wash post

Memo #3 to Jeff — Data & User Profiling for The Washington Post

 

For customer-related technologies, the financial and intellectual backing of Jeff Bezos, and his Amazon experience can give The Post a huge competitive advantage. Here is what should be at the top of the to-do list. 

Every digital manager must plan to tap into Amazon’s fantastic engineering firepower. (Even though Bezos bought the newspaper out of his own pocket, the first thing he’ll do — if he hasn’t already — will be drafting some of his techies as “advisors” to The Post.) The key point being: the influx of engineering brainpower must not be limited to the digital side of the house, or to the newspaper’s IT infrastructure. It should impact all activities: editorial, marketing, subscriptions and paid-for products. Let’s dive into details.

Turbo-boosting the editorial. Let’s start with the basics: What characterizes media outlets playing in The Washington Post’s league? It is their ability to line up top journalistic resources to cover stories that matter, in-depth, with multiple angles and treatment modes (text, features stories, photographs, graphics, multimedia storytelling, live blogging, opinions, etc.), while deploying the best expertise on topics covered. These are the five items that make the difference between the bulk of pure players and true legacy media.

In many ways, the above is anti-economic, it is loaded with inherent inefficiencies — dry holes, dead ends, waste of time on promising leads —  that drive nuts “quant zealots” obsessed with KPI’s and productivity measurements. At this point, the difference between great newsroom managers (i.e. editors) and average ones lies in their ability to make some room for “managed inefficiencies”. An editor’s key, delicate duty is weighing the purpose of resource-intensive tasks such as flummoxing the competition, pursuing a worthy story, or launching a months-long journalistic project aimed at a Pulitzer prize. Unfortunately, weak leadership, balking at tough choices and yielding instead to a sorry attempt to spread an even level of (dis)satisfaction among constituencies causes inefficiencies to grow like weed.

The foremost goal of technology-enhanced news content is smartly weaving together all components of a topic. The idea is to keep the reader aboard by encouraging multiple levels of reading, with different angles for a subject, calls to essential archives or to other forms of journalism such as blogs or infographics. In this field, Amazon is light-years ahead of the news industry. By raising the number of editorial treatments seen by the reader, almost twenty years of Amazon’s e-commerce recommendation engine refinements will undoubtedly benefit The Post.

Another key item will be the level of news personalization. What should a Post reader see mostly? News that matters to him or her, or everything the paper’s staff collects? How to define mostly? Fully tailored contents based on past navigation? Stated preferences combined with the preserved serendipity that together make the core of news construction? This is a deeply involved problem — and the subject of a future Monday Note.

Reader profiling. All digital publishers dream of knowing exactly what reader sees what content, where, at what time of the day and on which vector: web, smartphone, tablet. The finer the granularity, the better. Slicing and dicing readership in segments of age, professions, residence, income, interests yields three types of uses:

  • increasing news content stickiness by serving customized content as mentioned earlier
  • smarter customized advertising, as opposed to dumbly drowning users into a flood of ads for months by using data collected during the shopping season. This practice, known as “retargeting”, is one of the internet “seven plagues” and the most potent repellent to advertising
  • channelling the reader to the catalogue of ancillary products any news outlet should operate. For example: once a reader is identified (even anonymously) as working in the legal field, for a media group struggling to fill the last seats of its conference on privacy laws, why not show this loyal reader a one-time only, 50% discounted ticket, valid for 24 hours only? Simplistic as this example might seem, its large scale application is far from trivial: it requires super-accurate analytics, the deployment of “event engines” that will trigger the display of the right offer, at the right time, to the right segment of the population. Fortunately, this is the kind of work Amazon geeks are particularly good at.

For The Washington Post, the benefits are numerous. Research shows that serving the right ad to the right profile can raise its value by a factor of 1.5x to 2x. And the performance of ancillary products (conferences, business events, news-related ebooks or professional products, education packages, etc.) will become easier to measure.

Impact on paywall and subscription models. Paywall theory can be summarized as follows:

  • deploying a wide range of tactics all aimed at significantly raising the number of news contents items (not necessarily articles) a reader watches every month. Let’s make no mistakes: the main dial is under the newsroom’s control, marketing wizardry won’t do the trick
  • finding readers most likely to convert to a paid-for subscription and, week after week, serving them (I write serving, not bombarding) offers they can’t refuse: an extended test-period, or a news-related bonus that reflects the breadth of the company’s line of products.

