerate when taking in account demography: On smartphones, the most active groups are the 18-24s and the 35-44s; on tablets the most active group is the 45-54 segment.

Platform usage varies in accordance to local market share, but when it come to paying for news, Apple leads the game:

iOS users are x1.5 likely to pay for news in the US
and x2 likely to pay in the UK than Android or other users

Here is the bad part, though. Again based on the Reuters report, the use of smartphones does narrow the range of news sources. More than ever, the battle for the first screen is crucial.

Across the ten countries surveyed,
37% of users rely on a single news source
vs. 30% for PC users

In the UK, the trend is even stronger with 55% of mobile users relying a single news source. This goes along with good news for those who still defend original news production: mobile news consumption is quite focused on legacy media. The BBC app crushes the competition with 67% of respondents saying they used the app the previous week, vs. 25% for Sky, MSN and Yahoo are trailing with respectively 2% and 7%.

If you want to survey a healthy digital news market, go to Denmark

MN_328_vikings_logo

A Viking logo (from the TV Series) as viewed by the Brand New blog;
note the ancient reference to technology…

Not only does Denmark rank among the best countries to live and develop a business in, but when it comes to digital news, it leads the pack in several of ways:

Despite the digital tsunami, Denmark retains many strong media brands. As a result, legacy media are the prime way for accessing digital news. And since Danish media did well embracing new platforms, they enjoyed similarly success on social, funneling readers to their properties.
The opposite holds for France and Germany where the transition is much slower; in those countries digital users rely much more on search to reach news brands. Two side effects ensue: News readers are more accidental and therefore generate a much lower ARPU; and the greater reliance on Google is problematic (hence the call to arms in France and Germany against the search engine giant.)

— Because of the strength of its traditional media brands, the Denmark news market has left very little oxygen to pure players: They weigh only 10% of weekly digital news, vs. 39% in the US and 46% in Japan were legacy media have been severely hit.

— Danes are the heaviest users of both smartphones and tablets to access news.

— They use mobile apps more than anywhere else: 19%, vs. 15% for US and 12% for Germany.

— They are mostly Apple users : 58% say they use an iOS device to access news in the last week (vs. 28% in Germany), hence a better ARPU for mobile publishers.

—  Danish news consumers generously overlap their devices way more than in any country. 79% use a PC, 61% a smartphone and 39% a tablet. Only 24% use only a PC for news. In Japan by contrast, 58% admit using only a PC for their news diet; up there, the use of smartphone and tablet to access information is respectively one half and one third of Denmark.

— In Danish public transportation, smartphones has overtaken print as the main news vector by 69% vs. 21% of the usage.

We all know where to seek inspiration for our digital news strategies.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

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Nokia Goes Android – Part II

 

Next week, we might see Nokia’s entry-level feature phones replaced by a low-end device running Android Open Source Project software. The phone may just be a fantasy, but the dilemma facing Nokia’s feature phone business is quite real: Embrace Android or be killed by it. 

Nokia will announce an Android phone! So says the persistent rumor, started about three months ago by an @evleaks tweet, and followed by more details as weeks went by. Initially code-named Normandy, the hypothetical feature phone is now called Nokia X, and it already has its own Wikipedia page and pictures:

Nokia X

Nokia is on the path to being acquired by Microsoft. Why introduce an Android-based phone now? The accepted reasoning is simple…

  • Even though it doesn’t generate much revenue per handset (only $42), Nokia’s feature phone business is huge and must be protected. Nokia’s Form 20-F for 2012 (the 2013 report hasn’t been published, yet) shows its phone numbers compared to the previous year:
    • 35M smartphones (-55%) at an average price (ASP) of $210 (+ 11%)
    • 300M feature phones (-12%) with an ASP of $42 (- 11%)
  • These 300 million feature phones — or “dumbphones” — keep the Nokia flag waving, particularly in developing economies, and they act as an up-ramp towards more profitable smartphones.
  • Lately, dumbphones have become smarter. With the help of Moore’s Law, vigorous competition, and Android Open Source Project (AOSP) software, yesterday’s underfed, spartan feature phones are being displaced by entry-level smartphones. Asha, Nokia’s offering in this category, has been mowed down by low-end Android devices from China.
  • Nokia can’t help but notice that these AOSP-based feature phones act as a gateway drug to the full-blown Android smartphone experience (and much larger profits) offered by competitors such as Samsung, Huawei, and Motorola’s new owner Lenovo.
  • So Nokia drops its over-the-hill Symbian software core, adopts Android, adds its own (and Microsoft’s) services, design expertise, and carrier relationships, and the result is Nokia X, a cleaner, smarter feature phone.

That’s it. Very tactical. Business as usual, only better. Move along, nothing to see.

It’s not that simple.

