When he returned to the helm at Apple in 1997, Steve Jobs righted a foundering company. Upon his death fourteen years later, Jobs left behind a giant… and many questions: Could Apple pull off more miracles like the iPhone and the iPad? Would Tim Cook be more than a supremely competent operating executive?
by Jean-Louis Gassée
After a week of hopping on airplanes and driving around the Real France (read: far from the Left Bank), I’m happily back at the Monday Note writing bench. I’ll sidestep a recapitulation of the Ad Blocker topic, too hot for now, and will focus instead on Apple’s recent announcements, starting with the iPad Pro.
At this year’s Worldwide Developer conference, we were told about Apple’s new music streaming service and given hints about the iPad’s future… and we were left asking questions about Apple’s relationship with Google.
by Jean-Louis Gassée
Forget the iWatch, Apple Pay, and the iPhone 7…the next big thing from Cupertino will be the Apple Car.
At first, I didn’t pay much attention to the Apple Car rumors. I saw them as the another wave of clickbait along the lines of the wiped-out Apple Television Set canards.
I even thought of writing a little parody piece:
WinCar, Microsoft Disrupts The Auto Industry.
After penetrating offices and homes, Microsoft will now hitch a ride in the third most important location (and time slice) in peoples’ lives: The Car.
As part of Satya Nadella’s Mobile First – Cloud First vision, the Azure-enabled WinCar is the ultimate personal mobility and connectivity device. Quoting Nadella’s July 10th message to the troops:
“We will think of every user as a potential ‘dual user’ – people who will use technology for their work or school and also deeply use it in their personal digital life.
Microsoft will push into all corners of the globe to empower every individual as a dual user – starting with the soon to be 3 billion people with Internet-connected devices. And we will do so with a platform mindset. Developers and partners will thrive by creatively extending Microsoft experiences for every individual and business on the planet.”
Microsoft’s connections to the auto industry are old and obvious: Steve Ballmer’s father was a manager at Ford; Microsoft wrote successive generations of Sync, Ford’s dashboard infotainment system; Dr. Helmut Panke, an illustrious auto industry figure and former Chairman of BMW’s Board of Management, sits on Microsoft’s Board of Directors. Bill Gates drives a Ford Focus. Ballmer? He’s a Ford Fusion man...
As I saw the growing stream of Apple Car tweets and blog posts, two minutes of research took me to what seems to be the source of the reverberating fracas, a single Wall Street Journal story titled Apple Gears Up to Challenge Tesla in Electric Cars; iPhone Maker Has 100s Working on Design of a Minivan Like Vehicle. The article tells us that the project, code named “Titan”, is being shepherded by Steve Zadesky, a former Ford engineer who “helped lead the Apple teams that created the iPod and iPhone” — two products that have many, many fathers.
Most of the echoes of the rumor emanate from that one story. The Financial Times’ Apple hiring automotive experts to work in secret research lab isn’t much more than a rewrite. The always “reliable” Business Insider tells us that Tesla and Apple are poaching each other’s engineers and throws in a quote from an unnamed Apple employee: “We’re working on something that will give Tesla a run for its money”. A Mac Observer post tells us that they have it on good authority from someone who “travels in more rarefied circles” that “a lot of people at the top in Silicon Valley consider it a given that Apple is working on a car”.
The posts and reposts are quick to find “evidence” that back up the rumors. Apple’s Sr. VP Eddy Cue, who sits on Ferrari’s Board (a fact that’s omitted from Cue’s official bio), has long been a conduit between choice automobiles and highly paid company engineers and executives. Apple recently hired Johann Jungwirth, former president and chief executive of Mercedes-Benz Research and Development North America. Recent sitings of Apple’s mysterious unmarked vans fitted with a dozen cameras proves they’re building an autonomous vehicle.
The picture wouldn’t be complete without a juicy link to complaints about American cars by “design god” Jony Ive and no less divine watch designer Marc Newson, who says that American car design is on the “shit we hate” list.
(Let’s give ourselves a moment of contemplation, here. These two august industrial artists come from Britain, whose auto industry is now either German or Indian. Bentley, Sir Jony’s choice, is owned by Volkswagen; Rolls Royce is a subsidiary of über Bavarian BMW; Jag-ü-ar and Land Rover are in the competent hands of the Tata conglomerate.)
Just as in the little Microsoft parody above, the signs are unmistakable, Apple is definitely making a car.
Let’s count the ways….
The company has the money. With $178B in the bank, it could easily afford to build a car factory. The cost of doing so, a couple billion, is certainly less than the price of a microprocessor fabrication unit where costs approach $10B. And the company is no stranger to large industrial bets. As Horace Dediu notes, Apple spent close to $4B in Machinery and Equipment in the quarter preceding the launch of the latest iPhone; for the latest quarter, spending of more than $3.2B is 60% higher than a year before. As Horace tells us, large increases in Machinery and Equipment spending presage big product launches – which is a little besides today’s topic:
Short of building everything from the ground up, perhaps Apple is going to buy their way in. Why not acquire Tesla and enjoy a running start? Tesla’s market cap of $26B makes it an affordable acquisition. The current Model S is, in several ways, the first Silicon Valley car, built nearby in Fremont, with a modern touch-based UI, autopilot features, and regular over-the-air software updates.
An Apple car would almost certainly be out of many drivers’ budgets, but let’s recall that Apple has a history of disrupting from the top. They took over the MP3 player market and the smartphone industry by providing a more expensive product and carefully building an ecosystem of software, content, services, and retail operations that deliver user experiences that, in turn, generate higher margins. And as car technology matures, Moore’s Law will help drive down prices.
But now let’s look at the reality.
Yes, Apple has plenty of money, but the century-old auto industry doesn’t seem like a good way to make more of it. Ford, the healthiest US car company, made $835M in net income last quarter, less than 4% of their $34B in sales. Compare that number to Apple’s record-breaking $18B profit. Tesla, Apple’s supposed rival in the fantasy blogs, pulled in a little less than $1B last quarter, and it lost about 10% of that. There isn’t an inkling of an explanation for why and how a superior product designed and built by Apple would bring superior returns.
