ny times

The New York Times KPI’s

 

Here are numbers lifted form the NYT’s Innovation report (see last week) and other sources. 

Most of The New York Times’ reach comes from its digital audience. Regardless of the metric, viewers on desktops and mobile are crushing print readers.

321-1 - 450

Sources: ComScore for the monthly uniques (US only); internal count for the home page views per 24 hours period and Gfk MRI based on net weekday & Sunday readership, Fall 2013 survey.

321-2 - 450

321-3 - 450

In theory, the Times can get rid of print. Digital revenue far exceeds the cost of running the newsroom, which amounts to $200m a year for 1300 writers and editors. Even if you add $20m for the 200 technical staff needed to run digital operations, and even 30% more for overhead, sales, marketing, and support staff, the result would still be a substantial profit  – but would advertisers come in the same way for a digital-only product?

321-4 - 450

The ad market seems to reward quality journalism over aggregation and listicles: The NYTimes.com monetizes itself three times better than Business Insider and nineteen times better than BuzzFeed. For this graph I simply divided annual advertising revenue for each media by the number of monthly users: 30m UVs for the NYT, 12m UVs for Business Insider according to ComScore figures quoted in this 247wallst story, and a revenue estimated at $20m by Reuters. (Had I used a 25m UVs assumption, BI’s ARPU would have been only $0.80 per visitor and per year).

321-5 - 450

The Times is known to have invested a lot in its digital subscription system (760,000 subs to date). It turns out to have been worth every penny. For those who doubt the paid model’s efficiency, The New York Times provides a great blueprint for quality media.

–frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com 

 

Time to Rethink the Newspaper. Seriously.

 

The newspaper’s lingering preeminence keeps pulling legacy media downward. Their inability to challenge the old sovereign’s status precludes every step of a critically needed modernization. (Part of a series).  

This column was scheduled to appear in the next two or three weeks. Then, on Thursday, the thick Innovation report by an ad hoc New Times task force came to the fore. Like many media watchers, I downloaded its 97 pages PDF , printed it (yes) and carefully annotated it. A lot has been written about it and I’m not going to add my own exegesis on top of numerous others. You can look at the always competent viewpoint from Nieman Lab’s Joshua Benton who sees The leaked New York Times innovation report as one of the key documents of this media age. (Other good coverage includes Politico and Capital New York — I’m linking to the NYT tag, then you’ll have all the stories pertaining to Jill Abramson’s brutal firing as well).

320-Innovation_full

This report is important one for two main reasons:

– The New York Times is viewed as one of the few traditional media to have successfully morphed into a spectacular digital machine. This backdrop gives a strong resonance to the report because many news organizations haven’t achieved half of what the NYT did, whether the metric is the performance of its digital subscription model, or its achievements in high-yield advertising – all while keeping its impregnable ability to collect Pulitzer prizes.

– We rarely, if ever, see an internal analysis expressed in such bold terms. Usually, to avoid ruffling feathers, such reports are heavily edited – which ends up being the best way to preserve the status quo. Even more, mastheads tend to distance themselves from endorsing conclusions coming from the “management crowd” – a coldly demeaning phrase. But, it the Times case, the report was expressly endorsed by the top editors (Abramson and her then second-in-command Dean Baquet who now leads the shop.)

Let’s then focus back to this column’s original intent: Why reinvent the newspaper, quickly and thoroughly.

Until last week, the reference on the matter was an email sent in January 2013 by Lionel Barber, the Financial Times editor (full-text in the Guardian), in which he sets a clear roadmap to shifting resources from print to digital:

I now want to set out in detail how we propose to reshape the FT for the digital age. (…)

[We] are proposing a shift of some resources from night work to day and from print to digital. This requires an FT-wide initiative to train our journalists to operate to the best of their abilities. And it requires decisive leadership. (…)

On unified news desks, we need to become content editors rather than page editors. We must rethink how we publish our content, when and in what form, whether conventional news, blogs, video or social media.

 A year later, key numbers for the FT are impressive:

– A 2013 profit of £55m ($92m, €67m) for the FT Group (which includes the 50% stake Pearson owns in the Economist Group); that’s an increase of 17%, while sales are slightly down by 1% to £449m ( $755m, €551m)

– 415,000 digital subscribers (+31% in one year) who now account for two-thirds of the FT’s total audience (652,000 altogether: +8%, including a staggering 60% growth in corporate users at 260,000)

– A rise in digital subscribers that offsets the decline in advertising now accounting for 32% of FT Group revenue vs. 52% in 2008.

– For the first time, in 2013, FT digital content revenue exceeded print content.

The FT might be on sale – but its management did quite well.

Echoing Lionel Barber’s view of resources reassignments are the equally strong terms from The New York Times’Innovation Report:

In the coming years, The New York Times needs to accelerate its transition from a newspaper that also produces a rich and impressive digital report to a digital publication that also produces a rich and impressive newspaper. This is not a matter of semantics. It is a critical, difficult and, at times, painful transformation that will require us to rethink much of what we do every day. [page 81] 

Stories are typically filed late in the day. Our mobile apps are organized by print sections. Desks meticulously lay out their sections but spend little time thinking about social strategies. Traditional reporting skills are the top priority in hiring and promotion. The habits and traditions built over a century and a half of putting out the paper are a powerful, conservative force as we transition to digital — none more so than the gravitational pull of Page One. [It] has become increasingly clear that we are not moving with enough urgency. [page 59]

The newsroom should begin an intensive review of its print traditions and digital needs — and create a road map for the difficult transition ahead. We need to know where we are, where we’re headed and where we want to go. [page 82]

These quotes from a news organization that never gave up on great journalism will be helpful to those who desperately struggle to transform newsrooms. It is also a plea for the necessity of dumping the obdurate print-first obsession:

– It precludes modernizing the recruiting process as journalists are still too often picked for their writing capabilities while many other talents are needed.

– It limits audience development initiatives. In today’s print-oriented newsrooms, most writers and editors consider their jobs done once the story is filed in the CMS (Content Management System). Unfortunately, in every fast-growing digital media outlets such as Buzzfeed, The HuffPo, Politico, Quartz, Vox Media, now part of the competitive landscape, throwing the story online is actually just the beginning. The ability to cause a news item to reverberate around the social sphere is now as important as being a good writer.