There’s an important difference between the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), and the full Android environment that’s offered by Samsung, LG, HTC and the like.

The Android Open Source Project is really Open Source, you can download the source code here, modify it as you see fit for your application, add layers of services, substitute parts…anything you like.

Well, almost anything. The one thing you can’t do is slap a figurative “Android Inside” sticker on your device. To do that, you must comply with Google’s strict compatibility requirements that force licensees to bundle Google Mobile (Maps, Gmail, YouTube, etc.) and Google Play (the store for apps and other content). The result isn’t open or free, but smartphone makers who want the Android imprimatur must accept the entire stack.

As an added incentive to stay clean, a “Full Android” licensee cannot also market devices that use a different, incompatible version (or “fork”) of the Android code published by Google. A well-know example of forking is Amazon’s use of Android source code to create the software engine that runs its high-end Kindle Fire tablets. You won’t find a single instance of the word “Android” on these devices: Google won’t license the name for such uses.

(For more on the murky world of Android licensing, bundling, and marketing agreements, see Ben Edelman’s research paper: Secret Ties in Google’s “Open” Android.)

The hypothetical, entry-level Nokia X can’t offer an entire Android stack — it can’t be allowed to compete with the higher-end Lumias powered by Microsoft’s Windows Phone — so it would have to run an “unmentionable” Android fork.

Even without the “Android Inside” label, everyone would soon know the truth about the Android code inside the new device. This could give pause to software developers, carriers, and, the more curious users. “Where is Microsoft going with this? Won’t the Android beast inside soon work its way up the product line and displace the Windows Phone OS?”

Microsoft will make soothing sounds: “Trust us, nothing of the sort will ever happen.  Nokia X is a purely tactical ploy, a placeholder that will give Windows Phone enough time to reveal its full potential.” We know how well attempts to create a Reality Distortion Field have worked for Microsoft’s Post-PC denials.

The Redmond not-so-mobile giant faces a dilemma: Lose the Asha feature phone business to aggressive forked-Android makers, or risk poisoning its Windows Phone business by introducing potentially expansionist Android seeds at the bottom of its handset line.

Several observers (see Charles Arthur’s penetrating Guardian column as an example) have concluded that Microsoft should follow Amazon’s lead and accept the “Come To Android” moment. It should drop Windows Phone and run a familiar Embrace and Extend play: Embrace Android and Extend it with Bing, Nokia’s Here Maps, Office, and other Microsoft properties.

Critics, such as Peter Bright, an energetic Microsoft commenter, contend that forking Android isn’t feasible:

“Android isn’t designed to be forked. With GMS, Google has deliberately designed Android to resist forking. Suggestions that Microsoft scrap its own operating system in favor of such a fork simply betray a lack of understanding of the way Google has built the Android platform.”

Dianne Hackborn, a senior Android engineer (and a former comrade of mine during a previous OS war) contradicts Bright in great point-by-point detail and concludes:

“Actually, I don’t think you have an understanding of how Google has built Android. I have been actively involved in designing and implementing Android since early on, and it was very much designed to be an open-source platform… Android creates a much more equal playing field for others to compete with Google’s services than is provided by the proprietary platforms it is competing with. I also think a good argument can be made that Android’s strategy for addressing today’s need to integrate cloud services into the base platform is an entirely appropriate model for a ‘real’ open-source platform to take.”

In the end, Microsoft probably doesn’t trust Google to refrain from the same games that Microsoft itself knows (too well) how to play. Microsoft used its control of Windows to favor its Office applications. Now it’s Google’s turn. The Mountain View company appears set to kill Microsoft Office, slowly but surely, and using all means available: OS platforms and Cloud services.

None of this draws a pretty picture for Microsoft’s mobile future. Damned if it introduces Android bits at the low end, damned if it lets that same software kill its Asha feature phone business.

JLG@mondaynote.com
@gassee
———————-
PS: Almost four years ago, I wrote a light-hearted piece titled Science Fiction: Nokia goes Android. It was actually less fictional than I let on at the time. In June 2010, I was asked to give a talk at Nokia’s US HQ in White Plains, NY. I was supposed to discuss Apple but I declined to spend too much time on that topic arguing that the Cupertino company was too “foreign” to Nokia’s culture. Instead, I made two suggestions: Fire your CEO and drop your four or five software platforms — Symbian and Linux variants — and adopt Android. Nokia’s combination of industrial design expertise, manufacturing might, and long-standing, globe-spanning carrier relationships could make it a formidable Android smartphone maker.

The first recommendation was warmly received — there was no love for Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, the accountant cum attorney CEO.

The second was met with indignation: “We can’t lose control of our destiny”. I tried to explain that the loss had already taken place, that too many software platforms were a sure way to get killed at the hands of monomaniacal adversaries.