Furthermore, there is no Moore’s Law for cars. In a Tesla Model S, the computers are a small part of the bill of materials. Batteries, which contribute the most to the price, don’t double in power or halve in cost every 18 months.
A simple chart by Benedict Evans sheds light on the opportunities before us:
The sort of money that apple has come to expect just isn’t in cars.
An autonomous car is good PR and to some it may seem like an inevitability, but as Lee Gomes, a former tech writer for the Wall Street Journal, explains in this Slate piece: The autonomous Google car may never actually happen. This isn’t because Google engineers are incompetent, but because actual, in-the-wild autonomous driving is fraught with countless intractable exceptions. What happens in heavy rain or snow, or when the software behind the camera has trouble recognizing objects that are blown onto the road?What happens when your car approaches a a last minute detour around new construction site?
Apple’s life today is relatively simple. It sells small devices that are easily transported back to the point of sale for service if needed. No brake lines to flush, no heavy and expensive batteries and cooling systems, no overseeing the installation and maintenance of home and public chargers. And consider the trouble Tesla faces with entrenched auto dealers who oppose Tesla selling cars directly in some states. Apple doesn’t need these headaches.
There is a simpler and regrettably less grand explanation for the rumors.
Johann Jungwirth, the Mercedes Benz R&D exec that Apple hired last September, worked on infotainment systems, which makes him a natural for Apple’s work on CarPlay. The mystery vans are most likely part of the company’s Maps product.
Apple has made a commitment to better in-car systems, not in and for themselves in isolation, but as a reinforcement of the iOS ecosystem. If the large number of engineers that they’ve “poached” from Tesla seems a bit much, consider again the enormous size of iPhone (and iPad) revenue for this past quarter: $60B – compared to GM’s $40B for the same period. To Apple, anything that helps the iOS ecosystem is well worth what looks like oversized investments to outsiders.
Cars have always excited humans, they are a way to extend the reach of our bodies. As Roland Barthes once said about the Citroën DS 19 [emphasis mine]:
“I think that cars today are almost the exact equivalent of the great Gothic cathedrals; I mean the supreme creation of an era, conceived with passion by unknown artists, and consumed in image if not in usage by a whole population which appropriates them as a purely magical object.”
An Apple car feels good: design, quality, service, trust. A winner. I’ll buy two. It’ll work because it’d be really great if it did… but a small matter of implementation – actually the larger Moore’s Law intrudes.
The fantastic Apple Car is a fantasy.
by Jean-Louis Gassée
Apple’s most recent quarterly numbers broke all sorts of records and, as we shall see, a number of laws.
Apple just released its numbers for the quarter ending last December, the first quarter of its 2015 Fiscal Year. The figures are astonishing:
iPhones: Apple sold 74.5M, + 57% over last year’s same quarter. iPhone revenue was $51.2B, + 57%. That’s enough iPhones for 1% of the world population, 9.4 iPhones for every second of the past quarter. I hope to see some day a documentary movie on the supply chain heroics leading (parts manufacturing, assembly, transportation logistics) required to achieve such numbers. But I’m not holding my breath.
Overall company revenue grew 30% to $74.6B, with the iPhone representing a never-before 69% of total sales. This why some now call Apple the iPhone Company.
Profit (a.k.a. Net Income): $18B. This appears to be the highest quarterly profit ever achieved by a company:
Record quarterly profits is becoming commonplace for Apple. The company has broken into the top ten list five times since Q1 FY 2012.
(The Wikipedia article on record profits and losses has Fannie Mae’s $84B in 2013 in the #1 spot, but Fannie’s categorization as a Government-Sponsored Enterprise puts it in a different race – not to mention the $77.8B and $64.2B losses in Q4 2009 and Q4 2008 respectively.)
Cash: After generating $33B from operations, the company now holds $178B in cash and cash equivalents. To get a sense of the magnitude of this amount, $178B represents $550 for every US citizen, or $25 per human on Earth. The World Bank has more data here on income levels and other such numbers, and the Financial Times has a helpful blog entry, If Apple were a country…, that compares Apple’s “economy” to those of various nations.
If you’re hungry for more Apple numbers, I suggest you feast your eyes on Apple’s 10-Q (its quarterly SEC filing), especially the meaty MD&A (Management Discussion & Analysis) section starting on page 24. Management also discusses the quarterly numbers in its customary conference call; the transcript is here.
But not everyone thinks highly of Apple’s doings.
We have academics spewing sonorous nonsense under the color of authority, such as Juan Pablo Vazquez Sampere’s We Shouldn’t Be Dazzled by Apple’s Earnings Report, published in the Harvard Business Review. Sampere, a Business School professor, finds Apple’s display of quarterly numbers unseemly:
“Announcing boatloads of money, as if that were point, makes us think Apple no longer has the vision to keep on revolutionizing.”
John Gruber offers a reasoned retort to the professor, but it probably won’t sway the likes of Joe Wilcox, a Sampere defender who writes: Atop the pinnacle of success, Apple stands at the precipice of failure.
Or consider Peter Cohan, an habitual Tim Cook critic, who recently told us there are “6 Reasons Apple Is Still More Doomed Than You Think”.
Apple… always one foot in the grave. But in whose grave?
This last quarter hasn’t been kind to the Apple doomsayers. A bundle of their lazy, ill-informed or poorly reasoned — and often angry — predictions are offered here for your compassionate amusement. Or we can turn to the ever reliable Henry The iPhone Is Dead In The Water Blodget for morsels such as this one, from November 2013: Come On, Apple Fans, It’s Time To Admit That The Company Is Blowing It. One of Henry’s points was Apple prices were too high. It’s getting worse: Last quarter, the average price per iPhone rose to $687.
We now turn to law-breaking.
Law 1: Larger size makes growth increasingly difficult.