– As stated in the Times report, convincing the masthead on the mandatory resource-shifting in only part of the journey; most of the transformation’s weight lies on the shoulders of the rank and file in the newsroom.

– At the NYT as everywhere else, the old guard (regardless of age, actually), is the main obstacle to the necessary rapprochement between the editorial and the business side. For instance, by rejecting the idea that Branded Content would greatly benefit from the newsroom expertise (although everyone agrees that a news writer should never be asked to write advertorial), or that a conference is indeed an editorial initiative directed to a valuable audience segment, such conservative postures are actually shrinking the company down to its most fragile component.

– The same goes for the analytics arsenal. I heard scores of examples in which newsrooms call for more dashboards and indicators, but seldom use them. Editors should be supported by tactical analytics teams (including at the editorial meeting level) that will provide immediate and mi-terms trends, as well as editorial decision-making tools.

One of the most difficult part of the transformation of legacy media is not addressed in the Times Innovation report nor in the FT’s exposé. It pertains to the future of the physical newspapers itself (the layout of the Times remains terribly out-of-date): How should it evolve? What should be its primary goals in order to address and seduce a readership now overwhelmed by commodity news? What should be the main KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) of a modern newspapers? What about content: types of stories, length, timelessness, value-added? Should it actually remain a daily?

(To be continued…)

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

 

Two strategies: The Washington Post vs. The NYT

 

Both are great American newspapers, both suffer from the advertising slump and from the transition to digital. But the New York Times’ paywall strategy is making a huge difference. 

The Washington Post’s financials provide a good glance at the current status of legacy media struggling with the shift to digital. Unlike others large dailies, the components of the Post’s P&L clearly appear in its statements, they are not buried under layers of other activities. Product-wise, the Post remains a great news machine, collecting Pulitzer Prizes with clockwork regularity and fighting hard for scoops. The Post also epitomizes an old media under siege from specialized, more agile outlets such as Politico, ones that break down the once-unified coverage provided by traditional large media houses. In an interview to the New York Times last year, Robert G. Kaiser, a former editor who had been with the paper since 1963, said this:

“When I was managing editor of The Washington Post, everything we did was better than anyone in the business,” he said. “We had the best weather, the best comics, the best news report, the fullest news report. Today, there’s a competitor who does every element of what we do, and many of them do it better. We’ve lost our edge in some very profound and fundamental ways.”

The iconic newspaper has been slow to adapt to the digital era. Its transformation really started around 2008. Since then, it has checked all the required boxes: integration of print and digital productions; editors are now involved on both sides of the news production and all relentlessly push the newsroom to write more for the digital version; many blogs covering a wide array of topics have been launched; and the Post now has a good mobile application. The “quant” culture also set in, with editors now taking into account all the usual metrics and ratios associated with digital operations, including a live update of Google’s most relevant keywords prominently displayed in the newsroom. All this helped the Post collect 25.6 million unique visitors per month, vs. 4 to 5 million for Politico, and 35 million for the New York Times that historically enjoys a more global audience.

Overall, the Washington Post Company still relies heavily on its education business, as show in the table below :

 Revenue:.......$4.0bn (-3% vs. 2011)
 Education:.....$2.2bn (-9%)
 Cable TV:......$0.8bn (+4%)
 Newspaper:.....$0.6bn (-7%)
 Broadcast TV:..$0.4bn (+25%)

But the education business no is longer the cash cow it used to be. Not only did its revenue decrease but, last year, it lost $105m vs. a $96m profit in 2011. As for the newspaper operation, it widened its losses to $53m in 2012 from $21m in 2011. And the trend worsens: for the first quarter of 2013, the newspaper division’s revenue decreased by 4% vs. a year ago and it lost $34m vs. $21m for Q1 2011.

Now, let’s move to a longer-term perspective. The chart below sums up the Post’s (and others legacy media’s) problem:

Translated into a table:

                  Q1-2007   Q1-2013  Change %
 Revenue (All):....$219m.....$127m.....-42%
 Print Ad:.........$125m.....$49m......-61%
 Digital Ad:.......$25m......$26m......+4%

A huge depletion in print advertising, a flat line (at best) for digital advertising, the elements sum up the equation faced by traditional newspapers going from print to online.

Now, let’s look at the circulation side using a comparison with the New York Times. (Note that it’s not possible to extract the same figures for advertising from the NYT Co.’s financial statements because they aggregate too many items.) The chart below shows the evolution of the paid circulation for the Post between 2007 and 2013:

..and for the NY Times:

Call it the paywall effect: The New York Times now aggregates both print and digital circulations. The latter now amounts to 676,000 digital subscribers that have been recruited using the NYT’s metered system (see previous Monday Notes under the “paywall” tag). (Altogether, digital subscribers to the NYT, the International Herald and the Boston Globe now number 708,000). It seems the NYT found the right formula: its digital subscribers portfolio grows at a 45% per year rate, thanks to a combination of sophisticated marketing, mining customer data and aggressive pricing (it even pushes special deals for Mother’s Day.) All this adds to the bottom line: if each digital sub brings $12 a month, the result is about $100m that didn’t exist two years ago. But it does not benefit the advertising side as it continues to suffer. For the first quarter of 2013 vs. the same period last year, the NYT Company lost 13% in print ads revenue and 4% for digital ads. (As usual in their earning calls, NYT officials mention the deflationary effects of ad exchanges as one cause of erosion in digital ads.)

One additional sign that digital advertising will remain in the doldrums: Politico, too, is exploring alternatives; it will be testing a paywall in a sample of six states and for its readers outside the United States. The system will be comparable to the NYT.com or the FT.com, with a fixed number of articles available for free (see Politico’s management internal memo.)

It is increasingly clear that readers are more willing than we once thought to pay for content they value and enjoy. With more than 300 media companies now charging for online content in the U.S., the notion of paying to read expensive-to-produce journalism is no longer that exotic for sophisticated consumers.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

 

The New York Times’ shifting model

 

At the NYT Company, in ten years, the share of quarterly revenue attributed to circulation grew from less than 30% to more than half today… 

The stock market brutally punished the New York Times for its worse-than-expected quarterly earnings. Are financial analysts completely blind? How come they didn’t foresee the decline in advertising revenue that affects the NYTimes — and any publication in the world outside of the BRIC zone? This is incomprehensible. A simple look at the overall ad sector (see the previous column featuring the Internet Split) causes one to realize how much worse the New York Times numbers could have been.