As with most theories, practice is much harder. A paid-for system is a long-term, investment-intensive, staffing-critical effort. Two legacy media did it particularly well: The Financial Times and The New York Times. The former built a subscription base that now surpasses the paper’s; the latter added $100m a year in revenue that did not exist three years ago. Most paywall strategies underperform for two reasons: first, an error in predicting the editorial contents’ ability to retain readers beyond a free threshold of 10, 15, or 20 stories a month; second, a failure to build the data-driven infrastructure that is mandatory for any paid-for product. The Washington Post does relatively well with the first test. For the second, the backing of Amazon tech brains will give it the best chances to succeed.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

Memo #2 to Jeff Bezos: Let’s talk about news products and design

 

Should the new owner of The Washington Post dump the print edition? What should its digital online strategy and tactics look like, both in terms of contents and platforms? 

The questions stated above might not fall into Jeff Bezos areas of sharpest expertise. But there is no shortage of smart people within The Washington Post — at least a core group eager to seize their new owner’s “keep experimenting” motto and run with it.

What can he do? For today, let’s focus on editorial products.

#1. The printed newspaper. Should The Washington Post dump its print product altogether? The short answer is no. At least not yet and not completely. Scores of digital zealots, usually with a razor-thin media culture, will push for the ultimate sacrifice. But in every market — Washington, London, Paris — there still exists a solid base of highly solvent readers that will pay a premium for the print product. This very group carries two precious features for newspaper economics: One, they are willing to pay almost any price to have their precious paper delivered every day. For a proof of that statement, see how quality papers repeatedly hiked prices in recent years, $2 or €2 is no longer a psychological threshold. Hefty street prices helped many to offset the decline of advertising revenues. Keeping the printing presses running offers a second advantage, the ads themselves: They gave lost ground, but the remaining print ads still bring 10 or 15 times more money per reader than digital versions — which is, let’s be honest, a complete economic failure of digital news products.

How long will it last? I’d say around five years. It actually depends of the evolution of the print product. Look at this weekend paper’s layout:

wapo pages

Is there anyone at The Washington Post who seriously believes this paleolithic visual will help retain readers?

Bezos should bring in a team of modern art directors from abroad. One such example is Innovation Media Consulting, an organization that works in many countries and has a great track record (I know one of Innovation’s partners well, Juan Señor, but I have no interest whatsoever in the firm.) Visually, the Post should consider a new layout (the Berliner format is a much better fit for tomorrow’s print than the old broadsheet). Also, to get a much-needed glimpse on what’s going on outside the Beltway, management should use their Amazon account to buy copies of the excellent Best Newspapers Design compilation.

Regarding the national vs. local/regional question, to me, the debate is settled: There is no point at having a physical daily newspaper with a national reach, period. (This could change if, one day, the Post is down to just one thick weekend edition.) Last August, in a remote trading post of Northern New Mexico, I found a fresh copy of the New York Times, most likely printed in Denver or Santa Fe, four hours truck drive from where I was (just have a look at this Google Map featuring the NYT printing plants locations to see my point). National + global scope belongs to digital.

#2. Digital products. The plural is important because, for a news company such as the Post, no single focus will do. At least three avenues ought to be considered: Web, mobile and tablets. (For the moment, we’ll put the Web aside, where The Post is doing great.)

For all publishers, mobile is way more tricky than initially imagined: as long as we can’t integrate content subscription in cell carrier billing, it will be difficult to have people pay for it — except if we consider some kind of in-app purchase for specialized contents. As for advertising on mobile, it now grows in “spectacular” fashion — going from the infinitesimal to insignificant. Furthermore, when comparing their product line to pure players such as Circa, we see how legacy media experienced difficulties in catching the mobile wave (see a previous Monday Note) or Pocket. The Post better work in that direction.