This is the Law of Large Numbers, not the proper one about probabilities, but a coarser one that predicts the eventual flattening of extraordinary growth. If your business weighs $10M, growing by 50% means bringing in another $5M. If your company weighs $150B, 50% growth the following year would require adding $75B – there might not be enough customers or supplies to support such increase. Actual numbers seem to confirm the Law: Google’s FY 2014 revenue was $66B, +19% year-on-year; Microsoft’s was $87B, +11.5%; Apple’s $183B in revenue for 2014 was a mere +7%.
And yet, last quarter, Apple revenue grew 30%, breaking the Law and any precedent. iPhone revenue, which grew 57%, exceeded $51B in one quarter — close to what Google achieved in its entire Fiscal 2014 year.
Right now, Apple is “guiding” to a next quarter growth rate that exceeds 20%. For the entire 2015 Fiscal Year, this would mean “finding” an additional $37B to $40B in sales, more than half a Google, and a little less than half a Microsoft.
Law 2: Everything becomes a commodity.
Inexorably, products are standardized and, as a result, margins suffer as competitors frantically cut prices in a race to the bottom.
Exhibit 1: The PC clone market. As mentioned, the iPhone ASP (Average Selling Price) moved up, from $637 in Q1 FY 2014 to $687 last quarter. Moving the ASP up by $50 in such a competitive market is, to say the least, counterintuitive. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, a rising ASP means customers are freely deciding to give more money to Apple.
We’re told that this is just a form of Stockholm Syndrome, the powerless customer held prisoner inside Apple’s Walled Garden. Not so, says Tim Cook in a Wall Street Journal interview:
“…fewer than 15% of older iPhone owners upgraded to the iPhone 6 and 6 Plus…the majority of switchers to iPhone came from smartphones running Google Inc.’s Android operating system.”
This correlates with Apple’s 70% revenue growth in Greater China, a part of the world where, in theory, cheap clones rule.
Law 3: Market share always wins.
Why this one still has disciples is puzzling, but here we go. With the bigger market share come economies of scale and network effects. Eventually, the dominant platform becomes a gravity well that sucks application developers and other symbionts away from the minority players who are condemned to irrelevance and starvation. Thus, just as the Mac lost to Windows, iOS will lose to Android.
Apple has gained PC market share in all but one quarter over the past eight years — that’s 31 out of 32 quarters.
But even that impressive run isn’t as important as the sustaining number that really does matter: profit share. Despite its small unit share (around 7% worldwide, higher in the US), Apple takes home about half of all PC industry profits, thanks to its significant ASP ($1,250 vs $417 industry-wide in 2014, trending down to $379 this year). Apple’s minority unit share in the mobile sector (13% to 15%) captured 90% of mobile profits this past quarter.
Small market share hasn’t killed the Mac, and it’s not hurting the iPhone — which enjoyed a much happier start than the Mac.
Law 4: Modularity Always Wins.
This is one of Clayton Christensen’s worries about Apple’s future. In the end, modularity always defeats integration:
“The transition from proprietary architecture to open modular architecture just happens over and over again. It happened in the personal computer. Although it didn’t kill Apple’s computer business, it relegated Apple to the status of a minor player. The iPod is a proprietary integrated product, although that is becoming quite modular. You can download your music from Amazon as easily as you can from iTunes. You also see modularity organized around the Android operating system activity that is growing much faster than the iPhone. So I worry that modularity will do its work on Apple.”
This was written in May 2012. Three years later, the iPod is all but gone. The music player that once generated more revenue than the Mac and paved the way for the iPhone by giving rise to the iTunes infrastructure has become an ingredient inside its successor. With 400M units sold, Apple no longer even reports iPod sales. One could say integration won.
Christensen rightly points out that in the PC clone market, modularity allowed competitors to undercut one another by improving layer after layer, smarter graphic cards, better/faster/cheaper processing, storage, and peripheral modules. This led to the well-documented PC industry race to the bottom. But Christensen fails to note that the Mac stubbornly refused (and still refuses) to follow the Modularity Law. And, as Apple’s recent numbers show, the iPhone seems just as immune to modularity threats.
I have no trouble with the Law of Large Numbers, it only underlines Apple’s truly stupendous growth and, in the end, it always wins. No business can grow by 20%, or even 10% for ever.
But, for the other three, Market Share, Commoditization, and Modularity, how can we ignore the sea of contradicting facts? Even if we set Apple aside, there are so many “exceptions” to these rules that one wonders if these so-called Laws aren’t simply convenient wishful thinking, a kind of intellectual Muzak that fills an idea vacuum but has no substance.
As Apple continues to “break the law”, perhaps we’ll see a new body of scholarship that provides alternatives to the discredited refrains. As Rob Majteles tweeted: “Apple: where many, all?, management theories go to die?
by Jean-Louis Gassée
After last week’s lengthy discussion of Apple’s software foibles, today’s fare is lighter but intriguing: The Apple logo is a stamp of excellence that’s proudly worn by the Mac, iPhone, iPad, Watch… why is it withheld from one of Apple’s other major group of products?]
Naming a computer company Apple was a true stroke of genius, the kind that sits beyond the reach of consciousness. With the name came a visual representation. The first, unofficial logo evoked Isaac Newton’s famous epiphany:
(Source: Edible Apple)
Not a stroke of genius. It was a too kitschy, too busy, and failed to provide an easily memorized and recognized image, a signpost to the company’s products. It was quickly replaced with the simple Apple bite logo that we know today:
(Source: Graphic Design 1)
Theories of the the logo’s meaning and construction occupy a corner of Apple mythology. Some are misguided (it’s an homage to Alan Turing, it’s a blasphemous reference to the forbidden fruit), while others are playful: A fellow named Barcelos Thiago points out the use of the Fibonacci series in the Apple logo (and in just about everything else).