In any event, the demise of the ad market will accelerate the transformation of the Times. Here are the highlights for the third quarter of 2012 that particularly disappointed Wall Street (comparisons are for Q3 2012 vs. Q3 2011, full earnings release here):
– Total revenue decreases by -0.6%
– Advertising revenue drops by -9% across the board. Print ad takes a -11% dive and  digital ad revenue is off by -2.2% (for the second quarter in a row.)
– Costs are not contained enough (again, according to analysts) and rise by 2.3%, mostly because of benefits, performance-based and stock-based compensation and… printing costs.

Thursday, Wall Street dumped the stock, causing its biggest drop since 1980: It plunged by 22% to $8.31. Since the beginning of the year, NYT shares are up by about 6% vs. 12% for the S&P index.

On the bright side: Circulation revenue grew by 7% vs. last year. This is mostly due to the rise in digital subscribers. (Print gains reflect a recent price hike). Paid subs for the NYTimes and the International Herald Tribune totaled 566,000 for the 3rd quarter, a remarkable growth of 11% vs. the 2nd quarter of 2012 (+57,000 subs.)

In hard dollars, though, circulation figures no longer offset the loss in advertising. For the first nine months of 2012, revenue coming from circulation grew by $55m to $695m vs. a $47m loss in ads. But, for last three months, the NYT lost more in ads (-$18m) than it added in circulation (+$17m). In the earnings call with analysts, CFO Jim Follo points to a difficulty with his company’s business model: When advertising revenue goes down, 90% of the decrease translates into a margin loss, but circulation revenue gains generate additional costs.

The last 10 years show an interesting evolution for the advertising vs. circulation ratio. Between 2001 and 2011, revenue for the New York Times Media Group (primarily the newspapers and digital operations), fell by 30% in dollars adjusted for inflation. Advertising revenue decreased by 45% as Circulation revenue grew by 9% (and the “Other” category was slashed by 51%.

As shown in the table below, the New York Times’ revenue stream now relies mostly on circulation: 55% today vs. 29% in 2001. As digital subscriptions gain traction and advertising plummets, the trend accelerates when comparing the full 2011 year with the 3rd quarter of 2012:

              2001   2011  Q3-2012 
Advertising    62%    49%   39%
Circulation    29%    45%   55% 
Others          9%     6%    6%
Source: NYT Co. Financial statements

This evolution shows the strategic importance of the digital subscription system setup by the NY Times 15 months ago. So far, it works fine (see also a previous column NYT Digital Lessons). Thanks to its paywall, the NYT collects an average of 4750 new subscribers each week. Even the Boston Globe grew: +13% digital subscribers (currently 3,000) for this quarter when compared to the previous one .

The system has yet to unleash its full potential. For now, the NYTimes maintains a great deal of paywall porosity. Unlike the FT.com, there is no mandatory registration. It is actually pretty easy to circumvent the limit of 10 free articles per month: simply use different computers and devices. But the New York Times execs in charge of the system are in no rush to tighten the reins. They know mandatory registration will boost the transformation of registered users into full-paid-for ones, but it will be costly in terms of traffic.

Audience-wise, the paywall’s impact is uncertain. Times’ insiders said it had no effect. But, according to GigaOM’s Mathew Ingram (who quotes ComScore data), unique viewers would have fallen by 20% since March 2011 (from 34m Unique Visitors to 27m) and page views by 15%. Ingram suggests this trend could contribute to the erosion in ad revenue (although there is plenty of evidence showing that CMPs — cost per thousands page views — are indeed higher behind a paywall.)

One sure thing: before adding further paywall restrictions, The New York Times wants to find the perfect formula. On the Q3 earnings call, Denise Warren, who oversees the revenue side, explicitly referred to the topic: “We are exploring entry level opportunities as well as higher-ends as well”. In other words, her team is testing all possible prices and packages; current offers are likely to be sliced into multiple segments.

Overall, NYT’s management remains bearish on advertising for the next quarter at least. Jim Follo and Denise Warren invoked business leaders’ evaporating trust in the economy and also mentioned the oversupply in digital inventories (too many page views for sale, everywhere). They also point a finger to the shift in buying practices with, as they call it, “programmatic buying channels” (ad exchange, real-time bidding), who take over the market, pushing prices further down. One exception to this deflationary spiral is the luxury segment, stronger than ever, and well-tapped by The New York Times’ ability to provide customized campaigns.

Future Times revenue streams also lie in its ability to expand abroad. Last summer, the NYT.com launched its Chinese version (under Beijing’s strong vigilance). Next year, says Chairman Arthur Sulzberger, the Times will launch a Portuguese version aimed at the vast Brazilian market (and there are rumors of a Spanish language version.)

Denis Warren, also referred to what she called an “untapped demand in the corporate education segment”. Strangely, her statement echoes Harvard professor Clayton Christensen’s interview with the Neiman Journalism Lab where he discusses his favorite topic, the disruption of legacy businesses:

For the Harvard Business School — we’ve been saying for about 13 years now that management education is going to be disrupted by in-house corporate universities. And nobody just ever imagined that it would happen. In fact, every metric of goodness at the Harvard Business School has been improving and still continues to improve — even as last year the number of people applying to Harvard MBA programs dropped off 22 percent. In the prior year, it went down 11 percent. I really believe that the business schools are just going off the cliff.

I’m concerned: If business schools are going off the cliff, who will produce next generation of media analysts?…
frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

NYT Digital Lessons

The New York Times Company’s latest quarterly numbers contain a rich trove of data regarding the health of the digital news industry. Today, we’ll focus on the transition from traditional advertising to paywall strategies being implemented across the world. Paywall appear as a credible way to offset — alas too partially — the declining revenue from print operations.

First, the highlights.

(See NYTCO’s press release here and stock here. Unless otherwise stated, all figures are for Q1 2012 and comparisons are Q1 2012 vs. Q1 2011.)