Three months later Kallasvuo was replaced…by a Microsoft alum who immediately osborned Nokia’s smartphone business by pre-announcing the move to Windows Phone almost a year before the new devices became available.

—–

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64 bits. It’s Nothing. You Don’t Need It. And We’ll Have It In 6 Months

 

Apple’s A7 processor, the new iOS 7 and “house” apps are all industry firsts: genuine, shipping 64-bit mobile hardware and software. As we’ve seen before with the iPhone or the iPad, this new volley of Apple products is first met with the customary bursts of premature evaluations and counterfactual dismissals.

On September 10th, Apple revealed that the new iPhone 5s would be powered by its new 64-bit A7 processor. The initial reactions were less than enthused. We were treated to exhumations of lazy bromides…

“I don’t drink Kool-Aid. Never liked the stuff and I think we owe it to ourselves to collectively question whether or not Apple’s ‘reality distortion field’ is in effect when we consider how revolutionary the iPhone 5S is and if Apple’s 64-bit A7 processor under its shiny casing will be all its [sic] cracked up to be when the device hits the market in volume.” [Forbes]

…and equally lazy “markitecture” accusations…

“With current mobile devices and mobile apps, there really is no advantage [to 64 bits] other than marketing — the ability to say you’re the first to have it…” [InfoWorld]

…and breezy brush-offs, such as this tweet from an industry expert:

“We’ll see just how good Apple’s marketing team is trying to leverage 64-bit. 64-bit add more memory and maybe registers. Period.” [Twitter]

Rather than wonder what these commenters were drinking, let’s turn to AnandTech, widely regarded as one of the best online hardware magazines.

Founded by Anand Lal Shimpi when he was all of 14-years-old, AnandTech is known for its exhaustive (and sometimes exhausting) product reviews. The 14-section September 17th iPhone 5S review doesn’t disappoint. Among other things, it provides detailed iPhone 5S vs. iPhone 5 performance comparisons such as this:

5S GeekBench Anand Edited

There are many other charts, comparisons, and considerations of the new 64-bit ARMv8 instruction set, the move from 16 to 32 floating-point NEON 128-bit registers, the hardware acceleration of cryptography operations… It’s a very long read, but not a boring one (at least not for interested geeks).

The bottom line is plain: The A7 processor is a substantial improvement that’s well supported by the 64-bit iOS7. (And I’d like to meet the author and bow to his encyclopedic knowledge.)

Was it because of AnandTech’s cool analysis that the doubters have changed their tune?

As I predicted, Apple A7 benchmarks well due to CPU arch (for IPC), new GPU, ARM v8′

Now that the A7 had become a Benchmarking Beast, the author of the previous week’s brush-off tweet (“more memory and maybe registers. Period”) has revised his position [emphasis mine]:

“The improvements Apple made with the A7 are truly incredible, and they really went against the grain in their choices. With an industry obsessed with more cores, they went with fewer, larger and efficient cores. With people expecting v8 and 64-bit ARM in late 2014, Apple brings it out in 2013 with full Xcode support and many performance optimizations.” […] “Apple has done it again, but this time in unexpected fashion.”

That all-purpose defense, unexpected, provides a key to the wrong-footing of many “experts”.

When Apple entered the microprocessor field a mere five years ago with its acquisition of Palo Alto Semiconductor, the move was panned: Apple had no future competing with established industry leaders such as Intel, Qualcomm, Nvidia, and Samsung.

But with the successive, increasing refinement of the A4, A5, and A6, the designs were ultimately viewed as good, very good, roughly on par with the rest of the industry. What these processors lacked in raw power was more than made up for by they way they were integrated into Apple’s notion of a purposeful, usable mobile device: Enhanced UI responsiveness, reduced power consumption, obeisance to the unique requirements of media and communications.

The expectation was that Apple would either fail, or produce a “competent” (meaning not particularly interesting) iteration of previous A4-5-6 designs. No one expected that the processor would actually work, with all in-house apps running in 64-bit mode from day one.

But let’s back up and rewrite a bit of history, ourselves:

On September 10th, Samsung announced its flagship 64-bit Exynos processor, supported by Android 5.0, the 64-bit version of Google’s market-leading mobile OS. The new Galaxy S64 smartphone, which will ship on September 20th, features both 64-bit hardware and software components. Samsung and Google receive high praise:

“Supercomputer-class processor… Industry-leading performance… Tightly integrated 64-bit software and hardware open a new era of super high-performance applications previously impossible on mobile devices…”

And Apple gets its just deserts:

“Once again, Apple gets out-innovated…This confirms the trend we’ve seen since Tim Cook took over… iPhones have become second-class devices… The beginning of a long decline…”

Apple can be thankful this is fantasy: The real world would never treat it like this (right?).