Apple’s reputation, products, and imagery have coalesced into a brand, a mark that’s burned (as in the word’s origin) into the collective consciousness. Last year, Forbes called Apple the world’s most valuable brand. It’s impossible to measure contribution of the name and logo to the company’s success, but a peek at the Forbes’ list shows how little Apple spends advertising its products compared to Microsoft, Google, Samsung, or less technical companies such as Coca-Cola or Louis Vuitton:
A brand exists in a circular relationship with the promises that it makes to the customer. If the products and services deliver on the pledge, the customer is more inclined to swear loyalty to the brand. A close examination of some of these circles brings up apparent paradoxes. Burberry’s, for example, was once credited for inventing the oxymoronic “mass-marketing of exclusivity” – a trick that Louis Vuitton now performs at the highest of levels, a feat that requires an advertising budget more than four times Apple’s.
The late Fred Hoar, an erudite Harvard graduate who once served as the head of Apple’s Marketing Communications, likened brand advertising to urinating inside one’s dark-blue flannel suit: It makes you feel warm but no one sees anything.
No such waste at at Apple. The product, not the brand, is the hero. Apple’s ads focus on the product, on what it does, on the feats that it allows unnamed customers to perform. The brand ascends to where it belongs, above specific products and promotions.
Apple ads are also (mostly) free from celebrity endorsements. The imprimatur of a noted figure can be effective — I’m thinking of George Clooney second banana persona in Nestlé’s tongue-in-cheek Nespresso ads. But we usually feel the use of endorsements as an admission that the product needs stilts, that it lacks differentiation.
If Apple ever hires a spokesperson for its iPhones, even if it’s Andrew Wiles or, in a couple of years, a happily retired Barack Obama, you should look elsewhere: The brand has started to unravel. (Apple does, of course, occasionally use celebrities — this ad featuring the Williams sisters for example — but as Adweek points out, it’s rare.)
Given this thinking, what do we make of Apple’s other brand, Beats?
Beats was acquired last year, for $3.2B. The reasons behind the price are still a bit unclear, but we already see ads that aren’t much more than mini-movies of celebrity athletes (Colin Kaepernick, Cesc Fabregas, LeBron James) shutting out the noise of irate fans and implications of social injustice by donning the company’s headphones.
Does the Beats lines needs stilts in order to achieve differentiation and justify its high pricetag? The quality of Beats headphones is a contested subject. One study shows they’re preferred by teens, other painstaking reviews claim there are many better headphones. On this, because of my old ears, I don’t have much of an opinion beyond Sound Holiday Thoughts written in December 2013.
It’s a novel situation: Apple Thinks Different about the two brands it now owns. The personal computing brand is carefully nurtured, pruned, protected, now at the pinnacle. The other is just as carefully kept apart.
Walk into an Apple store and you’ll see Beats headphones and speakers next to Bose, B&O, and Logitech products. Before the acquisition, this was no surprise, Beats products were just third party accessories. Now, they’re Apple products, even if they don’t carry the Apple logo. They sit on the shelves next to their competitors, such as the $999.95 Denon Music Maniac Artisan headphones. Can you imagine the Apple Store selling Surface Pro hybrids, stocking them right next to the iPads?
You won’t find Apple logos on Beats headphones, and you won’t find any Apple references in a Beats headphone commercial. The headphones are part of the Beats Music streaming music ecosystem whose goal is to play everywhere, including the Windows Phone Store.
But there’s a problem. As Horace Dediu notes, Apple’s music business has stopped growing, vastly overwhelmed by apps:
The Beats acquisition raised many questions still unanswered: Why get into the headphones and loudspeakers business? What is the Job To Be Done here? Same queries for the Beats Music streaming service, one that might benefit from its bundling with Apple hardware, but whose curation “sounds” less than enthralling thus far, notwithstanding Tim Cook’s enthusiasm.
As the year unfolds, we’ll see how Beats products and services grow the brand, if its isolation from the Apple brand merely is prophylactic caution, or part of a bigger plan to stay on top of the music world.
The Apple Watch won’t be the only development to… watch this year.
This week’s product launch should break the mold of Apple’s recent Fall announcements: More products than usual and a challenge to the status quo – in payment system this time.
A larger iPhone; a line of wearables (unveiled if not yet ready-to-ship); significant iOS improvements (a true “iOS 2.0”); HomeKit and HealthKit devices, applications, and partnerships; payment systems… If only half of the rumors about Apple’s September 9th media event are true, we’re going to have a wider and deeper flood of new products than we’ve seen in Apple’s previous Fall launches.
And let’s not forget the big white cocoon that covers the two-story structure that Apple built for the occasion:
(image source: AppleInsider)
Apple is likely to add some drama to the event by lifting the veil at the last moment.
For today, we’ll focus on the recent flurry of leaks and rumors surrounding payment systems. We’ve heard about agreements with American Express, Visa, MasterCard, Bank of America; with retailers such as Nordstrom and Macy’s, CVS and Walgreens; and hoteliers such as Starwood… The predications may not prove accurate down to the last detail, but the outbreak is too strong not to be taken seriously. Apple is about to get into the payment system business in a serious way.
There have been rumors before. Search for “apple payment system” and you’ll get about 80 million hits on Google (11 million on Bing). Flipping through the pages, we see that the excitement started as far back as five years ago when Apple’s “Grab & Go” patent filings disclosed the company’s interest in near field communication, a wireless data transfer method that can be used for quick purchases and payments. This led to the birth of a new i-Word around 2010: the iWallet.
From its very beginning, the iPhone has looked like a logical payment device. Our phones are always with us; they’re more secure than the magnetic stripe on a credit card because they can use “payment tokens” — codes that authenticate you without identifying your credit card account; payment apps can be easily downloaded and updated.
The possibilities looked endless and, of course, led to overheated predictions: Think of all the trillions of dollars sloshing around in debit/credit cards. If Apple captured only a small fraction of the flow, they’d be filthy rich!