  • Total Revenue is stable at $499.4 million.
  • Operating profit is down by 23% at $19.6 million. When excluding depreciation, amortization and (generous) severance packages, OP is up 9.4% at $57 million.
  • Print advertising for all properties and from all sources is down 8.1% at $238 million
  • Circulation revenue is up 9.7% at $227 million.
  • Digital subscriptions, launched just a year ago, reach 454,000. That’s a 16% growth vs. Q4 2011.
  • Digital advertising for the entire NYTCO (this includes NYTimes.com, BostonGlobe.com, Boston.com, About.com, etc) is down 10.3% to $71 million.
  • Such decrease is primarily due to About.com losing 24% of its ad revenue to $22.6 million, and 50% of its operating profit to $7 million. This online guide is entirely dependent on advertising.
  • But the real bad news is the decline in digital advertising for the NYT News Media Group  consisting mostly of the NYT and the Boston Globe. Revenue dropped by 2.3% to $48.5 million for the quarter.
  • Digital advertising accounts for 22.5% of the entire NYTCO ad revenue, and for 30% of the NYT News Media Group’s digital advertising revenue.

We can discern four trends:

#1:  Digital advertising is struggling, even for a major brand such as the New York Times.
Again the evolution :
FY 2010: +18%
FY 2011: +10%
Q1 2012 (Y/Y):  -2%

This confirms a much feared trend. By and large, in a news context, the performance of digital advertising is on the decline. All indicators are now flashing red: CPM (cost per thousand impressions), cost per click, volumes, yields, etc. The cause is well-known, and way more acute for digital than for print: ads and news contents do compete for the same eyeballs. The more attractive and eye-catching the content is, the lesser the ad yields. Behavioral advertising won’t change that much — at least for hard core, high value-added news environment.

This decline also announces a major shift in the way ads are sold. The advertising flow is likely to split: premium ads such as well-placed special packages will still be sold for high prices by in-house teams. But the bulk of the inventory will shift downward to bazaars in which gazillions of pageviews will be dumped into real-time exchanges supposed to optimize prices. The bad news: such schemes are likely to fuel deflationary trends for remnant (i.e. sub-premium) inventories. The good news: media organizations such as online news outlets or pure players are likely to join such marketplaces and perhaps gain an operating role of sorts — assuming they are smart enough to cooperate (I’ll address this in an upcoming column).

#2 Paywalls work. With roughly half a million paying subscribers, the NYTimes.com has captured the equivalent of 39% of its weekday print circulation of 1.3 million. In its financial statements, the Times doesn’t break down its revenue structure, but a significant part of the 13% increase in circulation revenue (print + digital) is attributable to digital subscriptions (the rest comes from the recent print price hike).
Estimates are difficult but here are some clues: on these 500,000 digital subs, it is estimated that 60% pay the basic $15/mo rate while 40% opt for the full $35 digital package. This would translate to digital subscribers contributing $34.5 million (18%) to the $190 million in NYT Media Group circulation revenue that appear in its quarterly statement. 18% is not that bad for a paywall that is barely one year old (even though this estimated revenue doesn’t reflect the cost of the NYTimes’ massive promotions for its paywall program). But again, compared to the $48 million of digital advertising, it is significant.

#3 A warning to paywall dreamers: some restrictions apply. In order to be successful, a digital subscription must check the following boxes:
Own a sizable share of a given (and preferably solvent) segment of the population. In other words: start from a large built-in audience. Globally, the New York Times has about 34 million unique visitors per month – a large pool for conversions to the paywall.
Don’t expect a paywall to work for a small site or a niche product — unless it is a reference for its community. Even then, in spite of its reference status in New England, the Boston Globe shows a mere 18,000 paid-for digital subscribers.
– Allow time to grow the subscriber base. A paywall strategy must spread over several years. The free audience first has to be converted into registered users able to be thoroughly data-mined; then the paywall will be tightened with less and less articles available for free (the NYT recently lowered its threshold from 20 to 10 free articles); the entire process will take at least two to four years, depending on where you start from.
– Carefully manage porosity. That’s why some people refer to a “semi-permeable membrane” (see the interesting conversation between Clay Shirky and NYT’s Digital manager Denise Warren on NPR last January). While it is tightening its paywall, the NYT leaves willingly plenty of free access to its content: if you land its site from a search engine, from Facebook, Twitter, or from a blog, no limit applies (same for the FT.com, actually). Such tactic has two virtues: it doesn’t affect natural referencing and incoming traffic from search engines (which could weigh as much as 30-40% of the audience), and the brand remains exposed to many — such as social networks users.
– Quality is non-negotiable. A successful paywall requires exclusive, unique, authoritative, high-quality content. A paywall isn’t the right solution for streams of “commodity news” or user-generated contents. It won’t work for the Huffington Post. Despite its enormous audience, the HuffPo’s embryonic original content won’t do much to alter its “Left wing Fox News” positioning (Even though the HuffPo managed to score a Pulitzer Prize for National reporting for its remarkable Beyond The Battlefield series.)

#4 Print is still alive. While print advertising is drying up, the share of circulation revenue keeps rising (in relative terms.) The good news: price hikes don’t seem to matter: the recent increase to $2.50 had no effect on sales. Actually, the Times uses its weekend edition (priced at $5.00) to channel digital subscriptions by providing the best deal of its complex rate card. Which leads to two conclusions: a sizable reservoir of readers is ready to pay for quality-on-paper at almost any price (see a previous Monday Note Cracking the Paywall); and commercially strong weekend editions can be a potent vector for digital subscriptions.

Print and digital strategies are more intertwined than ever.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

Cracking the Paywall

(This version corrects an error in the percentage for the price increase of the FT)

Every newspaper, magazine or website is working on a paywall of sorts and closely monitoring what everyone else is doing. In almost every news company, execs are morosely watching advertising projections and finding numbers that are not exactly encouraging. For digital media, there is no way around this year’s weak outlook: the bad economic climate only adds to the downward price pressure exerted by the ever growing inventory of web and mobile pages. In a best-case scenario, volumes and prices will remain flat. On the print circulation side, Western newspapers are likely to witness a continuing readership erosion at a rate of several percentage points.