Tablets promise much better monetization. For this, assess the rate of iPad ownership among the Post’s readers (I bet it must be around 60%). Unfortunately, in the old press, the current rationale calls for flavors of print replicas, usually based on a PDF. As I’m writing this paragraph, I’m trying to download this morning’s Sunday edition of the Post for their iPad app; I’m stuck at about 20% of the download. (I certainly won’t ridicule the Post’s occasional glitches since it still occurs too often at my own paper– and I’m the one responsible…)

Why are digital publishers like us still struggling with this? It’s because we are stuck with a technology — namely PDF — that wasn’t designed for low download times, nor for interaction with the user, enhanced contents, social sharing, etc. Plus, many of us can’t depart form the idea that readers need to find on our apps the exact page look and feel, column structure and general layout of the print version. That assertion becomes less and less valid as the number of online readers keeps growing. That audience can become several orders of magnitude larger than the print edition’s readership: Simply consider that the NYT has 50 million people who are in contact with its online version one way another (including the very long tail), that’s more than fifty times it’s print circulation on any weekday.

Granted, a news product must have a visual identity, recognizable in every possible form, but that certainly doesn’t mean sticking to a 1993 technology with guys like us trying to keep outdated stuff alive, like a Havana car repairman nostalgically tinkering with a 1956 Chevrolet Bel Air

Jeff Bezos must keep one important things in mind: The modernization of print media has always been driven by the magazine industry, not by newspapers: From graphic design, to marketing, to advertising, weeklies and monthlies have lead innovation for decades. Now, as their print vector is dying, many of them tend to innovate on digital. They’re not doing it equally well, of course: a large group such as Condé Nast is pathetically backward — most of its titles offer only ultra-basic and unstable apps — but many publications (Fast Company, Business Week) made the leap forward with digital magazines really designed for the tablets. Even the NYT is about to launch a digital magazine for tablets that will feature great productions such as the Pulitzer Prize winning Snow Fall. So will ProPublica, I’m told.

fastco app

The Post should get rid of the cumbersome PDF legacy and switch to a full blown e-newspaper for iPad, generic Android tablets and Kindle Fire. There is no shortage of inspirational works available in the AppStore and in Apple Newsstand: Longform for the curation (my favorite weekend readings), The Magazine, TNW and more, all filled with interesting ideas or features…

To further stimulate innovation Jeff Bezos should call in firms able to genuinely think outside of the box such as Ideo or smaller shops who design great selling apps like Caroline+Young (the dataviz app mem:o), the people who did the sketching app Paper53… Personally, I’d even go as far as picking up the brain of great architects like Norman Foster, Rem Koolhas or workspace specialists NBBJ who have been commissioned to build Amazon new headquarters… It would be the most enthralling experiment to mix such great and diverse design talent pool with the Post’s journalistic excellence…

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

Memo #1 to Jeff Bezos: Try Washington Post Prime

 

We can be sure Jeff Bezos will try many things with the Washington Post. One could be drawing inspiration from Amazon’s fabulously successful Prime service. (First article in a series) 

Changes at The Washington Post’s will be the most watched media story of the coming months and, perhaps, years. Why? First of all, with the iconic Watergate saga, The Post epitomized a historic high in print journalism. The episode combined the fierce independence of a great media company, the courage of two people — namely Katherine Graham, the paper’s proprietor, and editor-in-chief Ben Bradlee — who together bet on the tenacity and energy of two young reporters, Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein. For my generation, these times are part of the mystique of great journalism.

wpost_watergate
The grand old days (credit: Washington Post, Watergate Files)

Second, The Washington Post was sold (for cheap, only $250M) because it faced a certain death. Its weekday circulation fell by 60% since 2003 (still 472,000 copies today), and the advertising-loaded Sunday issue lost more than half of its audience (more details in Alan Mutter’s coverage). As for digital advertising, The Post has been unable to compensate for the in print advertising hemorrhage, gaining only $1 in digital while at the same time the print ads were losing $16 — similar to everyone else in the business.

Like most of its peers, The Post was far too slow in its shift to digital journalism, leaving an open field to new, more agile ventures such as Politico, a pure digital player that even managed to snare talent form the historic newsroom. Eventually, management got around to adjust all dials in the best possible manner (see a previous Monday Note on the subject) — alas without inverting the trend.

But the main reasons to watch Bezos’ next moves remain his appetite and proven ability to reinvent aging business models. He did so with the retail business, energized by two of the celebrated obsessions that became religion in his company: maximum efficiency applied down to the minutest of details, and an unprecedented care for the customer.

Can these two ingredients apply to the  news business?