Others disagreed. In January 2011, PCWorld’s Tom Spring explained why Apple’s Mobile Payment System Will Fail. Among his objections, was the implicit assumption that phones are somehow easier than cards (“What’s gained…by waving an iPhone instead of swiping a bank card is not clear to me”), and that retailers won’t accept phones as payment instruments until the “Another Box at the Register” obstacle is surmounted:
“Near field communication is a technology that requires a physical box/reader on the retailer’s end. Until we know more about what incentives there are for retailers to invest in this technology I think it’s going to be hard sell for Apple to convince millions of merchants to put another box at the point of sale…”
Indeed, attempting to modify ingrained customer behavior isn’t a well-trodden path to riches, nor is asking retailers to install a new box next to their cash register. This is why many payment system innovations, Google Wallet is a recent example, have failed to amass enough gravitational pull to gain currency (pardon the pun). There just hasn’t been enough acceptance by consumers and retailers for “fast lane” payment devices to become as matter-of-fact as the incumbents.
Still… Apple has repeatedly shown great patience and willingness to challenge settled wisdom.
The company’s embrace of payment systems started in 2003 when its newly-opened iTunes Store offered two innovations: Single tracks were sold for 99 cents apiece (at the time), and we could settle the purchase with a credit card. Critics scoffed: The price is too low! The credit card companies’ fixed+percentage transaction fees will be a profit-killer!
How can Apple possibly make money with such a proposition?
This was myopia. The iTunes Store wasn’t intended to be a money maker. Its only purpose was to sell more iPods at higher margins, that’s where the money was – and still is. In retrospect, Jobs was pouring the foundations of the Apple ecosystem business model: Hardware is the star; everything else supports the big shots’ volumes and margins.
Returning to today’s (or this coming Tuesday’s) topic, Apple doesn’t want to displace the key players — the banks and credit card companies — any more now than they did a decade ago. Credit card companies, for example, play a hard-to-replace role in policing transactions. It’s not always pretty or convenient when one has to call a US number from Europe because the system “tripped” over an unusual transaction, but it works.
One can’t imagine Apple even thinking of storing and lending money, of trying to “capture a fraction of the flow”. If the company does introduce a near field payment system, it won’t be as an attempt to make money in itself, it will simply be another extension of the Apple ecosystem, another way to make iDevices more attractive.
Beyond this neat playbook theory lurks the matter of modifying consumer behavior and retail infrastructure; Tom Spring’s objections are just as cogent today as they were in 2009. And perhaps Apple’s answer — its rebuttal to the conventional reluctance — is hiding in the still-cocooned show-and-tell building.
PS: On today’s topic, see Horace Dediu’s views on the value of payment systems as bit pipes.
On September 9th, Apple will announce products likely to be seen as a new milestone in Tim Cook’s tenure as Apple’s CEO.
You Break It You Own It. This Labor Day weekend sits about midway between two anniversaries: Tim Cook assumed the CEO mantel a little over three years ago – and Steve Jobs left this world – too soon – early October 2011. And, in a few days, Apple will announce new products, part of a portfolio that caused one of Cook’s lieutenants, Eddy Cue, to gush Apple had the “best product lineup in 25 Years”. Uttered at last Spring’s Code Conference, Cue’s saeta was so unusual it briefly disoriented Walt Mossberg, a seasoned interviewer if there ever was one. After a brief pause, Walt slowly asked Apple’s exec to repeat. Cue obliged with a big I Ate The Canary smile – and raised expectations that will soon meet reality.
After three years at the helm, we’ll soon know in what sense Tim Cook “owns” Apple. For having broken Steve’s creation, for having created a field of debris littered with occasionally recognizable remains of a glorious, more innovative, more elegant past. Or for having followed the spirit of Steve’s dictum – not to think of what he would have done – and led Apple to new heights.
For the past three years, detractors have relentlessly criticized Cook for not being Steve Jobs, for failing to bring out the Next Big Thing, for lacking innovation.
Too often, clickbaiters and other media mountebanks veered into angry absurdity. One recommended Cook buy a blazer to save his job; another told us he a direct line to Apple’s Board and knew directors were demanding more innovation from their CEO; and, last Spring, a Valley bloviator commanded Apple to bring out a smartwatch within 60 days – or else! (No links for these clowns.)
More measurably, critics pointed to slower revenue growth: + 9% in 2013 vs + 65% in 2011 and + 52% in 2010, the last two “Jobs Years”. Or the recent decrease in iPad sales: – 9% in the June 2014 quarter – a never-seen-before phenomenon for Apple products (I exclude the iPod, now turning into an ingredient of iPhones and iPads).
Through all this, Apple’s CEO never took the bait and, unlike Jobs, either ignored jibes, calmly exposed his counterpoint, or even apologized when warranted by the Maps fiasco. One known – and encouraging – exception to his extremely controlled public manner took place when he told a representative of a self-described conservative think-tank what to do with his demand “to commit right then and there to doing only those things that were profitable” [emphasis mine]:
“When we work on making our devices accessible by the blind, […] I don’t consider the bloody ROI.”
“If you want me to do things only for ROI reasons, you should get out of this stock.”
The not-taken road to perdition hasn’t been a road to perfection either. Skipping over normal, unavoidable irritants and bugs – the smell of sausage factories is still with me –
a look at Apple’s Mail client makes one wish for stronger actions than bug fixes leading to new crashes. This is a product, or people, that need stronger decision as they do not represent Apple at its best. Another long-time offender is the iTunes client. One unnamed Apple friend calls it “our Vista” and explains it might suffer from its laudable origin as a cross-platform Mac/Windows application, a feature vital to iPod’s success – we’ll recall its 2006 revenue ($7.7B, + 69% year-to-year growth!) was higher than the Mac’s ($7.4B, + 18%).
Now looking forward, we see this:
A large, cocooned structure being built by an “anonymous” company, next to Cupertino’s aptly named Flint Center for the Performing Arts, where Apple will unveil its next products this coming September 9th. Someone joked this was yet another instance of Apple’s shameless imitation of Google’s innovations. This time Apple copied Google’s barges, but could even get its own clone to float.
Seriously, this is good news. This is likely to be a demo house, one in which to give HomeKit, HealthKit or, who knows, payment systems demonstrations, features of the coming iOS 8 release for “communicating with and controlling connected accessories”. The size of the structure speaks for Apple’s ambitions.