But here is the interesting point: The strongest players don’t just bow to the inevitable, they accelerate their transition to digital. This week, I was struck by the fact two such leaders made the same move: The New York Times and the Financial Times both announced serious price hike for their newsstand price (respectively 25% and 13.6%) :
- The NYT moves from $2.00 (€1.57) to $2.50 (€1.96) from Monday to Saturday, with no change for the Sunday edition still priced at $5 (€3.92) in New York, and $6 (€4.72) elsewhere.
- The FT goes from £2.20 ($3.39 or €2.66) to £2.50 ($3.85 or €3.03) on weekdays, as the weekend edition moves from £2.80 ($4.32 or €3.39 ) to £3 ($4.62 or €3.63).

Those numbers are really meaningful: a 10% increase every two years or so can be seen as an inflation adjustment — a generous one considering the inflation rate in those countries to be about 2.5%-3.5%. At 25% increase is a strategic decision aimed at accelerating the switch to digital. (The paper version of the FT now costs 25% more than it did last October).

Interestingly enough, for a New York Times addict, reading the paper online with the cheapest package ($15 a month), is now 40% to 50% cheaper that the home-delivered version and 70% cheaper than buying the paper each day at a newsstand. As for the FT, the standard digital version is now 21% cheaper than the print subscription and 68% less than the newsstand price.

Both are working hard at converting readers to the digital paid-for model. The FT is heading full steam into digital, furiously data-mining its 4 million subscribers base to convert them into paid-for subscribers (250,000 according to the most recent count). The FT’s tactics is simple: readers are relentlessly pushed toward the paywall thanks to a diminishing number of stories available for free: from 30 free articles per month in 2007 it is now down to 8 articles; the other bold move is making registration mandatory in order to access even a single story.

Last year, the New York Times came up with a less readable strategy: the adjustable paywall. And it seems to work. The NYT has been able to collect 324,000 paid-for digital subscribers in nine months. Considering the NYT has about four times less non-paying digital registered users than the FT (therefore a lesser conversion potential), this is not bad.

The Times builds its paid-for strategy on three key factors:

1 / The uniqueness of its content. Let’s put it this way: The New York Times has no equivalent in the world when it comes to great journalism, period. This valued content helped collect 34 million uniques visitors a month in its domestic market, and 47 million worldwide. More than any other newspapers in the world, the NYT has a huge base of loyal users. If it manages to convert only 5% of its global audience, say 2.4 million people, and extracts an ARPU (combined subscription and advertising) of $150 per year, it will gross €360 million, which largely covers the cost of its newsroom ($200 million a year, by far the largest in the world).

2 / The managed porosity of its paywall. One key requirement in building the digital subscription system for the Times was keeping as many of its readers as possible. There are two main reasons for this: high audience numbers are critical for advertising revenue; and the visibility factor is crucial for a news brand. This led to a system that targets the heaviest users. But even those can easily game the system (by using several browsers on several devices, I never bump into the paywall, with no particular desire to avoid it). Similarly, prices vary from $15 to $35… for exactly the same content — this is typical of a price structure aimed at audiences with flexible purchasing powers (it is widely established that richer people tend to opt for the most expensive package, regardless of its true value).

3 / Getting in bed with Apple. Since the early iPad days, The New York Times has been working closely with Apple for applications, subscriptions, and the nascent Newsstand. Again: thanks to its unique brand and the trust it carries, the NYT experiences no trouble collecting the precious customer data the app’s default settings fail to provide. In doing so, the Times benefited from Apple’s huge promotional vortex. The Apple system is highly beneficial when it comes to building an audience. But it does so at the expense of the essential customer relationship, and at a huge cost of 30% when the goal should rather be in the 10% range.
That was the Financial Times’ rationale for breaking the Apple leash. Last week, the FT went even further: it acquired the software firm Assanka, well-known for the development of the FT.com’s remarkable web-app that insured its crucial independence from Apple (story in PaidContent). In itself, the move demonstrates the FT’s commitment to mobile products: HTML5 development remain difficult and the FT decided it was critical to integrate Assanka’s development tools.

Of these three factors, the uniqueness of content remains the most potent one. With the inflation of aggregators and of social reading habits, the natural replication of information has turned into an overwhelming flood. Then, the production of specific content — and its protection — becomes a key element in building value. As for price structures, there is no magic formula. Usually, the simpler the better (as Apple demonstrated) — especially for businesses that start from scratch. But, with pre-existing and different audience segments such as an individual and corporate users, pricing decisions become more complicated and a diversified price list can prevent cannibalization. As for the Apple vs. independent app issue, my personal take is that sleeping with Apple is a quick short-term win, an easier strategy. But, in the long run, the independent way (which, after all, is an article of faith for Apple itself) will yield better results.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

My 2012 Watch List

When it comes to cracking the digital media code, 2011 involved more testing than learning. Media companies seem to be locked in a feverish search mode. Their sense of urgency is reinforced by the continuous depletion of worldwide fundamentals: digital advertising’s encephalogram remains flat (at best); and when audiences grow, revenues do not necessarily correlate. As for legacy media such as large quality newspapers which still draw 70-80% of their revenue from print, they are still caught in a double jeopardy: losing circulation plus looming downward price pressure on ads. We see an unforgiving mechanism at work: on mature markets such as Europe or North America, print media currently absorbs about 25% of ad spending while time spent on newspapers falls well below 10%. On digital media the balance is just the opposite: the web takes roughly 20% of ad investments for 25% of time spent; as for mobile devices, there is almost no ad money spent (<1%), but people spend about 10% of their time on their smartphones — and the growth is exponential.

Last year, we saw many efforts in the “right” direction—”right” being a rapidly redefined. Below is a subjective list of moves, trends, innovations, attempts that burgeoned in 2011 and are likely to become more sharply defined with this coming year.

#1 Paid-for news. Many are trying, but no one has cracked the code—yet. Part of the problem is we are in a model that’s just the opposite of one-size-fits-all. We are likely to witness the emergence of many different ways of charging readers for quality content. Variables in the equation are many and sometimes hard to quantify:

- National vs. local
- General news vs. specialized
- Typologies of contents
- Most Likely Prime time reading
- Most Likely Prime device use
- Target group structure.

Go figure a reliable business model with a so many factors in the formula…

Paywalls come in different flavors. The prize for complexity goes for the New York Times’ Digital Subscription Plan launched March 17. According to the Times, its crystal-clear equation can be summed-up as follow:

Once readers click on their 21st [in a 4 weeks period], they will have the option of buying one of three digital news packages — $15 every four weeks for access to the Web site and a mobile phone app (or $195 for a full year), $20 for Web access and an iPad app ($260 a year) or $35 for an all-access plan ($455 a year). All subscribers who take home delivery of the paper will have free and unlimited access across all Times digital platforms except, for now, e-readers like the Amazon Kindle and the Barnes & Noble Nook.