As for customer care, in general, the press has a long way to go. As both a heavy consumer (my many digital subscriptions) and a long time media professional, I can offer many sorry testimonials to the media industry’s backward customer service. From order fulfillment (weeks in some cases) to client-support, media lies at the polar opposite of the digital industry, especially Amazon. From day one, I’ve been a paid subscriber to the Wall Street Journal and an Amazon customer. After gross overcharges for my subscriptions to the Journal, its customer service repeatedly failed to even to grant me an explanation. I finally gave up: As soon as my subscription is over, I’ll walk. Fortune Magazine has been landing in my physical mailbox for many years; sadly, it is apparently unable to provide the codes required to enjoy my subscription on Apple’s Newsstand. Again, I gave up. Another example outside the news sector: Canal+, one of the largest paid-for TV network in the world (I’m not a customer): according to several customers and two consultants I spoke with, the network’s main strategy to retain subscribers is the use every possible trick to prevent them for terminating their subscription. “Even death might not be enough to exit the service”, joked a media professional…

If Amazon had behaved like that, it would have never become the retail behemoth it is today. It started in 1995 with no credibility — actually, it even had a negative image stemming from the suspicion surrounding online shopping at the time. Like others, Amazon had to build its reputation one customer at a time. I was an early adopter and, today, my reliance on Amazon keeps growing steadily (there were a few glitches along the way, quickly fixed.)

Why mention customer service? Evidently not by reason of the need to take good care of a digital or print subscriber — that should be the bare minimum. But because a media outlet such as the Post will eventually sell many other products and services beyond news; therefore, instilling a strong customer service mentality will be a prerequisite to expanding its business into other areas. Also, the move to digital raises the customer care standards bar. More for the Post than for any other media company, customers will use Amazon services as the benchmark of quality.

My bet is Jeff Bezos will use lessons from Amazon’s Prime service. For Monday Note readers outside the United States, Amazon Prime is a special service from which, for an annual fee of $79 (€60), you get free two-days shipping, free video streaming and the right to borrow Kindle titles in a catalog of 350,000 (I can hear writers and bookstore owners faint…) The least we can say is that it worked: more than 10m people joined the Prime program (including a couple of friends of mine who quickly dumped their cable subscription — call it collateral damage…) And that’s just the beginning: Amazon expects to reach 25m Prime customers by 2017. Even more interesting: when you cough up eighty bucks a year to use the service, you also tend to buy more, that’s the juiciest psychological facet of the Prime program. See how it works for the famous tech writer Farhad Manjoo (who wrote an interesting piece in Slate If Anyone Can Save theWashington Post, It’s Jeff Bezos

 I was recently looking back at my Amazon order history. Before 2006, the year I first signed up for Prime, I placed less than 10 orders per year at the site. Prime completely changed my shopping habits. In my first year with the service, I placed 46 orders. This year my household is on track to quadruple that.

These macro level numbers confirm the success: the Amazon Prime customer spends much more than a regular one: $1224 (€930) vs. $524 (€400) per year. Furthermore, Prime accounts for one third of Amazon’profits (see a detailed story by FastCompany on the matter). In short, an immense product line, served by a near-perfect execution (an Amazon order is shipped about 2.5 hours after you clicked the “Place your  order” button), augmented by a psychological incentive smelling of free, fast and convenient all conspire to generate both high ARPU and loyalty — two outcomes newspapers economics are starving for. How can such reasoning apply to our industry? Can the antique “bundling” systems benefit from it and, as an example, open the way to new super-subscriptions? What tools can Jeff Bezos leverage to pull this off?

We’ll explore answers in further columns.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com

Culture War: Jeff Bezos and The Washington Post

 

by Jean-Louis Gassée

After predicting the death of newspapers, that was last year, Jeff Bezos, the Amazon founder, now buys himself the The Washington Post. Necrophilia or the beginning of another spectacular transformation of an old genre?

A successful business man reaches the dangerous age of 50, looks at his fortune and makes a decision: He’s going to plough a few of his millions into a restaurant. In the past 25 years, he’s been to many of the best dining places around the world. Power lunches, closing dinners, gastronomy road trips with the family, he’s done it all.

He knows restaurants.