On other good news, we hear Apple’s entry into “wearables”, or into the “smartwatch” field won’t see any shipments until 2015. The surprise here is that Apple would show or tease the product on 9/9. There have been exactly zero leaks of body parts, circuit boards, packages and other accessories, leading more compos mentis observers (not to be confused with compost mentis on Fox News) to think a near term announcement wasn’t in the cards. But John Paczkowski, a prudent ans well-informed re/code writer assures us Apple will indeed announce a “wearable” — only to tell us, two days later, it won’t ship until next year. The positive interpretation is this: Apple’s new wearable category isn’t just a thing, an gizmo, you can throw into the channel and get the money pump running – at nice but immaterial accessory rates. Rather, Apple’s newer creation is a function-rich device that needs commitment, software and partnerships, to make a material difference. For this it needs time. Hence the painful but healthy period of frustration. (Electronic Blue Balls, in the immortal words of Regis McKenna, the Grand Master of Silicon Valley Marketing, who was usually critical of firms making an exciting product announcement, only to delay customer gratification for months.)
The topic of payments is likely to be a little less frustrating – but could mead to another gusher of media commentary. Whether Apple partners with Visa, American Express or others is still a matter of speculation. But one thing is clear: this idea isn’t for Apple to displace or disintermediate any of the existing players. Visa, for example, will still police transactions. And Apple isn’t out to make any significant amount of money from payments.
The goal, as always, is to make Apple devices more helpful, pleasurable – and to sell more of these at higher margins as a result. Like HomeKit or HealthKit, it’s an ecosystem play.
There’s also the less surprising matter of new iPhones. I don’t know if there will be a 4.7” model, or a 5.5” model or both. To form the beginning of an opinion, I went to the Palo Alto Verizon store on University Avenue and asked to buy the 5” Lumia Icon Windows Phone on display. The sales person only expressed polite doubt and excused himself “to the back” to get one. It took eight minutes. The rest of the transaction was quick and I walked out of the store $143.74 lighter. I wanted to know how a larger phone would feel on a daily, jeans and jacket breast-pocket experience. It’s a little heavy (167 grams, about 50 grams more than an iPhone 5S), with a very nice, luminous screen and great Segoe WP system font:
I won’t review the phone or Windows Phone here. Others have said everything that needs to be said on the matter. It’s going to be a tough road for Microsoft to actually become a weighty number three in the smartphone race.
But mission accomplished: It feels like a larger iPhone, perhaps a tad lighter than the Lumia will deliver a pleasant experience. True, the one-handed use will probably be restricted to a subset of the (mostly male) population. And today’s 4” screen size will continue to be available.
There remains the question of what size exactly: 4.7”, or 5.5” (truly big), or both. For this I’ll leave readers in John Gruber’s capable hands. In a blog post titled Conjecture Regarding Larger iPhone Displays, John carefully computes possible pixel densities for both sizes and offers an clarifying discussion of “points”, an important iOS User Interface definition.
We’ll know soon.
As usual, the small matter of implementation remains. There are sure to be the usual hiccups to be corrected in .1 or .2 update in iOS 8. And there won’t be any dearth of bilious comments about prices and other entries on the well-worn list of Apple sins.
But I’ll be surprised if the public perception of Tim Cook’s Apple doesn’t take yet another turn for the better.
Strategic Alliances and other grandly named partnerships never seem to live up to their florid marriage announcements. Apple and IBM are it – again – but this time, Apple is the larger, more prosperous company, and IBM is trying the bad old recipe of regaining growth by cutting down.
Let me slip into something more comfortable: Devil’s Advocate robes. Thus togged out, I will explain why this Apple + IBM rapprochement won’t work – or, worse, it will.
First, the clash of cultures.
Apple is a focused company, its financial statements tell the story: Its money is made in hardware. All other activities, such as the important contributions from the App Store, make up an ecosystem that support the hardware volumes and margins. Everyone in the company knows this.
A look at IBM’s latest quarterly report tells a much more complicated story. In its simplest analysis, the company consists of three main segments, each with its own P&L (Profit & Loss) numbers and, one assumes, its own goals, rewards and punishments, and fight for resources. It is, counterintuitively as the shadow of its former grandeur remains, a smaller business than Apple’s: $24.4B last quarter (-2% year-to-year) vs. $37.4B (+6%).
I asked WolframAlpha for per employee, per year revenue and profit comparisons and got this:
Inside IBM, morale isn’t great. Following a series of layoffs, management is perceived as using Excel as a windshield to drive the company.
Two groups with widely differing habits of the heart and mind.
Second, earlier embraces haven’t worked.
We have memories of AIM, the 1991 accord between Apple, IBM, and Motorola that gave us Kaleida, the multimedia PowerPC processor, and Taligent, Apple and IBM’s attempt at a more modern operating system. Big announcements, big plans – and nothing but debris.
Even earlier, we have memories of the Apple/DEC Alliance: In the Summer of 1987, my boss and benefactor John Sculley had given me the mission to bring to a conclusion a conversation he’d started with DEC’s CEO. Things went well and, in January 1988, we reached our goal:
“…Apple Computer and Digital Equipment announced a joint development agreement under which the two companies would work together to integrate Macintosh and the AppleTalk network system with the VAX and DECnet.”
At the celebratory dinner, I sat next to DEC’s founder, Ken Olson. The likable Grand Old Man professed happiness with our collaboration and calmly told me that while he knew lots of people who used PCs, he couldn’t comprehend why. At home, he said, he had a “glass teletype” — a CRT, remember those? — and an Ethernet connection back to the factory, quite expensive at the time. Combined with DEC’s ALL-IN-1 office productivity suite (all commands were two-characters long) he had everything he needed.
The Apple/DEC Alliance went nowhere. As with many such covenants, the product of the announcement was the announcement itself. The marriage itself was a sham.
Third and more generally, alliances don’t work.