Weirdly enough, this overly complex and pricey scheme seems to work: by the end of Q3, the Times had harvested 324,000 paid digital subscribers. This has to be viewed in the context of a site getting 47 million Unique Visitors per month on average, and 33 million in the US alone. As for mobile access, 11 million iPhones apps and 3 million iPads have been downloaded.

To watch in 2012: how fast the NYT will recruit new paid digital subscribers. To get a good view of the key elements in NYT’s digital revenues, see Ken Doctor’s analysis in Newsonomics. Plus, after the sudden resignation of its CEO (Janet Robinson), the NYT might be entering a new era; she could be replaced by a predominantly digital person.

#2 The Web App Movement. The boldest move of the year was made by The Financial Times: in June, it unveiled a web app for iPad and iPhone, independent of Apple’s closed ecosystem. Among its many advantages, the web app allows the FT.com to foster a close relationship with all its customers. In five months, the FT.com has collected over 250,000 paying digital subscribers. Its entire digital operations now accounts for 30% of its revenue. (More on the FT.com’s economics in this PaidContent story.)

To watch in 2012: The outlook seems quite good for the FT.com. Its marketing division is working hard to tap into a huge database of 4 million registered users, including 1 million for the independent web app, half of them putting it on the home screen of their device.

#3 The Apple’s Newsstand is another item of the 2012 watch list. The project responded to publishers’ wish to see their prestigious titles rise over the crowd of garage apps, and to be able to propose long term subscription plans. In October, Apple came up with its digital kiosk, which is essentially a shortcut for publishers apps displayed in a wooden shelf. For good measure, Apple added an exclusive feature: automated downloading. In short, it is a success for magazines who register massive hikes in their digital sales, but much less so for dailies which remain a bit shy. (We been through this in a previous Monday Note)

==> To watch in 2012: the key issue for a massive move to Apple’s Newsstand remains customer data. Either Apple and the publishers will be able to work out a scheme in which about 70% of the customers will agree to provide their coordinates (see Apple’s Newsstand: Wait for 2.0), or the independent web app movement (FT.com-like) is likely to gain traction.

#4 The switch to Digital Editions, as opposed to dumb PDF, might play a critical role in the development of tangible revenue for the industry. Here, I spoke highly of great examples of tablet-specific applications such as BloombergBusinessWeek+ or the Guardian’s iPad version.

To watch in 2012: the adoption of Digital Editions will depend on three factors: 1) The publisher’s willingness to invest significantly on projects not profitable in the short-term, 2) The advertising community’s ability to understand that digital editions will bring their clients much higher benefits than PDF versions or even web sites will do, 3) The acceptance by various Audit Bureaus of Circulation that reader engagement is incomparably higher for designed-for-tablets editions (for more on the subject, read our recent column Unaccounted For Readers.) If these three items are checked, 2012 is likely to be The Year of Digital Editions.

#5 The Huffington Post contagion. Its acquisition by AOL for $315m has propelled the HuffPo to new highs. The content—largely based on unabashed aggregation and legions of unpaid bloggers—remains mediocre, but no ones really seems to care. As in the pre-bubble era, only eyeballs and hype count. The HuffPo has plenty of both. (OK, when you look at the numbers, as Ken Doctor did in this piece, you’ll see a HuffPo visitor brings 3.5 times less money than the NYT does…).

To watch in 2012: This is the year where the Huffington Post will go legit. Everyone is now kissing Arianna’s ring. Including large media company, such as Le Monde, ElPais, DieZeit and a couple of others in Europe that will help Arianna to go global. As appetizing as an alliance between Alain Ducasse and McDonald’s. Sometimes the search for strategy goes haywire…

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

NYTimes’ “Fair” Prices

Today, both Jean-Louis and I struggle with the same topic: last week’s announcement of the New York Time’s strange paywall structure.

For a digital newspaper, there is no such thing as a fair price. Too many questionable assumptions, too many variables, too many ways to play with data. The Monday Note and my day job as the head of the French digital press consortium both gave me opportunities to work on such numbers for weeks. Intellectually stimulating as the exercise might be, when analyzing readers’ migration to digital, you can’t reach useable conclusions through a mere extrapolation of the eroding print model. Nor can you reliably model price elasticity in an electronic medium where “free” is the rule, “freemium” the minority, and paid-for the exception.

Let’s start with the basic problem: the free model (read: advertising supported) cannot provide the financial support for an ambitious, in-depth, global information enterprise. This type of organization is inherently expensive. The depletion of print readership (expect a real 5-8% drop every year), and the corresponding loss in advertising revenue create an urgent need for new financial models. Otherwise, the likes of the Huffington Post will find nothing to aggregate other than the vast echo chamber they built their ephemeral value on.
As the past fails to provide a solid foundation, the most prudent way of building a new business model starts with basic building blocks. For instance, the cost of a high-volume digital transaction platform for news products (all sorts of products, not just dumb PDF shovelware) should be around 8% to 10% of revenue, all included. Then, covering the news should require x hundreds of editorial staff, y dozens of support positions, all costing z. In addition, the news organization’s value proposition need to be factored in these numbers. That value proposition, in turn, translates into who and how many would be willing to pay for such (perceived) qualities. All this leads to the most important task: rethinking the organization in order to achieve these goals — in a context where the print’s old money flow now looks like a dried-up creek in Summer.

Trial and error is the only way to find answers to all these questions. Experimenting requires humility, agility, ability to learn from mistakes. Let’s admit it: such traits are in short supply in century-old news organizations that – until recently – thrived on their unchallenged confidence. In contrast, an ability to adjust quickly is a dominant feature of the most successful digital companies. Another characteristic of the best tech companies being a relentless quest for simplicity. As an example, think of Apple’s fixation on removing unnecessary buttons and dials, or just look at Google’s main search page.

Unsurprisingly, the New York Times chose the opposite path. One possibility entailed weighing how much its large audience of faithful readers would be willing to pay for its content and shooting for a single subscription price aimed at generating volume. Instead, the NYT went for a convoluted pricing structure.