But he keeps failing. He fires the chef, changes suppliers, hires a new dining room manager, looks for a classier sommelier, fights city inspectors, calls on his acquaintances and asks them to bring their celebrity friends… nothing works.

He was blinded by his command of his true calling: being a customer. He saw the show from a comfortable box seat and only went backstage when invited by a knowing proprietor eager to glad-hand a moneyed patron. Our gastronome failed to see he knew very little about being a restaurateur, the intricacies, the people challenges (theft, drugs and sex), the politics that are involved in running a real restaurant.

(During my psychosocial moratorium, before I joined the high-tech industry in 1968, I worked in a bar, a food-serving strip-joint, and a restaurant. I thought these places were deranged. Decades later, I read Anthony Bourdain’s Kitchen Confidential and realized the “people challenges” I witnessed aren’t so unusual after all. Enjoy the book and think about the goings-on back there next time a maitre d’ looks down his aquiline nose at you.)

Failed restaurants are common in Silicon Valley, with its crowd of affluent and well-traveled business people who think they can master the trade. A few of them subsidize the great dinners we get to enjoy — for a while. They have our fleeting gratitude and end up with a painfully depleted bank account.

Is this a valid parable for Jeff Bezos plowing $250M (so far) into The Washington Post? To start, the price paid for the DC “paper of record” amounts to less than 1% of the Amazon founder’s fortune. Even if he has to double or triple his initial investment while he turns the paper around, it won’t trouble Bezos’ pocketbook much — he can eminently afford the bet.

And, unlike our failed restaurateur, I don’t think Bezos’ purchase was made in a mid-life fit of vanity. (Although see this delicious piece of Internet satire that contends he bought the paper as a result of a mistaken click.) Read Bezos’ Wikipedia bio, or his letters to shareholders… you’ll see he’s a deep-thinking geek (now a term of respect. The Urban Dictionary updates the meaning: people you pick on in high school and wind up working for as an adult). He’s justifiably famous for taking the very long view, and he’s quotably willing to be “misunderstood” for a long time.

But can he win?

Personally, I hope so. I used to love newspapers, I remember how much I enjoyed breakfast with two local and two national papers, all delivered to my doorstep, an unimaginable luxury in France.

Once upon a time, for their advertising revenue, newpapers enjoyed an oligopoly. With three or four dailies in each market, prices were contained. And we, the readers, certainly didn’t mind that advertisers paid 75% of the cost of our daily fix.

Then, the Internet that Bezos has ridden so well intervened and newspapers lost the news race. The Internet won on velocity and, too often, on relevance. In a Fortune Tech piece offering “5 hacks for Jeff Bezos“, Ryan Holmes, CEO of Social Media Management company HootSuite, points to the speed and tone of social media as sources of fixes for the Post:

Perhaps the greatest criticism of newspapers today is that they have lost relevance to their own readers. Writing on the decline of the Post, New York Times media columnist David Carr points out that “[the] days when people snapped open the daily paper to find out the things they should care about were long past …” Big newspapers, in particular, have proven startlingly inept at delivering timely, relevant news to the people they serve. So, naturally, readers have gone elsewhere, to myriad online sources that better cater to their interests.

Since the Net offered a seemingly unconstrained amount of billboard space, the price that newspapers could charge for ads was quickly cut by a factor of ten and, more recently, sixteen.

But it wasn’t just the emergence of the Internet as a news medium that dealt newspapers a near fatal blow. They also lost the race because of internal, cultural circumstances.

In another case of the Incumbent’s Curse, newspapers looked down on the Internet and those annoying high-tech people and things.  Kara Swisher, co-head of AllThingsD (a Wall Street Journal enterprise), recounts her trouble with the old, arrogant culture at the Post in her Dear Jeff Bezos, Here’s What I Saw as an Analog Nobody in the Mailroom of the Washington Post letter:

“It happened every day — other reporters playfully mocking me for using email so much or for borrowing the Post’s few suitcase cellphones, or major editors telling me that the Internet was like the CB-radio fad, or sales people insisting that the good times would never end for newspapers as long as there were local businesses that needed to reach consumers. (In truth, they still do, but that’s another letter.)”

Sadly, the Post’s cultural reluctance isn’t unique. In another country, two prominent dailies I know exhibit very similar symptoms, print journalists who actively despise or even obstruct the Internet side of their house.