My fantasy isn’t without basis: Within 24 hours of Apple’s September announcement, Samsung’s mobile business chief Shin Jong-kyun said his company will have its own 64-bit Exynos processor:

“Not in the shortest time. But yes, our next smartphones will have 64-bit processing functionality…” [The Korea Times]

As for Android support, no problem: 64-bit versions of the underlying Linux kernel already exist. Of course, the system software layer that resides on top of the Linux kernel — the layer that is Android — will also need to be converted to take advantage of the 64-bit processor, as will the Software Development Kit (SDK) that third-party developers use to create apps. It’s a sizable challenge, but one that’s well within the Android’s team skills and resources; the process has certainly been under way for a while already.

The real trouble starts outside of Google. Which 64-bit processor? Intel’s (the company says it will add 64-bit “capabilities” to Android)? Samsung’s? Qualcomm’s?

Who writes and supports device drivers for custom SoC modules? This sounds a lot like Windows device driver complications, but the complexity is multiplied by Google’s significantly weaker control over hardware variants.

Apple’s inherent control over all of the components in its platform will pay dividends in the speed and quality of the transition. There will be glitches — there will always be new, factory-fresh bugs — but the new 64-bit hardware is designed to run existing 32-bit apps, and it seems to actually do so in practice.

Now let’s go beyond the iPhone 5S. In his September 10th presentation, Phil Schiller, Apple’s Marketing Supremo, called the A7’s performance “desktop class”. These words were carefully calibrated, rehearsed, and approved. This isn’t a “Can’t innovate anymore? My asssaeta, blurted while seized by religious fervor at last Spring’s Apple Developers Conference.

Does “desktop class” imply that Apple could use future versions of its 64-bit processor to replace Intel chips in its Mac devices?

In the AnandTech post quoted above, several benchmarks compare Apple’s A7 to a new x86 chip, Intel’s Baytrail, with interesting results:

AnandTech Baytrail A7

So, yes, in theory, a future Apple 64-bit processor could be fast enough to power a Mac.

But let’s consider a 3GHz iMac running a high-end media creation application such as Photoshop or Autodesk. The processor doesn’t want to be constrained by power consumption requirements, it’s optimized for performance (this even ignores the upcoming MacPro and its thermal management prowess).

Can we see a split in the Mac product line? The lower, more mobile end would use Apple’s processors, and the high-end, the no-holds-barred, always plugged to the wall desktop devices would still use x86 chips. With two code bases to maintain ß OS X applications to port? Probably not.

Apple could continue to cannibalize its (and others’) PC business by producing “desktop-class” tablets. Such speculation throws us back to a well-known problem: How do you compose a complex document without a windowing system and a mouse or trackpad pointer?

We’ve seen the trouble with Microsoft’s hybrid PC/tablet, its dual Windows 8 UI which is considered to be “confusing and difficult to learn (especially when used with a keyboard and mouse instead of a touchscreen).”

The best suggestion I’ve seen so far comes from “a veteran design and management surgeon” who calls himself Kontra and proposes An interim solution for iOS ‘multitasking‘ based on a multi-slot clipboard.

If Apple provides a real way to compose complex documents on a future iPad, a solution that normal humans will embrace, then it will capture desktop-class uses and users.

Until such time, Macs and iPads are likely to keep using different processors and different interaction models.

JLG@mondaynote.com

 

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Android vs. Apple. Market Share vs. Profit Share, Part 255

 

Conventional wisdom and badly reconstructed history can lead to seemingly comfortable but in reality fragile conclusions. Prepare to be confused. 

Ever since the Android platform emerged as the only real competitor to Apple’s iOS devices, we’ve been treated to a debate which I’ll oversimplify: If Apple makes all the money but Android gets all the volume, who will win? A cursory survey of tech journals and blogs would lead one to believe that the case is closed: Market Share trumps Profit Share. It always does.

So Apple should call it a day? I’m skeptical. Not about the conclusion — Market Share isn’t exactly a dark horse — but about the arguments that are trotted out. False memories of Apple’s past have become a template for its future. For example, a recent Wall Street Journal article ends thus [and, sorry, you need a subscription to see the entire article]:

“Unfortunately, Apple has seen this movie before. A generation ago, it also had a top product whose market share was undercut by cheap, inferior rivals. It hopes the iPhone’s story isn’t a sequel to the Mac’s.”

(I emailed the WSJ writer asking three simple, clarifying questions. No answer, but that’s standard practice, as witheringly described by Philip Elmer-DeWitt at the end of this post.)