There was a time when strategic alliances were all the rage. In 1993, my friend Denise Caruso published the aptly titled Alliance Fever, a 14-page litany of more than 500 embraces. The list started at 3DO and ending with Zenith Electronics, neither of which still stands: 3DO went bankrupt in 2003, Zenith was absorbed by LG Electronics.
These aren’t isolated bad endings. If you have the time and inclination for a nostalgic stroll through the list, you’ll see many more such disappearances.
But, you’ll object, this was more than twenty years ago. The industry has learned from these examples; we won’t fall into the same rut.
One would hope. And one would be disappointed.
The tendency remains strong for sheepish company execs to congregate and participate in what Valley wags call a Clusterf#^k. In two Monday Notes (Mobile World 2010 and 2011), I offered examples such as this one:
Do your eyes glaze over when you read such BS?
“Global leaders Intel Corporation and Nokia merge Moblin and Maemo to create MeeGo*, a Linux-based software platform that will support multiple hardware architectures across the broadest range of device segments, including pocketable mobile computers, netbooks, tablets, mediaphones, connected TVs and in-vehicle infotainment systems.”
Relax, you’re normal. Who are they kidding? Themselves, most likely.
All the holy words are there: Linux (mandatory), based (to male things clearer), platform (the p-word), multiple hardware architectures (we don’t know what we’re doing so we’re covering all bases), broadest range of devices (repeat the offense just committed), segments (the word adds a lot of meaning to the previous phrase), including pocketable mobile computers, netbooks, tablets, mediaphones, connected TVs and in-vehicle infotainment systems (only microprocessor-driven Toto toilets are missing from the litany).
Alliances generally don’t work because there’s no one really in charge, no one has the power to mete out reward and punishment, to say no, to change course. Often, the partners in an alliance are seen as a bunch of losers clinging to each other with the hope that there’s safety in numbers. It’s a crude but, unfortunately, not inaccurate caricature.
I’ll switch sides now and explain why It’ll Be Different This Time.
Division of labor is the most convincing argument for this partnership. IBM is and always has been an Enterprise Services company. As it did in its glorious mainframe days, it can take care of everything: analyze your business, recommend changes, re-engineer your organization, write software, maintain everything. Today, there’s much less focus on hardware revenue, but the broad scope remains.
Then came the mobile revolution, which IBM has missed out on. It’s not that they didn’t have the opportunity. The company could have jumped on the mobile-everything wave, but that would have meant breaking the “Roadmap 2015” promise that was avowed by IBM’s former CEO, Sam Palmisano. Palmisano might be forgiven for not anticipating the size and importance of mobile when he promised, in his 2010 letter to investors, that IBM share value would double by 2015, but Ginni Rometty, Palmisano’s successor, has no excuse. The 2012 changing of the guard was a perfect opportunity for Rometty to stand up, say Things Have Changed and re-jigger the roadmap. Ah well.
On the positive side, IBM’s clients are re-organizing their businesses as a result of the mobile deluge, some late, some early. The smarter ones have realized that mobile devices aren’t just “small PCs” and have turned to broad-range professional services vendors such as IBM to re-engineer their business.
For Apple’s part, the iPhone and the iPad have gained increasingly wider acceptance with large Enterprise customers: “98% of Fortune 500 companies have rdeployed iOS devices and more than 90% of tablet activations in enterprise environments are iPads.” Of course, a few BYOD devices don’t constitute wholesale adoption inside a company. Apple doesn’t have the manpower and culture to come in, engineer, deploy, and maintain company-wide applications and fleets of devices. That’s IBM forte.
What’s new in the arrangement is IBM’s decision to invest in extending its ability to develop applications that fully integrate iOS devices — as opposed to “suffering” them.
On the numbers side, naysayers mistakenly use the “98%” figure quoted above to opine that the partnership won’t create much additional revenue. They’re probably right — at least initially. But the partnerships could herald a move from “anecdotal” to systematic deployments that are deep and wide. This will take time and the needle won’t move right away…it will be more like the hours hand on the clock face.
Another more immediate effect, across a wide range of enterprises, will be the corporate permission to use Apple devices. Recall the age-old mantra You Don’t Get Fired For Buying IBM, which later became DEC, then Microsoft, then Sun…and now Apple. Valley gossip has it that IBM issued an edict stating that Macs were to be supported internally within 30 days. Apparently, at some exec meetings, it’s MacBooks all around the conference room table — except for the lonely Excel jockey who needs to pivot tables.
We’ll see if the company whose motto once was Think actually works well with the Think Different squad.
iPad sales are falling – but the sky is not. We’re merely dealing with a healthy case of expectations adjustment.
The tablet computer has always felt inevitable. The desire to harness the power of a computer in the comfortable form of a letter-size tablet with a keyboard, or perhaps a stylus for more natural interaction — or why not both? — has been with us for a very long time. Here we see Alan Kay holding a prototype of his 1972 Dynabook (the photo is from 2008):
Alan prophetically called his invention a personal computer for children of all ages.
For more than 40 years, visionaries, entrepreneurs, and captains of industry have whetted our appetite for such tablets. Before it was recast as a PDA, a Personal Digital Assistant, Steve Sakoman’s Newton was a pen-based letter-size tablet. Over time, we saw the GridPad, Jerry Kaplan’s and Robert Carr’s Go, and the related Eo Personal Communicator. And, true to its Embrace and Extend strategy, Microsoft rushed a Windows for Pen Computing extension into Windows 3.1.
These pioneering efforts didn’t succeed, but the hope persisted: ‘Someone, someday will get it right’. Indeed, the tablet dream got a big boost from no less than Bill Gates when, during his State of The Industry keynote speech at Comdex 2001 (Fall edition), Microsoft’s CEO declared that tablets were just around the corner [emphasis mine]:
“The Tablet takes cutting-edge PC technology and makes it available wherever you want it, which is why I’m already using a Tablet as my everyday computer. It’s a PC that is virtually without limits — and within five years I predict it will be the most popular form of PC sold in America.“
Unfortunately, the first Tablet PCs, especially those made by Toshiba (I owned two), are competent but unwieldy. All the required ingredients are present, but the sauce refuses to take.