Much has been written about Jeff Bezos’ personal (not Amazon’s) purchase of the Post. For example: Good Luck With That – Pew Research Graphs Bezos’ Stunning Challenge, where Tom Foremski steps us through the Post’s business challenges, starting with the inexorable decline in Print revenues:

Post Revenue Decline

Another comment well worth reading, Stop the Presses: A New Media Baron Appears, comes to us courtesy of Michael Moritz, a.k.a. Sir Michael, a journalist who went over to the Dark Side and is now Chairman of Sequoia Capital, a leading venture firm. The article reminds us of Bezos’ foremost preoccupation with customers [emphasis mine]:

“It won’t come as a surprise that Bezos explains that pleasing, if not thrilling, customers is Amazon’s most important task. In his 2009 letter he provided a peek into the internals of Amazon explaining that of the company’s 452 detailed goals for the ensuing year 360 had an impact on the customer, the word ‘revenue’ was used just eight times, ‘free cash flow’ only four times and ‘net income’, ‘gross profit’, ‘margin’ and operating profit were not mentioned. Even though there is no line item on any financial statement for the intangible value associated with the trust of customers this is, by far and away, Amazon’s most important asset.

Elsewhere, Moritz reminds us of another source of Amazon’s prosperity, Free Cash-Flow, a frequent topic in Bezos’ letters to shareholders:

“Since inception Amazon has generated $20.2 billion from operations almost half of which ($8.6 B), has been used for capital expenditures such as new distribution centers, which improve life for the customer.”

With this and more in mind, we now turn to the letter Bezos wrote to employees at the newspaper. While he professes no desire to “be leading The Washington Post day-to-day”, he nonetheless makes no mystery of his goal to be an agent of change, of modernization, of adapting to the Internet Age:

“There will, of course, be change at The Post over the coming years. That’s essential and would have happened with or without new ownership. The Internet is transforming almost every element of the news business: shortening news cycles, eroding long-reliable revenue sources, and enabling new kinds of competition, some of which bear little or no news-gathering costs. There is no map, and charting a path ahead will not be easy. We will need to invent, which means we will need to experiment. Our touchstone will be readers, understanding what they care about – government, local leaders, restaurant openings, scout troops, businesses, charities, governors, sports – and working backwards from there. I’m excited and optimistic about the opportunity for invention.”

This comes from a man who, last year, said ‘People Won’t Pay For News On The Web, Print Will Be Dead In 20 Years‘.

Changing business models as a publicly traded company is impossible in practice. The old model dies faster than the new one kicks in and Wall Street runs away from the transition’s “earnings trough”. By buying the Washington Post, Bezos is afforded a privacy that the old public ownership structure doesn’t permit. (That’s exactly why Michael Dell wants to take his own company private, so he can perform surgery behind the curtains.)

Which leaves the new owner with his biggest challenge: Understanding and changing the culture at the old “paper” — which sounds harder and more expensive than a gastronome trying to become a restaurateur.

There will be blood.

This is no reflection on Bezos’ truly amazing diversity and depth of skills, but a sincere concern borne of Culture’s ability to devour anything that stands in its way, sometimes silently until it’s too late. As the saying goes, Culture Eats Strategy for Breakfast.

Of course, we have examples of people performing seemingly impossible feats. Steve Jobs’ Apple 2.0 comes to mind, a turnaround of monumental proportions to which Bezos’ Amazon achievements could be fairly compared. So, why couldn’t Bezos build a WaPo 2.0?

As Aaron Levie, the founding CEO of Box, tweeted last week:

“Industries are transformed by outsiders who think anything is possible, not insiders who think they already know what is impossible.”

One more thing, a thought I can’t suppress: Unlike Steve Jobs, who gained insight from his tribulations and then spread the benefits on the largest of scales, Bezos hasn’t been burned and tempered by failure.

JLG@mondaynote.com

 

Two strategies: The Washington Post vs. The NYT

 

Both are great American newspapers, both suffer from the advertising slump and from the transition to digital. But the New York Times’ paywall strategy is making a huge difference. 