I was there “a generation ago”. In 1981, when IBM introduced the IBM PC, I was starting Apple France. Big Blue had made startling changes to its old ways, boldly calling its new machine The Personal Computer (we thought the “The” was ours). In an even bolder move, IBM loosened its tie and its dress code, and tried (successfully) to speak to the “common man” by using a Charlie Chaplin imitator as a mascot:

An interesting choice, particularly when juxtaposed with the real Chaplin’s cine-commentary on “labor-saving devices”:

The original PC from IBM’s Boca Raton group was a faithful homage to the Apple ][, right down to the cassette interface. But it wasn’t a cheap imitation. There was one important difference:  Where the Apple ][ used a 8-bit 6502 processor, IBM splurged on the much-more-powerful 16-bit Intel chip.

Almost overnight, the pages of InfoWorld, previously replete with salivating reviews of Apple products, were filled with IBM PC articles. The new machine got a major boost with the launch of Lotus 1-2-3, a multi-function spreadsheet that became the gold standard for office applications, especially on desktops that sported hard disks and large color screens. Against the Apple ][, the IBM PC was a superior product — and deftly marketed.

For the next few years, the Apple ][ family stumbled. The Apple ///, beset by early hardware failures, didn’t answer the 16-bit question. It wasn’t the modernization of the Apple ][ that the company had promised. The Apple II GS was even worse, not compatible enough with the Apple ][ and not powerful enough to attract developers, particularly Bill Gates who saw no potential for Microsoft applications.

That brings us to 1984. The Macintosh changed the game, right?

Hardly. At its coming out party, the Mac was two years behind schedule. I recall the “Mac’s Last Slip” jibes at company meetings. No one would deny the obvious potential, the elegance, the innovative user interface, the clean square pixels on the bit-mapped screen, the fonts, the LaserWriter connection… But the Mac didn’t support external hard drives until 1986, and it would be another year before internal disks, additional modularity, and a great Trinitron color monitor were added.

By that time, IBM had had the market to itself for half a decade, and its PC creation had morphed into the Wintel clone industry.

Contrary to the revisionist WSJ story, the “generation ago” Mac never had a market share to undercut. Apple’s flagship product — innovative, elegant, a generation ahead – was a dreamer’s machine. Down-to-earth market wisdom said the Mac was perfect for Stanford undergrads, but not serious enough for real business use. The common view was application developers wouldn’t be able to afford the investment in time and hardware. Starved of competitive software, the Macintosh was doomed to irrelevance and, ultimately, failure.

It almost happened, especially after Apple’s desperate attempt to prop up platform share numbers by licensing Mac clones, a move that resulted in a brutal drop in Apple’s margins. Market share vs. Profit Share…

The Mac was saved by Gil Amelio’s unintentionally self-sacrificing decision to hand the Apple reins back to Steve Jobs. What followed was the most amazing turnaround our industry has ever seen, and it started with two controversial moves: Jobs rescinded the Mac OS license, and he made a deal with the Microsoft Devil. He convinced Gates’ company to “invest” $150M in non-voting Apple shares and develop new Mac versions of the Explorer browser and Office apps (although, in reality, the agreement was part of a settlement of an older IP dispute).

We know the rest of the story, including a meme-adverse fact: For close to seven years, the Mac has consistently gained market share at the expense of PC clones.

Since the advent of another flagship product, the iPhone this time, the riches-to-rags Mac meme has led to predictions of a similar fate: Death by drowning in a sea of “cheap” Android clones. Apple’s high price ($650 per iPhone on average) gives too much low-end room for competitors. The price will be undercut, there will be a decline in unit share that, in turn, will lead to lower profits, lower developer interest, lower ability to invest in future products. The road to irrelevance is paved with high margins and low market share.

Never mind two differences. First, the iPhone never lacked apps, 750,000 of them at last count. And never mind that it is immensely profitable, that Apple is embarrassingly flush with more cash than all its high-tech colleagues combined. The pundits won’t accept evidence as an answer. Market Share will trump Profit Share. Why let facts cloud a good argument?

One is tempted to point to the race to the bottom that PC clone makers have experienced over the past decade. HP enjoys the largest Market Share of all PC makers, but it also “enjoys” less than 4% operating profit for its efforts. Meanwhile, Apple’s margin is in the 25% range for its Mac line. That may not be as enjoyable as the 60% margin for the iPhone, but it’s a solid business, particularly when you consider that the clone makers, HP and Dell foremost, are angling to get out of the business altogether. (See an earlier MN: Post-PC: Wall Street Likes the View.)

Returning to the iOS vs Android debate, I will state an opinion – not to be confused with a prediction, let alone The Truth: I think the vertical simplicity of Apple’s business will tilt the field in its favor as the complicated Android world devolves into anarchy. Apple vs Google isn’t Apple vs Microsoft/Intel/IBM.