Skip ahead to April 2010. The iPad ships and proves Alan Kay right: The first experience with Apple’s tablet elicits, more often than not, a child-like joy in children of all ages. This time, the tablet mayonnaise took and the “repressed demand” finally found an outlet. As a result, tablets grew even faster than PCs ever did:
(Source: Mary Meeker’s regular Internet Trends 2014 presentation, always long, never boring)
In her 2013 report, Meeker showed iPads topping the iPhone’s phenomenal growth, climbing three times faster than its more pocketable sibling:
(Source: Mary Meeker Internet Trends 2013)
There were, however, two unfortunate aspects to this rosy picture.
First, there was the Post-PC noise. The enthusiasm for Android and iOS tablets, combined with the end of the go-go years for PC sales, led many to decree that we had finally entered the “Post-PC” era.
Understandably, the Post-PC tag, with its implication that the PC is no longer necessary or wanted, didn’t please Microsoft. As early as 2011, the company was ready with its own narrative which was delivered by Frank Shaw, the company’s VP of Corporate Communications: Where the PC is headed: Plus is the New “Post”. In Microsoft’s cosmos, the PC remains at the center of the user’s universe while smartphones and tablets become “companion devices”. Reports of the PC’s death are greatly exaggerated, or, as Shaw puts it, with a smile, “the 30-year-old PC isn’t even middle aged yet, and about to take up snowboarding”.
(Actually, the current debate is but a new eruption of an old rash. “Post-PC” seems to have been coined by MIT’s David Clark around 1999, causing Bill Gates to pen a May 31st, 1999 Newsweek op-ed titled: Why the PC Will Not Die…)
Both Bill and Frank are right – mostly. Today’s PC, the descendant of the Altair 8800 for which Gates programmed Microsoft’s first Basic interpreter, is alive and, yes, it’s irreplaceable for many important tasks. But classical PCs — desktops and laptops — are no longer at the center of the personal computing world. They’ve been replaced by smaller (and smallest) PCs — in other words, by tablets and smartphones. The PC isn’t dead or passé, but it is shape-shifting.
There was a second adverse consequence of the iPad’s galloping growth: Expectations ran ahead of reality. Oversold or overbought, it doesn’t matter, the iPad (and its competitors) promised more than they could deliver. Our very personal computers — our tablets and smartphones — have assumed many of the roles that previously belonged to the classical PC, but there are some things they simply can’t do.
For example, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Tim Cook confides that “he does 80% of the work of running the world’s most valuable company on an iPad.” Which is to say Tim Cook needs a Mac for the remaining 20%…but the WSJ quote doesn’t tell us how important these 20% are.
We now come to the downward trend in iPad’s unit sales: -2.29% for the first quarter of calendar year 2014 (compared to last year). Even more alarming, unit sales are down 9% for the quarter ending in June. Actually, this seems to be an industry-wide problem rather than an Apple-specific trend. In an exclusive Re/code interview, Best Buy CEO Hubert Joly says tablet sales are “crashing”, and sees hope for PCs.
Many explanations have been offered for this phenomenon, the most common of which is that tablets have a longer replacement cycle than smartphones. But according to some skeptics, such as Peter Bright in an Ars Technica op-ed, there’s a much bigger problem [emphasis mine]:
“It turns out that tablets aren’t the new smartphone…[t]hey’re the new PC; if you’ve already got one, there’s not much reason to buy a new one. Their makers are all out of ideas and they can’t make them better. They can only make them cheaper.”
Bright then concludes:
“[T]he smartphone is essential in a way that the tablet isn’t. A large screen smartphone can do…all the things a tablet can do… Who needs tablets?”
There is a simpler – and much less portentous – explanation. We’re going through an “expectations adjustment” period in which we’ve come to realize that tablets are not PC replacements. Each personal computer genre carries its own specifics; each instils unique habits of the body, mind, and heart; none of them is simply a “differently sized” version of the other two.
The realization of these different identities manifests itself in Apple’s steadfast refusal to hybridize, to make a “best of both worlds” tablet/laptop product.
Microsoft thinks otherwise and no less steadfastly (and expensively) produces Surface Pro hybrids. I bought the first generation two years ago, skipped the second, and recently bought a Surface Pro 3 (“The tablet that can replace your laptop”). After using it daily for a month, I can only echo what most reviewers have said, including Joanna Stern in the WSJ:
“On its third attempt, Microsoft has leapt forward in bringing the tablet and laptop together—and bringing the laptop into the future. But the Pro 3 also suffers from the Surface curse: You still make considerable compromises for getting everything in one package.”
Trying to offer the best of tablets and laptops in one product ends up compromising both functions. In my experience, too many legacy Windows applications work poorly with my fingers on the touch screen. And the $129 Type Cover is a so-so keyboard and poor trackpad. Opinions will differ, of course, but I prefer using Windows 8.1 on my Mac. We’ll see how the upcoming Windows 9, code name Threshold, will cure the ills of what Mary Jo Foley, a well-introduced Microsoft observer, calls Vista 2.0.
If we consider that Mac unit sales grew 18% last quarter (year-to-year), the company’s game becomes clear: The sweet spot on Apple’s racket is the set of customers who, like Tim Cook, use MacBooks and iPads. It’s by no means the broadest segment, just the most profitable one. Naysayers will continue to contend that the prices of competing tablets are preordained to crash and will bring ruin to Apple’s Affordable Luxury product strategy…just as they predicted netbooks would inflict damage on MacBooks.
As for Peter Bright’s contention that “[tablet] makers are all out of ideas and they can’t make them better”, one can easily see ways in which Google, Lenovo, Microsoft, Apple, and others could make improvements in weight, speed, input methods, system software, and other factors I can’t think of. After we get over the expectations adjustment period, the tablet genre will continue to be innovative, productive, and fun – for children of all ages.