The Washington Post’s financials provide a good glance at the current status of legacy media struggling with the shift to digital. Unlike others large dailies, the components of the Post’s P&L clearly appear in its statements, they are not buried under layers of other activities. Product-wise, the Post remains a great news machine, collecting Pulitzer Prizes with clockwork regularity and fighting hard for scoops. The Post also epitomizes an old media under siege from specialized, more agile outlets such as Politico, ones that break down the once-unified coverage provided by traditional large media houses. In an interview to the New York Times last year, Robert G. Kaiser, a former editor who had been with the paper since 1963, said this:

“When I was managing editor of The Washington Post, everything we did was better than anyone in the business,” he said. “We had the best weather, the best comics, the best news report, the fullest news report. Today, there’s a competitor who does every element of what we do, and many of them do it better. We’ve lost our edge in some very profound and fundamental ways.”

The iconic newspaper has been slow to adapt to the digital era. Its transformation really started around 2008. Since then, it has checked all the required boxes: integration of print and digital productions; editors are now involved on both sides of the news production and all relentlessly push the newsroom to write more for the digital version; many blogs covering a wide array of topics have been launched; and the Post now has a good mobile application. The “quant” culture also set in, with editors now taking into account all the usual metrics and ratios associated with digital operations, including a live update of Google’s most relevant keywords prominently displayed in the newsroom. All this helped the Post collect 25.6 million unique visitors per month, vs. 4 to 5 million for Politico, and 35 million for the New York Times that historically enjoys a more global audience.

Overall, the Washington Post Company still relies heavily on its education business, as show in the table below :

 Revenue:.......$4.0bn (-3% vs. 2011)
 Education:.....$2.2bn (-9%)
 Cable TV:......$0.8bn (+4%)
 Newspaper:.....$0.6bn (-7%)
 Broadcast TV:..$0.4bn (+25%)

But the education business no is longer the cash cow it used to be. Not only did its revenue decrease but, last year, it lost $105m vs. a $96m profit in 2011. As for the newspaper operation, it widened its losses to $53m in 2012 from $21m in 2011. And the trend worsens: for the first quarter of 2013, the newspaper division’s revenue decreased by 4% vs. a year ago and it lost $34m vs. $21m for Q1 2011.

Now, let’s move to a longer-term perspective. The chart below sums up the Post’s (and others legacy media’s) problem:

Translated into a table:

                  Q1-2007   Q1-2013  Change %
 Revenue (All):....$219m.....$127m.....-42%
 Print Ad:.........$125m.....$49m......-61%
 Digital Ad:.......$25m......$26m......+4%

A huge depletion in print advertising, a flat line (at best) for digital advertising, the elements sum up the equation faced by traditional newspapers going from print to online.

Now, let’s look at the circulation side using a comparison with the New York Times. (Note that it’s not possible to extract the same figures for advertising from the NYT Co.’s financial statements because they aggregate too many items.) The chart below shows the evolution of the paid circulation for the Post between 2007 and 2013:

..and for the NY Times:

Call it the paywall effect: The New York Times now aggregates both print and digital circulations. The latter now amounts to 676,000 digital subscribers that have been recruited using the NYT’s metered system (see previous Monday Notes under the “paywall” tag). (Altogether, digital subscribers to the NYT, the International Herald and the Boston Globe now number 708,000). It seems the NYT found the right formula: its digital subscribers portfolio grows at a 45% per year rate, thanks to a combination of sophisticated marketing, mining customer data and aggressive pricing (it even pushes special deals for Mother’s Day.) All this adds to the bottom line: if each digital sub brings $12 a month, the result is about $100m that didn’t exist two years ago. But it does not benefit the advertising side as it continues to suffer. For the first quarter of 2013 vs. the same period last year, the NYT Company lost 13% in print ads revenue and 4% for digital ads. (As usual in their earning calls, NYT officials mention the deflationary effects of ad exchanges as one cause of erosion in digital ads.)

One additional sign that digital advertising will remain in the doldrums: Politico, too, is exploring alternatives; it will be testing a paywall in a sample of six states and for its readers outside the United States. The system will be comparable to the NYT.com or the FT.com, with a fixed number of articles available for free (see Politico’s management internal memo.)

It is increasingly clear that readers are more willing than we once thought to pay for content they value and enjoy. With more than 300 media companies now charging for online content in the U.S., the notion of paying to read expensive-to-produce journalism is no longer that exotic for sophisticated consumers.

frederic.filloux@mondaynote.com