Let’s back up a bit. Google’s 2005 acquisition of Android was a visionary move. (Some say Google’s vision was sharpened by Eric Schmidt’s presence on Apple’s Board as the company worked on the future iPhone. Jobs was furious about Google’s decision and summarily asked Schmidt to leave.) Android’s unprecedented growth — more than 50% share of the smartphone market in the US, and even more worldwide – is a testament to the “open” approach. Google gives away the Open Source Android OS; processors are another kind of “open”, custom-designed under ARM licenses open to all payers.

But Android is a “cushion shot”, it’s an indirect way for Google to make money. Android is a Trojan horse that infects smartphones so it can install services that collect the user data that feeds Google’s true business: advertising.

Now, Google faces several problems. Android’s openness leads to incompatibilities between devices, a problem for developers that didn’t happen under Microsoft’s rule in the PC era. Worse (for Google), the many diverging versions of Android (a.k.a. forks) — especially those created in China — carry no Google services. They harvest no data and so they bring no advertising revenue potential back to Google.

This is clearly a concern for Google, so much so that the company now offers “pure” Android smartphones by Samsung (for $650) and HTC (for $599) on its Google Play site.

On the other hand, Android 2013 is a mature, stable OS. It isn’t Windows ’95, which was nothing more than a shell bolted on top of DOS. While the Mac’s system software wasn’t fully developed when it first came out, many saw it as superior — or potentially superior — to Microsoft’s OS. Android is a tougher competitor than Windows was at the same age.

Then there is Google’s subsidiary Motorola Mobility and the relationship with Samsung, the most powerful Android handset maker. As discussed last week, Motorola’s stated intention is to push Android phone prices well below the $650 (unsubsidized) level. Is Samsung in a position to wag the Android dog? And if so, how will they react to Motorola’s moves?

Let’s not forget “the small matter of execution”, one that might prove more important than lofty “strategic” considerations. And, to further complicate predictions, we have the herd’s tendency to assume Company X will make all the mistakes while its competitors will play a perfect game.

Confused? Then I have accomplished one of my goals, to show how unhelpful the old bromides are when trying to guess what will happen next.

JLG@mondaynote.com

PS: I’d be remiss if I didn’t direct you recently discovered articles by John Kirk, who calls himself a recovering attorney and indeed writes tightly reasoned posts on Techpinions. I’ll whet your appetite with two quotes. One from Does The Rise Of Android’s Market Share Mean The End of Apple’s Profits? [emphasis mine]:

Steve Jobs wanted, and Apple wants, market share. But they want the RIGHT market share. Apple wants customers who are willing to pay for their products. And Apple wants customers who are good for their platform. In other words, Apple wants market share in their target demographic. Based on the fact that Apple is taking in 72% of the mobile phone profits with only 8% or 9% of the market share, it sure sounds like they’ve aquired the right market share to me.

Does the rise of Android’s market share mean the end of Apple’s profits? Hardly. You can argue as loudly as you like that developers and profit share must necessarily follow market share. But the facts will shout you down.

The other is from 4 Mobile Business Models, 4 Ways To Keep Score where he concludes:

And if you’re going to prophesy that market share alone gives Google data that will someday, somehow, be worth something to someone, then you need to go back and re-read how the “razor-and-blades” business model is scored.

What we desperately need in analyzing mobile computing is far more attention paid to profits and far less attention paid to prophets.

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Facebook Home: Another Android Lock Pick

 

Facebook’s new Home on Android smartphone is an audacious attempt to demote the OS to a utility role, to keep to itself user data Android was supposed to feed into Google’s advertising business. Google’s reaction will be worth watching.

Amazon’s Kindle Fire, announced late September 2011, is viewed as a clever “Android lock pick“. Notwithstanding the term’s illicit flavor, Amazon’s burglary is entirely legal, an intended consequence of Google’s decision to Open Source their Android mobile operating system. Download the Android source code here, modify it to your heart’s — or business needs’ — content, load it onto a device and sell as many as you’d like.

Because it doesn’t fully meet the terms of the Android Compatibility Program, Amazon’s proprietary version isn’t allowed to use the Android trademark and the company had to open its own App Store. In industry argot, Amazon “forked” Android; they spawned an incompatible branch in the Android Source Tree.

The result of this heretic version of Android is a platform that’s tuned to Amazon’s own needs: Promoting its e-commerce without feeding Google’s advertising money pump.

And that brings us to Facebook’s new Home.

(The company’s slick presentation is here. Business Insider’s also provides a helpful gallery.)

Zuckerberg’s new creation is the latest instance of the noble pursuit of making the user’s life easier by wrapping a shell around existing software. Creating a shell isn’t a shallow endeavor; Windows started its life as a GUI shell wrapped around MS-DOS.  Even venerable Unix command line interfaces such as C shell, Bourne, and Bash (which can be found inside OS X) are user-friendly — or “somewhat friendlier” — wrappers around the Unix kernel. (Sometimes this noble pursuit is taken too far — remember Microsoft’s Bob? It was the source of many jokes.)