In a nutshell: after reading 20 articles over 4 weeks, you hit the wall. Then you must choose your plan: $15/month for web viewing + smartphone; $20/month for web access + app on a tablet; or $35/month for accessing the NYTimes on all devices (something the most valuable regulars do), details here. It took 14 months, and according to the Times digital czar Martin Nisenholtz, reams of market research to come up with this. I also involved a serious investment : $40m-$50m (!!) according to this Bloomberg story.

The New York Times paywall is like the French tax system: expensive, utterly complicated, disconnected from the reality and designed to be bypassed.

Loopholes abound. To avoid hitting the wall, take your pick:

  • Use different email accounts. If, like me, you own or operate several different domain names, bingo!
  • Easier: use three browsers as the cookies placed by the NYTimes on each are not interconnected; if you have Internet Explorer, Chrome, Firefox and Safari, that’s 80 stories a month! The paywall is fading away.
  • Delete your cookies. Many paranoid users do it every day, sometimes automatically. Deleting cookies introduces several drawbacks for those who want to navigate quickly, but penny-pinchers will like it.
  • Visit the NYTimes from other sites, such as Twitter or Facebook, but in fact from any site, including Google (see Jean-Louis’ view on this below).

This list goes on an on.

Whom is this paywall aiming at? According to the Times itself, about 15% of their current readership will hit the wall. The bet is that segment – affluent, busy, non-nerdy – won’t bother tricking the system and will instead pay up. Let’s accept that assumption and run the numbers (and notice the level of uncertainty):

Global audience for NYTimes.com: in February, according to Comscore, 48.5 million unique visitors worldwide. (Note that no one uses Nielsen numbers any longer.) Should we focus the analysis solely on the domestic market and reduce the UV number to 32m? Advertisers would agree: foreign audiences carry little value. But, when looking at those potentially willing to pay for the NYTimes, the answer is the opposite: let’s stick to the 48.5m.

Now, let’s remove those who just fly-by, i.e. people coming from search engine or social medias: they will look at one story and jump elsewhere. Google accounts for 15% of the NYTimes traffic; Facebook, 4%. Add others such as Twitter and round it up to 25% of the global audience. This leaves about 36m monthly regular users to play with, of which 15% (5.4m), according to the Times’ estimates, are heavy users likely to hit the wall. How many would take the jump and pay? And how much money would they contribute to the Times revenue line?

Here are the numbers for an average monthly spending of $20.00 :

Transformation rate => number of subscribers => annual revenue

5%  => 270,000 => $65m
10% => 540,000 => $130m
15% => 810,000 => $194m
20% => 1.08m => $259m

OK. Let’s stick to a reasonable 10%. How does the extra $130m compare to the current Times revenue structure? In 2010, The NYT Media Group (print + digital) made $1.55 billion all together. $780m came from advertising revenues, of which about $160m from NYTimes.com. Interestingly, 44% of the total  ($683m) came from circulation — at $2.00/day in newsstands, the NYTimes is expensive.

In this case, the Grey Lady’s digital operation would total: $130m+$160m = $290m. This is enough to support the huge 1000+ editorial staff (the newsroom expense line is said to be in the $200m range).

Let’s stop here. The New York Times’ pricing structure, the fact that it is also designed to protect the paper’s physical circulation, the paywall’s porosity all complicate projections. One thing is sure: $35 a month ($420/year — $455 year for 52wks) to view the online paper on three devices is ridiculous, not matter how elitist the target group is fantasized to be. You simply don’t charge such an amount in a (US) market where services like Hulu or Netflix cost $7.99 per month. The Times would have been better inspired to go for a simple $15 a month on all devices. Such a price would allow to shoot for a goal of 2 or 3 million digital subscribers worldwide within three years. This would yield $360m-$540m in extra revenue, corresponding to between 5% and 8% of the regular digital readers mentioned above. For a global brand of the NY Times’ stature, such numbers are not unattainable.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

The NY Times: Un-Free At Last!

On March 28th, after much handwringing, the New York Times will finally deploy a paywall. NYT fans, your author included, rejoice: We see this as a necessary condition for the newspaper’s survival. Necessary…but not sufficient. A “small matter of implementation’’ remains an obstacle on the paper’s path to greatness in the digital era. A matter that, so far, doesn’t seem to have received sufficient attention from NYT execs.

Let’s start with a test…and no peeking: How much do you pay for an iTunes “song”?

If you answered “about $1,” you pass. A little less, a little more, the exact number depends on the whims of unseen seers, but, yes, about a dollar. And that reliable debit, give or take a few pennies, feeds an important psychological criterion. You’re free to focus on choosing your music, unencumbered by price considerations.

You’ve graduated to the next level: How much for a New York Times digital subscription?

The pleasant reassurance of a readily available “close enough’’ answer is sorely missing.

See the NYT’s Publisher’s nearly impenetrable calculus in his letter to readers, dip into the lengthy FAQ, and finish with this buggy article in the paper’s otherwise excellent Media & Advertising. You may also want to peruse the 2141 reader comments. By itself, the number gives a temperature reading.

You’ll need an accountant and an attorney to traverse the maze of plans and to decode the fine print in the NYT’s paywall T&Cs, but as I understand them:

  • The first 20 articles in a “calendar month” are free. After that, you’ll be nudged towards a $15 subscription for 4 weeks of Web access.
  • Smartphones? An iPhone, Android, or Blackberry app is included with the $15 deal. For one year of 52 (4 * 13) weeks, you’ll pay 13 * $15 = $195. Yearly subscriptions aren’t offered. But do I have to pay twice if I own both an iPhone and a Moto Droid?There’s no Web-only deal. The basic $15 rate bundles Web and smartphone access.
  • If you have an iPad you’ll pay extra: $20 per 4-week billing cycle = $210 for one year.
  • Other tablets? Not yet.
  • You want access from all of your devices? PC, smartphone, iPad, Times Reader 2.0, the NY Times app from the Chrome Web Store…that’ll be $35 for 4 weeks, $455 for a year.
  • If you’re a paper subscriber, the NYT elders smile upon you: You’ll have access to everything from all your devices with no unseemly display of surcharge. But it depends on the deal you make: new subscriber, renewal, special offer, a conversation with a Customer Retention Specialist… It all sounds like dealing with a cell phone carrier or a cable network provider or an airline. Three well-loved businesses.
  • For e-book readers such as the Kindle and the Nook: Sorry, no access at this time. (Amazon will sell you the NY Times newspaper, but it doesn’t give you access to the site.)
  • What happens if you touch a page through a search engine, through your friend’s Facebook wall or Twitter tweet, through a link on someone’s blog? Free…unless it’s not. Some visits fall within the 20 articles/month rule; others, such as through Google links, will have a 5 free articles-a-day limit. One can see what an enterprising geek could make of this. How does the NYT know it’s you coming back for one more hit of their good stuff? They do it through cookies. $195/year is a good incentive for a little bit of “cookie management” and IP address spoofing.

I might have misrepresented a clause or two, but the overwhelming truth remains: This is a failure of the Mind more than a failure of the brains. The NYT decision makers are without a doubt exceedingly intelligent and hardworking. But are they steeped in the Web’s culture, in the smartphone/tablet revolution?

Customers don’t make decisions with their neocortex, an organ that is too easy to bullshit. They decide within deeper, comforting recesses, and they rationalize when the culture demands a seemingly logical, socially acceptable “post-planation”.

What price do NYT’s execs put on simplicity, on ease, on reader enjoyment vs. catering to their own internal discourse? If they don’t like talking to Steve Jobs (and vice versa) they could turn to Jeff Bezos for tips on simplicity.

iTunes has taught us that customers are willing to pay for content if the process is simple, if it’s easy on the mind and the wallet. One could argue that consumers aren’t paying for the content, they’re paying for the delivery service.  Regard Netflix on Demand, to use another example. Restricted content, instant delivery, success.

All of this is well known, analyzed, taught in business schools. The brains at the NYT should know all of this.

Instead of the cellular plan language above, the Grey Lady could proudly offer the following:

  • A 4-week subscription costs $15. It works across any combination of the following devices: [list here. more devices as we go].
  • Paper subscribers…thank-you, and you’re welcome to our digital content on all supported devices, gratis.
  • Not a subscriber? Not a problem. You can “touch” 20 articles a month for free, regardless of the source.
  • We know there will be “enterprising” individuals who will try to circumvent our paywall, and we understand the seduction. We’ll stick to positive countermeasures: we’ll protect our content by offering superior apps that deliver superior joy of use.

So…why doesn’t she?

We know readers will pay for content. Consumer Reports and The Wall Street Journal prove it, but with an important difference: They’ve always charged for their content so they’ve never had to face readers’ withdrawal symptoms.

Or perhaps I missed an essential cog in the NYT money pump. Looking back to the 5 articles per day limit when coming through Google, vs. 20 per month by other means, including links on the NYT main page…I smell a deal. Is money flowing from Mountain View to Manhattan despite the Lady’s rage against aggregators such as Google News (while never cutting them off)? Does Google subsidize 5 daily articles by kicking back a fraction of its advertising revenue to the NYT?

From an advertiser’s perspective, this becomes a dubious proposition. Ostensibly, the paywall strengthens the NYT’s pitch to advertisers: You know we have a “bankable” audience; our readers are willing to buy in. The first 20 articles a month are free. They’ll get hooked. But (the advertisers respond) if anyone can have 140 free articles a month through Google…doesn’t this weaken your “select audience” argument?

Advertising dollars aside, business model transitions are hard, some say impossible. As my compadre Frédéric has shown many times in previous Monday Notes such as this one, the ARPU falls dramatically when moving from paper to pixels pushed around the Internet.

The transition conundrum is this: The Internet is killing paper and Web advertising won’t keep a newspaper afloat, hence the recourse to a paywall after years of free access. This might explain the Grey Lady’s unseemly contortions.

JLG@mondaynote.com

The news flow: Dealing with the fire hose

In the Seventies, Peter Herford, CBS bureau chief in Saigon, used to send his stories the physical way: rolls of 16 mm film, usually shot with an Eclair (a French camera) and sound tapes (recorded on a Swiss Nagra recorder, a jewel of those analog times) were shipped to HongKong, courtesy the US Air Force, and then transfered to a regular US-bound flight, with a stop in Hawaii or Okinawa. “The CBS Evening News was hosted by Walter Cronkite who wanted half of its newscast filled with Vietnam stories”, Herford told me. Hence the daily routine. But once the stories were sent, Herford and his staff had time for reflexion, for working their sources and for thinking about the next stories. No satellite link, no cell phones. “Today, I would be stuck doing live reports all the time.” Hereford is in no way nostalgic about this totally analog era. As he was in Paris for a conference, a couple weeks ago, he was constantly taking pictures with a professional Canon camera. Today, he teaches journalism at the Shantou University in China and still exudes unabated enthusiasm for journalism.

Walter Cronkite in Vietnam (Feb. 1968) -- National Archives

Walter Cronkite in Vietnam (Feb. 1968) -- National Archives

Revisited with today’s journalistic tools, coverage of the Vietnam war would be different, in many ways. Live would be de rigueur.  Think about it. We would have had:
- a TV correspondent doing a standup (or rather a duck-down) right in the midst of the Khe-Sanh siege
- the Tet offensive twittered or live-blogged
- a retired general bashing the “delicate” tactics of carpet-bombing on his blog
- a heavily linked-to chemist-blogger, for his expert depiction of the horrendous effects of Agent Orange, a defoliant spread for ten years over the jungle (400,000 deaths, 500,000 birth defects). We can be sure it would have triggered a national outrage in the US, forcing the Kennedy/Johnson administration to stop
- the My Lay Massacre inevitably leaked, thanks to a disgusted soldier posting a video on YouTube soon after the the fateful day of March 16, 1968. Instead, we had to wait 18 months for a reporter for the Saint-Louis Post Dispatch to break the story; his name was Seymour Hersh, he was to become an iconic investigative reporter, bound to reveal the 2004 Abu Ghraib abuses in Iraq;
- for good measure, North Vietnamese bloggers would give the world a different perspective on the war as, on the other side, US soldiers-bloggers would have lifted the veil on the low morale, drug abuses among the troops, and their acceptance of inevitable defeat;
- in the end, the April 30th, 1975 evacuation of Saigon would have been reported live using citizens and evacuees cell phones and twitters. More