Facebook Home is a shell wrapped around Android; it’s a software layer that sits on top of everything else on your smartphone. Your Facebook friends, your timeline, conversations, everything is in one place. It also gives you a simple, clean way to get to other applications should you feel the need to leave the Facebook corral… but the intent is clear: Why would you ever want to leave Home?

This is audacious and clever, everything we’ve come to expect from the company’s founder.

To start with, and contrary to the speculation leading up to the announcement, Facebook didn’t unveil a piece of hardware. Why bother with design, manufacture, distribution and support, only to sell a few million devices — a tiny fraction of your one billion users — when you can sneak in and take over a much larger number of Android smartphones at a much smaller cost?

Second, Home is not only well-aligned with Facebook’s real business, advertising revenue, it’s even more aligned with an important part of the company’s business strategy: keeping that revenue out of Google’s hands. Android’s only raison d’être is to attract a captive audience, to offer free services (search, email, maps…) in order to gain access to the users’ actions and data, which Google then cashes in by selling eyeballs to advertisers. By “floating” above Android, Home can keep these actions and data to itself, out of Google’s reach.

Facebook, like Amazon, wants to keep control of its core business. But unlike Amazon, Facebook didn’t “fork” Android, it merely demoted it to an OS layer that sits underneath the Home shell.

On paper and in the demos, it sounds like Zuckerberg has run the table… but moving from concept to reality complicates matters.

First, Facebook Home isn’t the only Android shell. An important example is Samsung, the leading Android player: it provides its own TouchWiz UI. Given that the Korean giant is obviously determined to stay in control of its own core business, one wonders how the company will welcome Facebook Home into the family of Galaxy phones and phablets. Will it be a warm embrace, or will Samsung continually modify its software in order to keep Home one step behind?

More generally, Facebook has admitted that differences in Android implementations prevent the first release of Home from working on all Android phones. In order to achieve the coverage they’ll need to keep Google (and its Google+ social networking effort) at bay, Facebook could be sucked into a quagmire of development and support.

Last but not least, there’s Google’s reaction.

So far, we’ve heard little but mellifluous pablum from Google in response to Home. (Microsoft, on the other hand, quickly attempted to point out that they were first with an all-your-activities-friends-communications shell in Windows Phone but, in this game, Android is the new Windows and Microsoft is the Apple of the early 90’s.)

Google has shown that it can play nice with its competitors — as long as they aren’t actually competing on the same turf. The Mountain View company doesn’t mind making substantial ($1B or more) Traffic Acquisition payments to Apple because the two don’t compete in the Search and Advertising business. Facebook taking over an Android smartphone is another matter entirely. Google and Facebook are in the same game; they both crave access to user data.

Google could sit back and observe for a while, quantify Facebook’s actual takeover of Android phones, keep tabs on users’ reactions. Perhaps Home will be perceived as yet another walled garden with a massive handover of private data to Facebook.

But Google already sees trouble for its Android strategy.

Many Asian handset makers now adopt Android without including services such as Google Search, Gmail, and Google Maps, the all-important user data pumps. Samsung still uses many of these services but, having gained a leading role on the Android platform, it might demand more money for the user data it feeds to Google, or even fork the code.

In this context, Facebook Home could be perceived as yet another threat to the Android business model.

A number of possible responses come to mind.

In the computer industry, being annoyed or worse by “compatible” hardware or software isn’t new. As a result, the responses are well honed. You can keep changing the interface, thus making it difficult for the parasitic product to bite into its host and suck its blood (data, in this case), or you change the licensing terms.

Google could change or hide its APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) in order to limit Home’s functionality, or even prevent it from running at all (at least until a particularly nasty “bug” is fixed). Worse, Google could makes changes that cause the Facebook shell to still run, but poorly.

I’ll hasten to say that I doubt Google would do any of this deliberately — it would violate the company’s Don’t Be Evil ethos. But… accidents could happen, such as when a hapless Google engineer mistakenly captured Wifi data.

Seriously, FaceBook Home is yet another pick of the Android lock, a threat against Google’s core strategy that will have to be addressed, either with specific countermeasures or with more global changes in the platform’s monetization.

JLG@mondaynote.com

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Google’s Red Guide to the Android App Store

 

As they approach the one million apps mark, smartphone and tablet app stores leave users stranded in thick, uncharted forests. What are Google and Apple waiting?

Last week, Google made the following announcement:

Mountain View, February 24th, 2013 — As part of an industry that owes so much to Steve Jobs, we remember him on this day, the 58th anniversary of his birth, with great sadness but also with gratitude. Of Steve’s many achievements, we particularly want to celebrate the Apple App Store, the venerable purveyor of iPhone software. 

Introduced in 2008, the App Store was an obvious and natural descendant of iTunes. What wasn’t obvious or foreseen was that the App Store would act as a catalyst for an entire market segment, that it would metamorphose the iPhone from mere smartphone to app phone. This metamorphosis provided an enormous boost to the mobile industry worldwide, a boost that has benefitted us all and Google more than most.

But despite the success of the app phone there’s no question that today’s mobile application stores, our own Google Play included, are poorly curated. No one seems to be in charge, there’s no responsibility for reviewing and grading apps, there’s no explanation of the criteria that goes into the “Editors’ Picks”, app categorization is skin deep and chaotic.

Today, we want to correct this fault and, at the same time, pay homage to Steve’s elegant idea by announcing a new service: The Google Play Red Guide. Powered by Google’s human and computer resources, the Red Guide will help customers identify the trees as they wander through the forest of Android apps. The Red Guide will provide a new level of usefulness and fun for users — and will increase the revenue opportunities for application developers.

With the Google Play Red Guide, we’ll bring an end to the era of the uncharted, undocumented, and poorly policed mobile app store.

The Red Guide takes its name from another great high-tech company, Michelin. At the turn of the 20th century, Michelin saw it needed to promote automotive travel in order to stimulate tire sales. It researched, designed and published great maps, something we can all relate to. To further encourage travel, Michelin published Le Guide Rouge, a compendium of hotels and restaurant. A hundred years later, the Michelin Red Guide is still considered the world’s standard; its inspectors are anonymous and thus incorruptible, their opinions taken seriously. Even a single star award (out of three) can put an otherwise unknown restaurant on the map — literally.

Our Red Guide will comprise the following:

– “Hello, World”, a list of indispensable apps for the first time Android customer (or iPhone apostate), with tips, How-To guides, and FAQs.
– “Hot and Not”. Reviews of new apps and upgrades — and the occasional downgrade.
– “In Our Opinion”. This is the heart of the Guide, a catalogue of reviews written by a select group of Google Play staff who have hot line access to Google’s huge population of in-house subject matter experts. The reviews will be grouped into sections: Productivity, e-Learning, Games, Arts & Creativity, Communication, Food & Beverage, Healthcare, Spirituality, Travel, Entertainment, Civics & Philanthropy, Google Glass, with subcategories for each.

Our own involvement in reviewing Android apps is a novel — perhaps even a controversial — approach, but it’s much needed. We could have taken the easy path: Let users and third-parties provide the reviews. But third party motives are sometimes questionable, their resources quickly exhausted. And with the Android Store inventory rapidly approaching a million titles, our users deserve a trustworthy guide, a consistent voice to lead them to the app that fits.

We created the Red Guide because we care about our Android users, we want them to “play safe” and be productive, and we feel there’s no better judge of whether an application will degrade your phone’s performance or do what it claims than the people who created and maintain the Android framework. For developers, we’re now in a position to move from a jungle to a well-tended garden where the best work will be recognized, and the not-so-great creations will be encouraged to raise their game.

We spent a great deal of time at Google identifying exactly the right person to oversee this delicate proposition…and now we can reveal the real reason why Google’s Motorola division hired noted Macintosh evangelist, auteur, and investor Guy Kawasaki as an advisor: Guy will act as the Editor in Chief of the Google Play Red Guide.

With Guy at the helm, you can expect the same monkish dedication and unlimited resources we deployed when we created Google Maps.

As we welcome everyone to the Google Play Red Guide, we again thank Steve Jobs for his leadership and inspiration. Our algorithms tell us he would have approved.

The Red Guide is an open product and will be published on the Web at AppStoreRedguide.com as well as in e-book formats (iBookstore and Kindle formats pending approval) for open multi-platform enjoyment.
——– 

No need to belabor the obvious, you’ve already figured out that this is all a fiction. Google is no better than Apple when it comes to their mobile application store. Both companies let users and developers fend for themselves, lost in a thick forest of apps.

That neither company seems to care about their online stores’ customers makes no sense: Smartphone users download more apps than songs and videos combined, and the trend isn’t slowing. According to MobiThinking:

IDC predicts that global downloads will reach 76.9 billion in 2014 and will be worth US$35 billion.

Unfortunately, Apple appears to be resting on its laurels, basking in its great App Store numbers: 40 billion served, $8B paid to developers. Perhaps the reasoning goes like this: iTunes served the iPod well; the App Store can do the same for the iPhone. It ain’t broke; no fix needed.

But serving up music and movies — satisfying the user’s established taste with self-contained morsels of entertainment — is considerably different from leading the user to the right tool for a job that may be only vaguely defined.

Apple’s App Store numbers are impressive… but how would these numbers look like if someone else, Google for example, showed the kind of curation leadership Apple fails to assert?

JLG@mondaynote.com

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